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THE RULE OF REASON
II
TBE first section of this article" argued that the uncertainty and
inconsistency which patently afflict the law concerning price fixing and
market division are attributable to the twofold failure of Sherman
Act courts to be clear about the ultimate values the law implements
and to develop a realistic analysis of the economic phenomena with
which the law is required to deal.
The main tradition of the Sherman Act's rule of reason---established
by Justice Peckham, Judge Taft, and Chief Justice White in 1911-
necessarily rests, whether phrased in such terms or not, upon the
premise that the law's exclusive concern is with the maximization of
wealth or consumer want satisfaction. Though this premise is not
the only one upon which social legislation may be based, it is implicit-
and sometimes explicit-in the key decisions which established the
main tradition of the rule of reason, and it is, moreover, the only
premise capable of producing rational decisional law under the Sher-
man Act as now written. Acceptance of consumer want satisfaction
as the law's ultimate value requires the courts to employ as their
primary criterion the impact of any agreement upon output, and
thus to determine whether the net effect of the agreement is to create
efficiency, and thereby increase output or, alternatively, to restrict
output.2 This common acceptance of the wealth-maximization premise
and its inherent standards of judgment explains why the interpreta-
tions given the Sherman Act by Peckham, Taft and White, despite their
widely differing phrasings, were so similar in result, and why each
1. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Marhet Dii-
sion 1, 74 YAI. UJ. 775 (1965).
2. Peckham, Taft, and White all displayed concern that the law not destroy efficient
forms of combination but that it strike down combinations whose sole effect was the elim-
ination of competition. Id. at 783-805, 829-32. White most explicitly defined the evil to be
avoided as restriction of output because his version of the common law, which he incor-
porated into the Act, viewed the evils of monopoly as: (1) the power to fx price; (2) the
power to limit production; and (3) the danger of deterioration in quality. Id. at 802.
These evils are each reducible to restriction of output. The second-limitation of produc-
tion-is obviously that. The first-the power to fix prices-can be wielded only by re-
stricting output. The third-deterioration in quality-is merely a restriction of output
accomplished by putting less into each item produced rather than making fewer items.
The net effect of the two opposing tendencies--efficiency and restriction of ouput-
determines whether the questioned agreement is efficient in the larger sense of allocating
resources to maximize consumer want satisfaction. In order to avoid confusion, the nar-
rower meaning of efficiency will be used throughout this article. The broader meaning
will be indicated by such phrases as consumer want satisfaction, wealth maximization, etc.
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assigned a prominent place within the rule of reason to a category of
agreements illegal per se.
The primary deviant tradition of the rule of reason-originally
espoused by Justice White in 1897 and in 1918 by Justice Brandeis-
rejects consumer welfare as the sole value of the law and admits com-
peting considerations, most notably, perhaps, concern for small pro-
ducers. The criteria required by the simultaneous use of wholly
inconsistent values are necessarily either arbitrary or indefinable.
Probably because this deviant strain has never become dominant, the
criteria of the Brandeis tradition have in fact remained rather vague.
They seem reducible, however, to the idea, early rejected by the judges
of the main tradition, that a cartel should be judged by the "reason-
ableness" of the price it fixes. White's 1897 Trans-Missouri dissent is
thus to be equated with Brandeis' reading of the Act in the 1918 Chi-
cago Board of Trade opinion. The introduction of values incompatible
with consumer welfare, values that could, in fact, be furthered by cartel
agreements at the expense of consumers, was the reason that neither
White (in 1897) nor Brandeis (in 1918) gave a prominent, or perhaps
any, role to the per se concept.
The main tradition, with its insistence upon efficiency and re-
striction of output as the standards of the Sherman Act, is, therefore,
entitled to be preferred not merely as a matter of precedent but also
because of its exclusive ability to achieve those attributes of rationality,
efficacy, tolerable certainty, and the proper demarcation of the respec-
tive functions of legislature and judiciary which are characteristics of
good law.3
Though a proper choice of values is necessary to good law it is not
sufficient. The Sherman Act, which deals with price fixing and market
division in widely varying business contexts, requires a coherent
analytical structure to translate values into conclusions. The Act, how-
ever, has not evolved doctrine adequate to cope with this diversity of
phenomena. Too often the law deals with particular forms of price fix-
ing and market division as isolated and unique topics, neglecting to
locate each within a rational conception of the whole. Perhaps just as
often the law commits the opposite error of failing to make distinctions
corresponding to economic differences, and applies broad formulas to
situations in which they are wholly inappropriate. This second section
of a three-part article attempts to provide a general theory capable of
3. 74 YALE L.J. 775, at 829-47 and particularly at 831-32, 840-47.
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making the law of price fixing and market division internally consistent,
congruent with the law of similar behavior, and effective in serving
consumer welfare.4
ThE RuLE OF REASON: ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS AND THE
PER SE RULE
Much of the Sherman Act's doctrinal chaos is attributable to judicial
and scholarly fondness for impossibly broad statements of the per se
rule. The warmth and security that sweeping, absolutist formulations
offer is likely to prove here, as in other areas of the law, the forerunner
of icy intellectual demise. It is frequently said that any agreement to
eliminate competition is per se illegal,5 but the inescapable fact is that
an agreement which eliminates competition is basic to almost every
productive unit consisting of more than a single person. The agree-
ment may be spelled out or, more often, may be tacit, but, to the degree
that coordination of the productive activities of persons is achieved,
actual or potential competition must be eliminated. Holmes's Northern
Securities dissent demonstrated that an all-embracing rule against the
elimination of competition would require the atomization of society.
Such a rule is inconceivable. 6
The problem is to devise a per se rule which avoids the dilemma
Holmes foresaw not by illogical refusal to apply the rule, but through
4. The third section of this article will attempt to apply the theory to a number of
particular topics (for example, price-fixing and market-division provisions in patent and
know-how licenses) which appear to have created considerable conceptual difficulty.
5. As so used "competition" does not mean the presence in a market of a sufficient
number of sellers to insure competitive behavior but merely a condition of rivalry be-
tween business units. This distinction corresponds to the semantic shift between Peckham
in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic and White in Standard Oil and American Tobacco.
Peckham was able to read the Sherman Act as forbidding every agreement in restraint of
trade by equating that phrase to the elimination of a competitive structure. White was
able to deny that the statute forbade every restraint, without changing Peckham's test,
by equating the term to the elimination of rivalry. In accordance with White's usage,
which has become accepted in the law, references in this article to restrictions or elimi-
nations of competition are to be taken to mean restrictions or eliminations of rivalry.
Similarly, restraint of trade means restraint of rivalry and not restraint of output. A re-
straint of trade becomes "unreasonable" only under those conditions, discussed in the
text, when its primary effect, if it has any effect, is presumed to be a restriction of output.
6. It is thus quite possible that a moderm society should permit all forms of indus-
trial, agricultural, and commercial combination-indeed, a number have approximated
such a policy-but it is utterly inconceivable that anything recognizable as a society
should prohibit all. As Professor Arthur L. Corbin puts it, perhaps understating the case:
"Atomization [of productive units] would be as beneficial as a nuclear explosion." Letter
from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert H. Bork, June 27, 1965.
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the distinctions provided by its own rationale. The solution may be
found by defining the rule in terms of consumer welfare.
The Present Confusion Concerning the Per Se Rule
Failure to define the scope of the per se rule in terms of consumer
welfare may account for the Supreme Court's marked inability, to date,
to describe the contours of the per se rule satisfactorily. Something of
the inadequacy of current definitions may be seen by analyzing the
views of Justice Clark and Justice Douglas in White Motor7 and Penn-
Olin.8 Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in White Motor stated
that lack of economic information made it premature to decide whether
a per se rule should be applied to vertical market-division agreements
by which a manufacturer required its resellers to sell only to customers
located within their respective assigned territories.9 Justice Clark in-
sisted in dissent, however, that "To admit, as does the petitioner, that
competition is eliminated under its contracts is, under our cases, to
admit a violation of the Sherman Act. No justification, no matter how
beneficial, can save it from that interdiction."' 0 It was Justice Clark's
ill fortune to be confronted not long afterward, in Penn-Olin, with a
case involving the suggested application of both amended section 7 of
the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act to the formation of
a joint venture corporation. The government attacked the transaction
on the theory that the formation of the joint venture, set up to make
and sell sodium chlorate in the southeastern United States, eliminated
probable competition between the parent corporations. A majority of
the Court remanded the case for further findings on the section 7 issue.
Justice Clark's opinion for the Court is instructive, however, because
he was faced with the paradoxes of his position in White Motor. Though
these paradoxes are inherent in that position, the fortuitous overlap-
ping of section 1 and section 7 in Penn-Olin laid them bare.
Despite the absence of an explicit agreement to eliminate competi-
tion between the parents or between the parents and their joint sub-
sidiary, Justice Clark necessarily held that section 7 applied. Hie argued,
it would seem correctly, that it was realistic to recognize that neither
parent was likely to enter the market to compete with the joint off-
spring. 1 Given the reality of that assumption, the point could hardly
7. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
8. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). White Motor and
Penn-Olin are also compared in the first section of this article, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 777-80.
9. 372 U.S. at 261.
10. 372 U.S. at 281.
11. 378 U.S. at 168, 173.
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have been decided otherwise. To have required an explicit suppression
of competition would have made section 7 a dead letter in horizontal
merger cases.
In a rather less felicitous argument, however, Justice Clark also sug-
gested that the absence of an explicit agreement not to compete
rendered section 1 of the Sherman Act inapplicable.12 He may have felt
forced to this position because application in Penn-Olin of his sweep-
ing White Motor formula outlawing all contracts that eliminate compe-
tition would have compelled two bizarre conclusions: every horizontal
merger accomplished after 1890 was illegal without regard to market
share; and the original section 7 of the Clayton Act, as well as its 1950
amendment, as they applied to horizontal mergers at least, were either
complete surplusage or dilutions of more stringent Sherman Act
standards.
Though he avoided these absurdities, Justice Clark's solution (of
restricting section 1 to explicit eliminations of competition) is hardly
preferable. The distinction between explicit and implicit eliminations
of competition rests upon no discernible policy, as Justice Clark him-
self persuasively demonstrated when arguing for the application of
section 7 of the Clayton Act to the same transaction. The distinction is,
moreover, a curtailment of section 1 contrary to the language of the
statute.'3 Finally, it is directly opposed by many important Sherman
Act precedents which the Court certainly did not wish to overrule, 14
among them the Lexington Bank case,15 which, in that same term, had
applied section 1 of the Sherman Act to strike down a horizontal merger
despite the absence of any explicit agreement not to compete-in an
opinion subscribed to by Justice Clark.
12. "[R]eaching the merits, we hold that... on the present record there is no violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act.. . ." Id. at 161. The only explanation offered is the Court's
subsequent remark: "There being no proof of specific intent to use Penn-Olin as a
vehicle to eliminate competition nor evidence of collateral restrictive agreements between
the joint venturers, we put those situations to one side." Id. at 176.
13. Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . . ." Sherman
Anti-Trust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). This language
in no way requires that the parties to a contract, combination, or conspiracy articulate
a purpose to eliminate competition before they may be held to have created a restraint of
trade.
14. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), for example, was
decided primarily upon § 1 grounds and contained no explicit agreement not to compete.
Most of the early cases employed § 1 and § 2 interchangeably so that § I applied to all
horizontal merger cases. This construction of § 1 continues into the present, see note 15
infra.
15. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 655 (1964).
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Justice Douglas dissented in Penn-Olin, arguing that Sherman Act
cases holding market-division agreements illegal per se should be ap-
plied under section 7 to strike down the joint venture agreement.10
He did not discuss the difficulty, suggested above, that such reasoning
would render all horizontal mergers accomplished since 1890 illegal.
He did suggest that his position here could be reconciled with his
majority opinion in White Motor refusing to hold market division per
se illegal. Penn-Olin, he noted, was a horizontal case and White Motor
was vertical. 17 Justice Douglas did not indicate why that distinction
made a difference. In fact, in White Motor, he had indicated that the
distinction did not make a difference in price-fixing cases where both
horizontal and vertical arrangements are per se unlawful.'
Viewing the two cases together, it may seem likely that Justices
Clark and Douglas, as well as a majority of the Court, would at least
agree that explicit horizontal eliminations of competition fall within
the per se rule. Yet even that conclusion may not be true, and such a
rule would seem improper. Its impropriety, as well as the correct ration-
ale for the per se rule, may be suggested by a discussion of partnership
agreements containing promises of the partners not to compete with
the partnership.
The Respective Functions of the Per Se Rule and the
Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints
The partnership is one of the oldest examples in antitrust literature
of lawful integration. Partnership is also typically a horizontal ar-
rangement. Justice Peckham cited it as a lawful elimination of competi-
tion in Joint Traffic.19 Holmes argued from its assumed legality in
Northern Securities.20 Taft, in A ddyston Pipe & Steel, went further and
listed the agreement of partners not to compete as one of five ancillary
restraints of trade lawful at common law2' and, he implied, also lawful
under the Sherman Act. The rationale for the legality of this explicit
elimination of competition offers a solution to the conceptual difficul-
ties illustrated in the White Motor and Penn-Olin decisions.
Taft argued that the elimination of competition inherent in the
joining of men as partners was justified because "this effect was only
16. 378 U.S. at 181-82.
17. Id. at 177-78 n.1.
18. 372 U.S. at 260.
19. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898).
20. 193 U.S. at 410-11.
21. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898).
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an incident to the main purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise,
and energy to carry on a successful business, and one useful to the
community." 2 One may, however, grant that partnership, in the ab-
sence of monopoly power at least, is, like other forms of integration or
combination, socially desirable, and yet ask why allowing the partner-
ship is not enough. Why should the Sherman Act permit, in addition,
an agreement by the partners not to compete with the partnership? It
might appear that leaving the individual partners free to take business
for the firm or individually would best determine in which instances
integration is the more efficient mode of operation and in which dis-
integration is. Assuming the partnership to lack monopolistic control
of the market in which it operates, one complete answer is that the
partners must think a general agreement against competition with the
firm is most conducive to efficient operation. They could have no other
motive for making the agreement. At worst, if there are situations in
which individual operation would be more efficient, the agreement
must nevertheless, on balance, create more efficiency than inefficiency,
and the partners must believe that overall efficiency is best served by
not trying to sort out the separate situations.
It may be stated as a general rule, then, that where there is some
integration of activities, and when market share is too small to make
restriction of output profitable, the purpose of an agreement eliminat-
ing competition must be the creation of efficiency. It would theoreti-
cally be possible, therefore, to decide the legality of all horizontal
price-fixing and market-division agreements which protect integrations
of activities by the aggregate market power of the parties. It will be
desirable, nevertheless, to frame a general theory of the ways in which
market division and price fixing may create efficiency in order to
buttress the argument
Taft suggested the theory of efficiencies when he stated: "Restric-
tions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the
members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common
enterprise, were, of course, only ancillary to the main end of the union,
and were to be encouraged. "123 By "ancillary" Taft meant that the
agreement was subordinate to the main transaction, the partnership,
and causally related to its efficiency.24 This definition required that the
agreement be no broader than the need it served. It is desirable, how-
22. Id. at 280.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 282.
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ever, to be somewhat more specific about the nature of the causal
relationship than Taft was. One obvious function of an agreement
not to compete in the non-monopolistic partnership case is the pre-
vention of what may be called the "free ride" problem. One or
more of the partners must be prevented from appropriating to them-
selves as individuals the contributions of other partners. If such ap-
propriation occurs, the victimized partners will almost certainly de-
crease or stop altogether their contributions to the partnership activity.
The result will be a less effective partnership in that the efficiencies
of combination or integration will be less completely realized than they
otherwise might have been. This decay of efficiencies is prevented by
requiring of each partner an agreement not to compete with the firm.
Each then becomes free to contribute fully without fear of being vic-
timized and the partnership is enabled to become a more efficient unit.
The problem of the free ride may deteriorate the efficiencies of part-
nership in a variety of ways. In order to further the prosperity of the
firm, for example, the various members may specialize in different lines
of activity and may make known to the community the excellence of
the specialists. If business comes to one partner because of a reputa-
tion so gained and he takes it for his individual profit, he has taken a
free ride upon the sacrifice of the other partners in leaving that line
of specialization to him and in helping to make his ability known. It
would often be difficult or impossible to prove that particular pieces
of business were ultimately engendered by the firm in this fashion, but
to the extent that the other partners suspect that such parasitical be-
havior is occurring they will be less willing to leave areas of specializa-
tion to each other and less willing to advertise each other's merits to
the community. Partners will also be less willing to share assets such
as specialized knowledge and competence, unique business methods,
customer contacts, and the like, when there is a danger that other
partners may appropriate the contributions to their individual profit,
Considerations such as these probably underlay Taft's remark that
an ancillary agreement eliminating competition is a way of securing
to the joint enterprise the entire effort of the partners. For the Sher-
man Act to allow the partnership to be formed in the interest of in-
creased efficiency, but to disallow the ancillary agreement which makes
the integration more stable, and hence further increases its efficiency,
would be a pointless contradiction in policy.
Taft's basic insight, then, was that the fundamental criterion for
lifting combinations and agreements not to compete out of the cate-
gory of per se illegality was neither their explicitness or implicitness,
[Vol. 75:373
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nor their horizontal or vertical nature, but their capacity for contribut-
ing to efficiency.
This formulation also makes it possible to bring the law of close-knit
combinations and loose combinations into symmetry.2 The significant
difference between a partnership as such and the agreement not to
compete which protects it is the same as the difference between a
merger and an agreement to fix prices or divide markets. The differ-
ence in both cases lies simply in the relative visibility of efficiency-
creating potential. That is, when companies merge or individuals unite
in a partnership it can never be stated flatly that no efficiencies may re-
sult. 6 The case is different with respect to agreements not to compete-
of which price-fixing and market-division agreements are merely a sub-
category-simply because it is obvious that some of them do not contain
any possibility of creating efficiency. Generalizing from the partnership
case discussed, one category of agreements which cannot create effi-
ciency are those which do not accompany a combination or inte-
gration of other productive efforts of the parties. Thus, if competitors
agree to divide markets and do nothing else, it is plain that there is
no integration which is being made more effective. The result, if
the agreement has any effect whatever, can only be the restriction of
output. The second category consists of agreements not to compete
which are incapable of adding to the efficiency of the integration which
they seemingly accompany. Thus, a market-division agreement be-
tween competitors who jointly maintain a product safety testing labo-
ratory could not be related to the efficiency of the joint laboratory. -
25. As used here, a lose-knit combination is a combination by ownership and a loose
combination is one accomplished by agreement of othenvise independent firms. Loose
combination thus encompasses both cartels and cooperative productive or distributive
activities by firms which remain separately owned.
26. An important reason is that many of the most important efficiencies are intangible:
for example, the ability of the partners to specialize and so avoid the inefficiency of at-
tempting to handle too many matters or matters for which one or the other has no
particular aptitude. Mergers may create a variety of efficiencies whose existence cannot
be denied with certainty. See, e.g., the efficiencies which determine the best size of a busi-
ness unit listed in ROBINSON, THE STRucrumR OF CoMPTVrrmvE INDUsTRY 12 (rev. ed. 1958).
In addition, managerial efficiency may not be merely a question of the size of the business
unit but of the quality of management which is brought to a unit by merger or by con-
tract. Another factor making it impossible to deny the existence of efficiencies in advance
is that they may develop gradually and not be immediately perceivable. The important
point is that in all combinations or integrations, whether accomplished by ownership or
contract, there exists the possibility of increased efficiency.
27. The findings of the laboratory could be used by all the participating manufac-
turers and there appears to be no theory which indicates that the efficiency of the lab-
oratory would be improved if the manufacturers eliminated competition between them-
selves. See discussion at pages 449-51, infra. Appalachian Coals contained restrictions on
1966]
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These two categories define the proper scope of the per se rule: agree-
ments eliminating competition which have no efficiency-creating po-
tential. Following the common law terminology, agreements in the
per se category may be termed "naked" to distinguish them from
"ancillary" restraints.
The difference in relative visibility of efficiency-creating potential
is undoubtedly the reason the early Sherman Act courts created a per
se rule for certain loose arrangements but never created such a rule
for close-knit arrangements such as mergers .2  The ancillary-naked
distinction is a way of making the rationale of agreements not to com-
pete symmetrical with that of the merger or close-knit combination
cases. Once the category of visibly naked restraints is set aside as per
se illegal, the category of ancillary agreements is seen to be the same
economic phenomenon as the category of mergers or close-knit com-
binations. Their difference is merely one of legal form: the difference
between integration accomplished by contract and integration accom-
plished by ownership.2 9 Since the Sherman Act attempts to look beyond
legal form to economic substance, ancillary restraints and mergers
should be treated similarly. It follows, of course, that a finding of an-
cillarity does not render a restraint automatically lawful. The function
of the ancillarity concept is merely to take the questioned agreement
out of the per se category and subject it to the Act's remaining tests-
market share and intent.
The Propriety of a Per Se Rule
The propriety of any true per se rule-one which disregards ques-
tions of market power and intent-has occasionally been questioned.
The most common objections seem to be, first, that there can scarcely
competition which were, on their face, incapable of adding to the efficiences of the joint
sales agency they accompanied. See 74 YALE L.J. 775, 822-25.
28. Even amended § 7 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964),
as written, and as (increasingly) stringently interpreted, has not framed a true per se
rule for all horizontal mergers of the sort which prevails for some forms of agreements
not to compete.
29. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, READINGS IN PRICE THEORY, 331 (Stigler and
Boulding eds. 1952), analyzes contract as being similar to merger in extending the bound-
aries of the firm by substituting administrative organization of transactions for market
organization. The term "contract integration," as used in this article, refers to any co-
ordination of the business activities of otherwise independent units. The term is thus as
broad as the area of business contracts. The sole exception to this usage is that "cartels,"
defined here as eliminations of competition involving no coordination of activities other
than the suppression of business rivalry, are not considered contract integrations. The
relevant distinction for the Sherman Act, given its economic orientation, Is not between
ownership and contract but between integration and cartels.
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be inferred either a wrongful intent or effect from even a naked price-
fixing or market-division agreement between parties who lack market
control, and, second, that in any event it seems unfair to punish per-
sons whose conduct cannot conceivably have had anti-consumer con-
sequences. These objections may be illustrated and perhaps answered
by taking a pair of hypothetical situations. Suppose that two lawyers
engaged in general practice in New York City make an agreement to
fix fees but do not coordinate their activities in any other way. Two
other lawyers similarly situated form a partnership and agree upon
the fees they will charge. In neither case does it appear conceivable
that the agreement will have any effect upon the general level of legal
fees.
The version of the per se rule defended here would result in auto-
matic illegality for the first agreement, and not for the second.3 0 In
fact the second agreement, once market share were shown or conceded,
should be completely lawful. This difference in result arises from eco-
nomic presumptions and considerations of efficient law enforcement.
The economic presumptions are different because there is a contract
integration (the partnership) to which the price fixing seems ancillary
in one case and not in the other. The agreement is ancillary to the
partnership because it seems obvious that the partnership would be a
less effective integration of the partners' activities if they charged dif-
ferent fees for comparable work. For one thing, clients might become
concerned about which partner handled their work. This inference
that the price-fixing agreement enhances the efficiency of a contract
integration may safely be taken as conclusive without proof of the
actual creation of efficiency since the apparent market share of the
parties makes it highly improbable that the real purpose or effect of
the arrangement is to restrict output.3 '
30. These hypotheses ignore, for the sake of the argument, the questions of interstate
commerce and whether the government would waste its time in prosecuting either case.
31. If the partners do, in fact, work less and charge higher hourly fees, that must be
taken to reflect a decision to take the rewards of increased efficiency partially through
increased leisure. The Sherman Act can hardly object since the ground for objection would
have to be that increased efficiency must always be enjoyed through increased income.
Such a principle would also have to forbid an individual lawyer from deciding to work
harder for fewer hours, or from deciding to work at a more leisurely pace for the same
number of hours, or from deciding to quit the practice altogether for more enjoyable
though less remunerative pursuits. To apply such a principle would be to convert the
Sherman Act into a command that all persons work at peak efficiency at the tasks which
consumers indicate to be the most valuable by the rate of remuneration they award. The
concept of consumer sovereignty (which is the basis for the construction of the Act pre-
sented here) does not require such an intolerable destruction of individual freedom. It
can be avoided by construing § 1 of the Act to forbid only that collusion which re-
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The presumption runs the other way in the case of the lawyers who
merely agree upon fees. There is no contract integration, no coordi-
nation of activities, which could be made more efficient by price fixing.
There is, therefore, no likelihood of any consumer benefit flowing
from their agreement. It may be objected that, given their market
share, there is no likelihood of consumer detriment either. One answer
to this is that the parties are likely to be better judges of their actual
power over some separate segment of the general market than the en-
forcement agencies or the courts. The same case does not exist for
assuming that they know better the efficiency-creating potential of
their agreement unless they are able to point to an integration of their
activities from which efficiency could conceivably arise.
Considerations of law-enforcement efficiency weigh even more
heavily in favor of these divergent presumptions. When economic
reasoning indicates, in the case of the partnership, that efficiency is the
likely result of the fee-fixing agreement and that restriction of output
is highly improbable, it would place an enormous burden upon the
defendants and unnecessarily complicate the trial process to require
that actual evidence of efficiency be introduced and weighed.82 In the
case of the naked fee-fixing agreement between two otherwise inde-
pendent lawyers, it would place too great a burden upon the govern-
ment to require it to prove that restriction of output was a real
possibility, especially since in most cases the parties' market power
will not be as obvious.33 To make market power always an essential ele-
stricts output and thereby falsifies consumer alternatives by distorting in one market the
relationship between cost and price which continues to prevail in other markets. To some,
even this may not seem an adequate rationale for infringing the rights of producers (who
are also individuals) to freedom of action and association. This raises the topic of the
principle of legislation (the proper occasions for governmental coercion) and goes to the
question of whether the Sherman Act should have been adopted to begin with. This de-
bate need not detain us here, however, since this article is confined to the question of
the proper interpretation of an existing statute. The argument for producer rights, when
it is not an argument for repeal, is an argument for judicial balancing of the interests
of producers against those of consumers. This balancing is the essence of the Brandeis
tradition of the rule of reason and is improper under a statute structured like the Sher-
man Act for reasons already canvassed. 74 YALE LJ. 775, 829-47.
32. Efficiencies cannot be measured in any quantitative sense because, as mentioned In
note 26 supra, many of the most important ones are intangible and develop gradually
over time. There may be an argument, in cases where borderline market size is Involved,
for making sure that substantial efficiencies are likely to be present. See note 40 infra,
and accompanying text.
33. Efficiency and restriction of output are thus tested in the same fashion. Neither
can be given a quantitative value. The possible presence of efficiency is inferred from
the presence of integration. The possible presence of restriction of output is Inferred
from the presence of large market size. The two are balanced in the decision of cases by
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ment of illegality would introduce the complexities of market def-
inition into every government prosecution and effectively destroy the
advantages of the per se rule in making rapid and widespread enforce-
ment of the law possible.34 The cost would be too great in prosecutorial
resources. The cost of allowing the defense ought to be paid, of course,
if the inferences against efficiencies were not so strong. Until a plausible
theory of efficiencies from cartels is developed, however, the absence
of any underlying contract integration should be sufficient to condemn
any horizontal restraint as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
The second objection to the per se rule mentioned was its seeming
unfairness to parties whose actual capability of injuring consumers,
regardless of the parties' intent, is very slight and probably nonexistent.
This consideration bears more heavily upon the use of prosecutorial
discretion in bringing such a case and upon the severity of the penalties
to be imposed. It does not seem a reason to change the substantive
rule and absolve the parties completely. Their agreement is in the
nature of an attempt to do what is forbidden and their mistake con-
cerning their capacity to do harm seems a weak reason to acquit them.
This conclusion is buttressed by the consideration that acceptance of
this dubious equitable argument would, by introducing market power
as an element of every offense, destroy the per se rule and its benefits
for law enforcement in all cases.
There is, then, a strong case for a per se rule, even in the extreme
situations supposed here, and also for defining its scope by the absence
either of a contract integration or of an efficiency-creating relationship
between the restraint and the integration.
The Rule of Reason in the Trial Process
The discussion in the remainder of this article may be clarified by
outlining the manner in which the existing principal tests of the rule
of reason should be applied in determining the legality of an agree-
ment eliminating competition. It should be stressed that the sugges-
tions made here relate only to questions of economic analysis. They
requiring some integration of productive activities as a prerequisite to the validity
of any elimination of competition and setting a percentage of the market as a top limit
even in such cases. The balance so struck is necessarily rough, but it is all the unquanti.
fiable nature of the factors permits.
34. The proposal made here would, of course, require that the complexities of market
definition be introduced into horizontal ancillary restraint cases. This additional com-
plexity constitutes a loss in such cases of the advantages of a per se rule cited in the text.
The law assumes it advantageous to pay that cost in merger cases, however, and the policy
should be the same for ancillary restraints, since they are, in economic terms, the same
phenomenon as mergers.
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take not only the value premises of the main tradition of the rule of
reason as given but operate within its overall framework of economic
criteria. These suggestions, therefore, are consistent with the major
lines of Sherman Act precedent, though they conflict with many of the
detailed rules that courts have elaborated upon the law's foundations.
Change in the law would not require legislation since the rule of rea-
son has always assumed that courts would correct the law as economic
understanding progressed. Indeed, this mechanism of continual ju-
dicial revision and reform was made explicit in Chief Justice White's
classic formulation of the rule of reason35 and has always been a pri-
mary feature of the law's evolution.
Chief Justice White's statement of the rule of reason, set forth in
Standard Oil36 and American Tobacco,87 contains three tests which
may be rendered as (1) the per se concept; (2) the intention of the
parties; and (3) the effect of the agreement. 88 These three tests are
better viewed as guides for the litigation process than as logically
separate criteria. In a larger sense, there is only one test-the effect of
the agreement. The others are shortcuts to finding or inferring effect.
The method by which Chief Justice White's three-part statement of
the rule of reason assists the trial process, and the relation of the eco-
nomic argument of this article to White's categories, may be clarified
by an example. Suppose that the government brings suit charging de-
fendants with agreeing to an illegal division of markets. 89 The first
step is to determine whether the facts and contentions of the parties
properly bring the case within the ambit of the per se rule. If a per se
violation seems proven either by the pleadings or at any stage during
the trial, the court should announce that fact. At this point the de-
35. 74 YALE L.J. 775, 802-03, 805.
36. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
37. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
38. 74 YALE L.J. 775, 804.
39. The three categories of the rule of reason just mentioned do not come into play
until it is determined whether the agreement in fact existed. Should the defendants deny
the existence of any such agreement and lose on that issue, the case may be almost irre-
trievable from their point of view, for the effort at concealment is likely to be taken as
a confession of bad intent. This inference would not seem unfair and might almost be
made conclusive, except for the likelihood that the present uncertain state of the law and
frequent sweeping overstatement of the per se concept may lead even parties whose sole
purpose is the creation of efficiency to try to hide a market-division agreement from
the enforcement agencies and the courts. Were the law clarified along the lines to be
suggested here, it would seem entirely proper for courts to treat the attempted conceal-
ment of the fact of an agreement as conclusive proof of wrongful intent. If the defen-
dants admit the agreement, or if it is proved under circumstances which do not In them-
selves demonstrate an illicit intent, an investigation channeled by the three-part rule of
reason is in order.
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fendants could avoid judgment against themselves and obtain an
opportunity to go on with the trial only by making an acceptable offer
to prove that the market division was ancillary. This would require
an offer to prove a contract integration (unless that were conceded)
and, in any case, the statement of an economically plausible theory
which, if borne out by the evidence the defendants offer to adduce,
would show their agreement to have a substantial capacity for increas-
ing the efficiency of the integration. As will be seen, the economics
involved in judging the plausibility of defendants' theory, and thus
the acceptability of their offer of proof, are not overly complex and are
suitable for judicial use in the litigation process. Many trials will end
at this point with a decision that defendants have not offered a plau-
sible theory of efficiency.
If the defendants do present an acceptable theory of efficiency, they
should be held to have escaped the per se rule, or to use Chief Justice
White's phrasing, to have passed the "inherent nature" test. The trial
should then move to the second and third tests specified by White: the
search for the intent behind the arrangement and for its likely effect.
The question of intent presents a problem no different here than in
other antitrust cases. It will turn primarily upon testimony and docu-
mentary evidence of statements and behavior before and during the
formation and operation of the questioned agreement. The problem
is largely one of the existence and trustworthiness of such evidence.
If trustworthy evidence indicates that the defendants' primary expec-
tation of gain lay in the elimination of competition, that should be a
conclusive demonstration of the arrangement's illegality. Direct evi-
dence of good intent, that is, of an intention to create efficiency, should
be sifted and weighed with greater care. This differing treatment
arises from the practical consideration that defendants are more likely
to manufacture evidence of good intent than of bad. Only in ex-
ceptional cases, however, will evidence of bad intent be so convinc-
ing and so separated from other factual questions that it will prove
unnecessary to examine the question of the agreement's effect. The
two issues are likely to be so intermingled in the fact finding process,
in any event, that it would be impracticable to separate them into
separate stages of trial.
The task of assessing the probable net effect upon consumers of a
market-division agreement which seems likely to create efficiencies is
performed by applying rules of thumb constructed with the aid of
economic analysis. The main criterion is market power, which is de-
termined primarily by the percentage of the market controlled by the
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parties and by ease of entry. An argument could be made that where
the agreement seems capable both of creating efficiency and leading
to a restriction of output, the law ought not interfere since there is no
way of knowing whether its interference will have the net effect of
aiding or injuring consumers. This argument is not pursued here
solely because the law has assumed that such interference is proper
in horizontal merger cases under the Sherman Act. For present pur-
poses, that assumption will be accepted and applied, in the interests
of symmetry between the law of contract and ownership integrations.
Courts will determine, probably with the aid of precedent under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, what market shares are illegal. Solely
for the sake of illustration, let us assume that a share of 50%o is chosen
as the lawful upper limit. A market division agreement covering a
greater share of the market will be illegal regardless of its efficiency-
creating potential and the court need not inquire into the topic of
efficiencies at all. An agreement in the very low ranges, as already dis-
cussed, should be completely lawful if a contract integration to which
it appears ancillary is present. The court need not inquire further into
actual efficiencies in that case because the inference of their presence
is strong and the danger of restriction of output is extremely slight.
For agreements approaching the 50% size, however, the court should
make sure that efficiencies are present and substantial. This determin-
ation provides an added degree of safety in a possibly doubtful zone.
The court should not, however, attempt to measure the efficiencies
since measurement, for all practical purposes, is impossible.40
Since it is suggested that the law assess particular agreements not
to compete according to their capacities for restricting output or in-
creasing efficiency, this article takes up, first, the circumstances in
which market-division and price-fixing agreements may restrict out-
put, and, second, the methods by which such agreements may create
efficiencies.
40. The impossibility of measuring efficiencies has already been alluded to, note 20
supra. Courts have never attempted such measurement in merger cases under either
the Sherman Act or § 7 of the Clayton Act. They have, however, in dose cases listened
to argument and taken evidence to satisfy themselves that possibilities of efficiency
were present. See, e.g., under the Sherman Act, United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 443 (1920); and, under the Clayton Act, United States v. Lever Bros.
Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Under the Sherman Act at least, courts have
treated restriction of output in a parallel fashion, not attempting to measure it, but em-
ploying a market-share test, which varies with the circumstances of a particular industry,
i6 gauge its probable presence. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 834 U.S. 495
527-34 (1948).
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RES ICTION OF OUTPUT: HORIZONTAL AND
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Current doctrine, broadly phrased, appears to be that all horizontal
price fixing and market division is illegal per se, that vertical price
fixing is illegal per se, and that the legality of vertical market division
is uncertain. It is the thesis here that proper doctrine should hold
ancillary horizontal price fixing and market division lawful in all cases
in which the parties lack market control, and that all vertical market
division and price fixing should be lawful regardless of the parties'
market size.
The argument for these propositions rests upon a demonstration that
the agreements whose legality is proposed have the effect of creating
efficiency beneficial to consumers. The demonstration proceeds by first
eliminating the alternative explanation for the existence of such agree-
ments: that they increase the parties' revenues by creating the ability
to restrict output. With that hypothesis eliminated, the only remain-
ing explanation for the existence of such agreements is that they in-
crease the parties' revenues by creating efficiency.41 The demonstration
is carried further, however, and the succeeding portion of the article
attempts to explain some of the mechanisms by which certain market-
division and price-fixing agreements do increase the efficiency of con-
tract integrations.
Horizontal Market Division and Price Fixing
Though horizontal arrangements differ widely in their capacities
for creating efficiency, the method by which they may restrict output
is basically the same for cartels, contract integrations with ancillary
restraints, or ownership integrations.42 Cases such as Addysion Pipe -
41. Occasionally someone suggests a third hypothesis: that ancillary restraints of this
sort are made in the erroneous belief that they create efficiency. This alternative theory
need not detain us. It is dubious because it assumes that businessmen persist in foolish
and expensive behavior. More than that, however, the theory, if true, is irrelevant for
the law. The Sherman Act is not a delegation to courts to second guess all attempts to
do business more efficiently. If it were, courts should examine not only the wisdom of
market division and price fixing but all agreements which, if based on an incorrect judg-
ment, would waste resources. (For example, the foolish purchase of new machinery or
hiring of incompetent executive personnel would be agreements in restraint of trade re-
viewable by courts under the Sherman Act.) The lav wisely assumes the rationality of
business behavior and attempts only to sort out that which is likely to lead to the restric-
tion of output.
42. The theory of competitive and monopolistic behavior which follows is standard
and may be found in such texts as Sricri, THE TaOwRY oF PCE, chs. 9, 10, 12, 14 (rev.
ed. 1952).
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Steel and Standard Oil provide familiar instances of cartels and owner-
ship integrations, respectively. The recent Mattress Cases43 provide
examples of horizontal contract integrations accompanied by ancillary
restraints. Otherwise independent bedding manufacturers agreed to
make a uniform line of products and to advertise them nationally. Each
manufacturer agreed to sell his production of items bearing the com-
mon brand only within a designated territory.44
The firm operating in a purely competitive industry has, by def-
inition, too small a share of the industry output to be able to affect
market price.45 The market price, being unaffected by the firm's out-
put decisions, will always be its marginal revenue (the revenue gained
by the production and sale of an additional unit). At any given mo-
ment the firm's marginal costs are also given.40 The only factor under
the control of the firm is its rate of output. The firm will increase that
rate until its marginal cost equals the market price. Since marginal
costs are always rising at this point,4 7 the firm would decrease net rev-
43. United States v. Restonic Corp., 1960 Trade Gas. 69,739 (N.D. Ill.) (consent
judgment), 1962 Trade Gas. 70,442 (modification of consent judgment); United States
v. Serta Associates, Inc. (N.D. Ill.) (no disposition as yet); United States v. Scaly, Inc.,
1964 Trade Gas. 71,258 (N.D. Ill.) (awaiting argument in the Supreme Court); United
States v. Spring-Air Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 70,402 (N.D. Ill.).
44. This fact appears from the consent judgments listed in note 43, supra, and from
the opinion of the district court in Sealy, 1964 Trade Gas. 71,258 (N.D. Ill.).
45. If such a firm raises its prices, buyers will turn elsewhere and it will sell nothing.
If it undercuts the market price, it may be able to sell more but it will not be maximiz-
ing its net revenues. This follows from the fact that any firm in a competitive market
can sell all it wishes at the going price. The firm that undercuts that price merely dimin-
ishes the revenues it receives on that amount of sales. See note 46 infra.
46. Marginal costs are the costs added at any rate of production by producing one
more unit in the period of time used to measure the rate. If a firm is producing five
thousand units per month, its marginal costs are the increased costs of producing five
thousand and one units per month. Over a period of time the firm can change its cost
structure but day-to-day output decisions must be based upon the structure as it exists.
This is true, of course, whether the firm is a competitor or a monopolist.
47. If marginal costs were constant or declining, the firm would not be maximizing
net revenues since it would pay to produce an additional unit of output. The firm would
continue to do just that until a further increase was no longer profitable. The stopping
point is always provided by the realization that an additional unit will cost more than
it adds to revenues. If there is more than one firm in the market, marginal costs must
be rising when the stopping point is reached. If marginal costs remain constant or de-
dine, the firm would continue to expand until it supplied the entire demand. Such a
firm would be a natural monopoly. Two firms could exist under such circumstances only
on the wholly unrealistic assumption that their marginal costs at the stopping point were
absolutely identical and remained so. If one ever gained a slight cost advantage, it would
increase output at the other's expense and it would continue to do so until it drove the
other firm from the market, for under either the level or declining marginal cost hypoth-
esis the expanding firm would have lower marginal costs from that point on. Whenever
two or more firms exist in an unregulated market, therefore, we may be confident that
their marginal costs are increasing at the relevant ranges of output.
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enues by expanding output beyond that point-the cost of the addi-
tional unit would be greater than the price it would bring on the
market. To fix the rate of production below this point would also fail
to maximize net revenues because an additional unit would sell for
more than it cost. Thus a competitive market maximizes consumer
want satisfaction because the output is at a level which causes the price
to equal the marginal cost of production. The resources of the industry
are being used as efficiently as they can be, given the state of techno-
logical and managerial sophistication at the moment. Consumers' de-
mand for the product, with the costs given for the moment, determines
the amount of output. Consumer demand, of course, is determined by
the range of alternative products and services available. If consumer
tastes change so that more of the product is demanded, income being
constant, less of some other products or services will be demanded.
When the demand increases, each firm in the industry will be able to
increase net revenues by increasing the rate of output until marginal
costs rise to equal the new price level. Firms in industries with de-
creased demand can maximize revenues only by cutting back the rate
of production, in effect moving down the slope of the marginal cost
curve, until marginal costs once more equal the new lower price level.
Such shifts in demand obviously alter the value of productive resources
in various industries. The value of such resources is reflected in the
demand of the firms for them. A resource will tend to move where its
demand price or the value of its marginal product is greatest. s Thus
resources will tend to move in the same directions as consumer de-
mand. A system in equilibrium would produce maximum consumer
want satisfaction because the value of the marginal product of each
resource would be the same in all of its alternative employments. No
shift of resources could increase consumer satisfaction. Our unimagin-
ably complex economic system never reaches equilibrium, of course.
Consumer tastes and cost conditions alter too rapidly. But the mech-
anisms described continually shift resources in pursuit of an ever
shifting equilibrium. Consumer want satisfaction is, therefore, maxi-
mized as nearly as is possible in a dynamic economy.
When monopoly power exists in a market, resources will be mis-
allocated in the sense that a movement of resources from competitive
markets to the monopolized market would increase consumer want
satisfaction. Suppose that all the firms in a competitive market either
merged or formed a cartel so that they could make their output de-
48. "The value of the marginal product is the demand price for a productive service
if the quantities of the other productive services are held constant." STICLX, Op. cit. supra
note 42, at 188. (Emphasis in original.)
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cisions collectively as though they were a single firm. The single firm's
output will then constitute the total industry output and the firm
will not have to reckon with a given market price which remains un-
changed by its output decisions but with the consumer demand for
its product. With each increase in the firm's rate of output the market
price will come down. Unlike the competitor, therefore, the monop-
olist will not receive as marginal revenue on each additional sale the
price at which that sale is made. The additional output per period of
time lowers the market price for all sales. The marginal revenue of
the monopolist thus declines more rapidly than the market price and
the firm will stop increasing output when its marginal costs equal
marginal revenue. The price at that output will be above marginal
cost. The value of the marginal product of resources in the monop-
olized industry is thus higher than that of the same resources in com-
petitive industries. Since that value is created by consumer demand,
it follows that consumers would prefer to have resources shifted into
the monopolized industry until the value of their marginal products
is once again equal in all employments. It is this effect of monopoly
which constitutes resource misallocation and injures consumers. 9
A prerequisite for restriction of output is a large enough share of
the market so that the firm can alter total industry output significantly
by changing its own output. Such a share can be created by growth,
merger, ancillary restraint, or cartel. Size achieved by growth demon-
strates the presence of efficiencies. Merger and ancillary restraint raise
the possibility of efficiency, but cartels have no relationship to effi-
ciency. The economic similarity of mergers and ancillary restraints
suggests at once that the law should treat them alike. Taking the law's
treatment of mergers as the standard, the legality of a horizontal an-
cillary restraint should be judged by the market share it creates.50
49. Laymen and sophomores criticize monopolies for restricting output and raising
prices.. . . The objection must be reformulated: under monopoly the allocation of
resources is inefficient.... In other words, a productive service will have a less valu-
able marginal product in competitive than in monopolistic industries, so a transfer
of some of the productive service from the former to the latter will increase output.
STIGLER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 213.
50. Taft came close to such a position in Addyston Pipe &i Steel but spoke only of
cases in which the restraint was part of a plan to gather all the property used In a busi-
ness under one management in order to establish a monopoly. In such cases, he said, "the
actual intent to monopolize must appear." 85 Fed. 271 at 291. Since the Sherman Act
had not yet ,determined whether specific intent to monopolize was necessary In a merger
case, Taft's ictum does not necessarily detract from the fact that he recognized the pos-
sible efficiencies created by horizontal ancillary restraints, and further that in some cases
approach to monopoly proportions would bear upon their legality.
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The economic similarity of ancillary restraints and mergers suggests
at once that the permissible market share of the one should be the
same as the other. The Sherman Act, however, has typically allowed
much larger market shares in merger cases than has section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The problem is which standard to apply to ancillary re-
straints. There may seem a presumption in favor of section 7 criteria
since that statute represents the latest congressional expression of
policy with respect to mergers. It would, however, be unfortunate as
well as improper to carry over the increasingly stringent section 7
standards to sectioh 1 litigation concerning restraints ancillary to con-
tract integrations.
Such a transfer would be unfortunate because strict rules against
horizontal corporate mergers, though perhaps tolerable when limited
to a specific area, would cut too deeply if applied to other forms of com-
bination upon which the productiveness of the economy depends. As
noted, every partnership and corporation may be viewed as a combina-
tion. The application of stringent section 7 standards to such existing
forms of enterprise would require widespread dissolution and conse-
quent destruction of efficiency. It may be replied that application of
strict section 7 rules to contract integrations would be tolerable, because
contract integration is also a limited field. This seems a poor argument
for applying standards that diminish rather than increase consumer
welfare; it offers as an inducement only the promise that the damage
will be localized. Even such localization is dubious, however. The Sher-
man Act, taking section 1 and 2 together, applies to all forms of com-
bination or integration. Importing section 7 standards for corporate
mergers and acquisitions into section I's application to contract inte-
gration, therefore, would seem likely to increase substantially the
chances of damage to productive efficiency across the entire range of
the economy.
The fact that the Sherman and Clayton Acts are different statutes,
with different legislative histories and different courses of interpretive
development, serves as a natural barrier between section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. Were that barrier breached
so that harsh section 7 standards secured a foothold in section 1, the
remaining barriers to the spread of such doctrines throughout the
Sherman Act would be much lower. Assuming arguendo that in amend-
ing section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950, Congress intended to require
more stringent rules than the courts were then applying under the
Sherman Act, it is significant that the new standards were explicitly
limited to the field of corporate stock and asset acquisitions. There is
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thus a strong presumption that it would be improper for a court to
transplant section 7 standards to contexts in which Congress did not
limit the common-law development of the Sherman Act. This con-
clusion is reinforced by the fact that much of section 7's harshness is
induced by the belief that the statute was designed not merely to pre-
serve competition but also to preserve small competitors.5 1 Whatever
the merits or demerits of such a notion in the section 7 context, this
policy consideration does not seem transferable to section 1. One rea-
son is that, as has already been argued, the exclusive proper concern
of section 1 is consumer want satisfaction. A second reason is that
efficiency created through the contract integration of selected activities
of firms that remain otherwise independent differs from merger in
preserving rather than eliminating independent business units. For a
variety of reasons, therefore, the standards evolving in section 7 liti-
gation should not be applied to loose arrangements or contract inte-
grations tested under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Rejecting a section 7 test raises the question of what market per-
centages should be lawful for a horizontal restraint ancillary to a con-
tract integration case. A definitive answer to this question is beyond
the scope of this article,52 but perhaps the most satisfactory course for
51. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16, 333, 343-46 (1962),
and Procter & Gamble, 1963 TRADE REG. REP. 16,673.
52. Two considerations may indicate the proper range of critical sizes. The first is
that before restriction of output becomes a danger, the firm (including in that term a
cooperating group employing an ancillary restraint) must have a large enough share of
the market so that its restriction of output will significantly restrict the output of the
entire industry. Only the latter restriction can raise the market price. In the ordinary
case, it seems highly dubious that output restriction would be a profitable policy even
for a firm with 50% of a market. In order to restrict industry output by 10%, such a
firm would have to cut its own output by 20%, and then more than half of the increased
revenue from the higher price would go to its competitors. As the competitors increased
their output in order to equate their marginal costs with the higher market price, the
output-restricting firm would find its own position in the market reduced and the price
falling toward the original level.
The implications of this analysis may seem to require qualification in the light of
some contemporary oligopoly theory which suggests that where a few sellers occupy the
entire market they may, without colluding, arrive at output decisions similar to those
which would be produced by collusion. The antitrust law is struggling with the subject
o. oligopoly in a variety of contexts, however, and it seems unnecessary to attempt a so.
Itition of the problem in the limited context of contract integrations. It may be worth
noting, however, that the oligopoly theory described seems far from a completely reli-
able guide to actual market behavior. Many markets occupied by only two or three sell-
ers, or buyers, do not seem to display symptoms of output restriction. In fact, the dis-
covery of actual collusion in a number of supposedly oligopolistic industries suggests that
sellers often find the supposedly softer competition in such markets not nearly as attrac-
tive as real cartels, even allowing for the very considerable legal risks involved in cartel.
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contract integration law under section 1 of the Sherman Act is to fol-
low the lead already provided by section 1 and section 2 merger cases.53
There may be an argument for modifying even those limits upward
since contract integrations are probably a good deal less permanent than
ownership integrations. On the other hand, the developing concern
about oligopoly may tend to lower allowable market shares in all Sher-
man Act cases. Probably the results would be generally satisfactory if,
in cases where entry is likely to be slow or non-existent, parties con-
trolling up to 25% of the market were permitted to engage in ancillary
restraints, and if the allowable share scaled rapidly upward to perhaps
50% or 60% as entry became easier. Higher market shares than these
could be defended, but these should be the minimum allowable if con-
sumers are not to be deprived of the efficiencies that ancillary restraints
create.
Vertical Market Division and Price Fixing
An arrangement is vertical, according to the usage employed in this
article, when a firm operating at one level of an industry places a re-
striction upon competition at another level of that industry for the
firm's own benefit. (This definition excludes restraints, vertical in form,
which are actually the results of horizontal cartels at any level of the
industry.) The thesis advanced here is that every vertical arrangement
should be lawful. In White Motor, for instance, absent an allegation
that the market divisions or the price maintenance had been imposed
on White by its resellers acting in concert or that White employed the
resale price maintenance pursuant to an agreement with other truck
manufacturers, summary judgment should have been entered for de-
fendant on all issues.
Vertical integration by contract may be feared either because of its
effect in foreclosing competitors from a source of supply or from cus-
tomers or because of its effect in eliminating competition among the
firms controlled on the second level of the industry. Though not al-
ways sufficiently distinguished, both of these theories of injury to com-
ization. Such collusion seems to indicate that oligopolies, as such, are not nearly as likely
to restrict output as are cartels or monopolies. This may in turn indicate that the Sher-
man Act should not be concerned with the creation of oligopolies when the size of the
units seems related to substantial efficiencies.
53. In the absence of a recent authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement on allow-
able percentages in Sherman Act merger cases, Judge Learned Hand's dictum in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). may be as useful
as any other gloss on the prior cases: "That percentage [90] is enough to constitute a
monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and cer-
tainly thirty-three percent is not."
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petition appeared very early in the history of the Sherman Act. The
foreclosure theory dates at least from the 1911 American Tobacco
case54 and the suppression of competition or cartel theory of vertical
restraints was accepted as valid in the 1911 Dr. Miles" case. Neither
of these theories appears to have any merit.5 This article, however,
deals with market-division and price-fixing agreements and so is con-
cerned only with the cartel theory of vertical integration.
Taft apparently saw the essential point concerning vertical restraints
when, in Addyston Pipe & Steel, he justified "a case in which a rail-
road company made a contract with a sleeping-car company by which
the latter agreed to do the sleeping-car business of the railway com-
pany on a number of conditions, one of which was that no other com-
pany should be allowed to engage in the sleeping-car business on the
same line."5 This agreement may be analyzed as giving a monopoly
to the sleeping-car company on that particular railroad. That is no
different in economic principle than if the railroad had chosen to deal
with four sleeping-car companies but had assigned each an exclusive
share of its track (market division) or had required them to maintain a
certain scale of charges to the public (price maintenance). Seen in this
way, Taft's analysis of the sleeping-car case is relevant to the vertical
restraints discussed here.
Taft justified the elimination of competition at the sleeping-car
level in terms which made the market share of the railroad irrelevant:
The railroad company may discharge this duty [of furnishing
sleeping-car facilities] itself to the public, and allow no one else to
do it, or it may hire someone to do it, and, to secure the necessary
investment of capital in the discharge of the duty, may secure to
the sleeping-car company the same freedom from competition that
it would have itself in discharging the duty.5 9
For present purposes, the important part this passage is Taft's in-
sight that, since the railroad company could have furnished the sleep-
ing-car facilities itself without competition, nothing is lost if it grants
to its hired sleeping-car company the same freedom from competition.
54. See Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. GH!. L. REV. 157, 160-63 (1954).
55. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
56. rhe argument against the "cartel" theory of vertical integration follows in the text.
The argument against the foreclosure theory is set out in note 80 infra, and the articles
there cited.
57. See 74 YAL.E L.J. 775, 775-76.
58. 85 Fed. at 287. See 74 YALE L.J. 775, 798-99. The case Taft discussed was Chicago,
St. L. S. N.O.R. Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 139 U.S. 79 (1891).
59. 85 Fed. at 287.
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This reasoning would suggest, if followed logically, that a vertical
elimination of competition would always be lawful because nothing is
lost to consumers that was not already lost due to the horizontal position
of the firm imposing the restraint.60
Justice Hughes reached a contrary conclusion in his Dr. Miles opin-
ion. The Court there held illegal a resale price maintenance program,
and Hughes stated that the claimed benefits to the manufacturer of
resale price maintenance were irrelevant. Hughes argued that since
any benefit which the dealers might obtain by agreeing on prices them-
selves would be insufficient to validate their agreement, the benefit
which the manufacturer might derive from imposing such an agree-
ment could provide no greater justification.0' Hughes' reasoning seems
weak both in its premise that all horizontal price fixing should be per
se illegal and in its assumption that vertically imposed and horizontal
price restrictions always have the same impact upon consumers.ta That
reasoning, nevertheless, clearly requires the conclusion that all vertical
restraints suppressing competition among firms at a second level of the
industry are illegal.
Justice Douglas' White Motor opinion thus seems to represent a
small, tentative step away from the Hughes and toward the Taft po-
sition on vertical restraints. 63
60. In the first section of this article it was noted that Taft's reasoning
suggests another recurrent theme in antitrust by offering, seemingly as a justification
of the exclusive arrangement with the sleeping-car company, the observation that
the railroad company could have offered the sleeping-car service itself and allowed
no one else to do it. This raises the question-though only to assume the answer-
of whether it should always be lawful to accomplish by contract results that may
lawfully be attained by ownership. That, of course, is one way of stating the entire
problem of price fixing and market division.
74 YAAr- L.J. 775, 799. The analysis in this section of the article indicates that Taft assumed
the right answer for vertical restraints. In general, there should never be an objection
when one party confers market power it has upon another. It is the creation of larger
market shares-which can only take place horizontally-with which the law should be
exclusively concerned.
61. 220 U.S. at 408-09.
62. In his subsequent Appalachian Coals opinion Hughes departed from this premise.
There, dealing with a horizontal elimination of competition through a joint selling
agency-and with specific price-fixing provisions in the contracts-Hughes noted that the
elimination of competition which promotes efficiency, as in mergers or partnerships, is not
a per se offense. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-1. 366-67
(1933). In Dr. Miles, however, Hughes did not consider whether an asserted benefit to the
manufacturer from imposing price conditions must not be a claim of efficiency.
63. White Motor should not perhaps have been a wholly unexpected development.
The earlier Paramount litigation had upheld the legality of reasonable clearances in the
licensing of films to motion picture theatres, which is to say the legality of reasonable ver-
tical market division. A three-judge district court upheld the legality of reasonable clear-
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Addyston Pipe & Steel, Dr. Miles, and White Motor are used here
merely to suggest the range of judicial positions with respect to vertical
restraints. Though it is not suggested that the authors of those opinions
held consistently to the implications of their reasoning, the rationales of
the opinions may be used as models of possible approaches to the prob-
lem of vertical market division and price fixing. Of the three, Taft's
approach seems most nearly correct.
The railroad case which Taft analyzed may be used to illustrate the
argument for the legality of vertical restraints. This example presents
the argument in its most extreme form. If the case for legality can be
established here, it would seem valid for all other situations. Let us
suppose that the railroad company had a complete monopoly over
transportation in the area it served, and further, to make the illustra-
tion of general applicability, that rate regulation was either absent or
wholly ineffective. In these circumstances, the railroad may be expected
to calculate the amount of sleeping-car service it should provide and
the price to be charged in order to realize the largest monopoly return.
It will, of course, equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. The
railroad may realize, however, that the scale of operation of sleeping-
car service justified by its railroad is not the most efficient and that it
can get the service provided more cheaply by a sleeping-car company
ances in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 19-16). The
government had argued for the per se illegality of clearances in the district court but its
appeal did not raise the point. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Supreme Court, 334 U.S.
131, 144-48 (1948), noted that the issue of per se illegality was not before the Court, but
went on to review the district court's holding concerning the factors to be considered in
determining whether a clearance is unreasonable, concluding:
In the setting of this case the only measure of reasonableness of a clearance by
Sherman Act standards is the special needs of the licensee for the competitive ad-
vantages it affords.
Whether the same restrictions would be applicable to a producer who had not
been a party to such a conspiracy is a question we do not reach.
Id. at 147-48.
It is impossible to imagine that clearances were per se illegal after this. In a horizontal
cartel case in which the government had not appealed the issue of per se illegality,
Justice Douglas would surely not have reviewed a decree regulating the conduct of the
cartel, stated the Court's "measure of reasonableness" for the cartel's by-laws, and then
suggested that less stringent inhibitions might apply to firms not parties to additional
conspiracies. The Court's treatment of the clearance question must be, and has been,
taken as a strong indication that such agreements are legal if reasonable.
Seen against this background, the cautious refusal of Justice Douglas and the ma-
jority in White Motor to fashion a per se rule for all vertical market divisions until
more was known of their economic impact may be seen as a step toward rather than away
from a per se rule. The usual, though inexplicable, reading of Paramount's treatment of
clearances as a precedent for the motion picture industry only, however, probably pre-
cludes reading the progression in this way.
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that sells such service to a number of railroads. This method will seem
preferable because, for the monopolist as well as for the competitor,
any reduction of the marginal costs of operation will increase net
revenues. Such cost reduction will also, of course, increase the amount
of sleeping-car service offered the public and lower the price. At this
point, it is immaterial what price is arrived at between the railroad
and the car company. They will wish to maximize net revenue and
will not, therefore, wish to change the rate of output of sleeping-car
service from that at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The
way they split the total between themselves will not affect the public.
This reasoning also shows that the output to the public and the
price will not be changed by the railroad's agreement not to allow
another sleeping-car company on its line. This restraint may protect
the car company in whatever bargain it has been able to negotiate with
the railroad but the agreement will not change the motivation of either
party to keep output where marginal cost and marginal revenue are
equal.
One possible objection to this analysis is worth discussion. This ob-
jection could apply only when both vertically-related parties possess
monopolies (bilateral monopoly). This condition may be thought to
obtain here because the railroad has a monopoly in the area and its
promise gives the sleeping-car company a monopoly in the same area.
When the bargain between the sleeping-car company and the railroad
is made, the car company may view the price it pays the railroad as its
own marginal cost (assuming the price varies with the amount of
sleeping-car business done) and may then arrive at a new determination
of the output level which will measure its own maximizing point. If
the price the railroad charges the car company includes an element of
monopoly profit, as it surely will, this new determination by the sleep-
ing-car company will lead it to an even greater restriction of output and
a higher price to travellers than would be the case if the interests of
the two companies were identical. This possibility, of course, would
not only be worse for the public than the full monopoly output and
price, but would be worse for the railroad. The result is highly un-
likely, however. In the first place, this analysis does not take into ac-
count the added efficiencies gained by employing the car company
instead of the railroad offering the service itself. These may be such
that an additional restriction of output by the car company would still
give a greater output than if the railroad offered the service. In the
second place, and more important, the railroad, either in its original
contract or in later renewals, will be able to protect itself against the
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sleeping-car company's additional restriction of output by providing
for control over the amount of service and the price which the car
company must provide. Thus, the agreement can provide in advance
against any additional restriction of output by the car company since
the output which would be chosen by a single monopolist is the basis
upon which the bargain between the two is made and provides the
maximum revenue for division. We may be certain, in any event, that
either because of offsetting efficiencies in the railroad's operations or
the ability of the railroad to control the output level of the sleeping-
car company, or for both reasons, the result of their arrangement will
be primarily to increase efficiency rather to restrict output. If the rail-
road company did not predict that efficiency would be the net result, it
would have no incentive to enter into the arrangement in the first
place. Thus, even the limited bilateral monopoly objection, which
would apply only where the firm granting freedom from competition
had market power, is without substance.
It may be asked why the whole problem is not better avoided, where
the railroad has a monopoly position, by making illegal the railroad's
agreement not to permit another sleeping-car company on its line since
such a rule would enable the railroad to defeat any attempted addi-
tional restriction of output by the car company. The answer is that the
sleeping-car company requires the agreement as protection from bad
faith on the part of the railroad. The car company, as Taft pointed out,
is required to make an investment of capital to fulfill its contract. With-
out the protective clause, the railroad, by employing another sleeping-
car company, could in effect cancel the whole deal any time it decided
it could make a better one. The sleeping-car company would have no
similar option if it should decide it had made a bad bargain. In order
to get the level of investment it wants from a car company, therefore,
the railroad must give the exclusive contract.
The foregoing analysis of Taft's argument may be generalized to
cover all vertical restraints by which a supplier eliminates or limits
competition among the resellers of its product. A vertical elimination
of competition by a single manufacturer can, by definition, never affect
a larger proportion of the total output of the industry than the manu-
facturer produces. This means that the elimination of competition at
the retail level creates no more market power than the manufacturer
has at the manufacturing level. Vertical price fixing and market divi-
sion, therefore, creates no additional horizontal market control and
hence raise no danger of additional power to restrict output. This re-
mains true whether the manufacturer has 1% or 100% of the market.
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Only one full monopoly return can be taken from a series of vertically
related activities. The point may be illustrated by supposing that a
monopolistic manufacturer bought all its retail outlets. Taking into
account all relevant costs of manufacturing and retailing as well as the
elasticity of consumer demand, the firm would set a rate of output
which would maximize net returns. If the manufacturer then sold the
retail outlets, costs and demand remaining unchanged, the maximizing
output would remain the same. The manufacturer would never impose
a limitation upon competition among its resellers which had the effect
of restricting output further, for that would decrease the manufac-
turer's net revenue. The same reasoning applies to an oligopolistic
manufacturer. Any manufacturer with the power to restrict output will
want the entire profit from the restriction to accrue to itself rather than
to somebody else. And it can hardly be imagined that a competitive
manufacturer using vertical price fixing or market division is moved
by an altruistic impulse, verging on the suicidal, to give its resellers
greater-than-competitive profits at its own expense.
In the case of an individual manufacturer's imposition of restraints
upon competition among its resellers, therefore, the manufacturer's
motive can never be restriction of output. An alternative explanation
for the manufacturer's behavior is necessary, and the only satisfactory
alternative hypothesis is that the manufacturer believes the restraint
will increase its net revenue by increasing distributive efficiency. This
is not to say that the elimination of competition among resellers may
not have some tendency to affect efficiency adversely. Market division,
for example, may result in the allocation of some accounts to resellers
that would not othervise be able to hold them. But any such adverse
tendency must be outweighed by a tendency to create efficiency. Other-
wise, the manufacturer would not employ the restraint.
Where a group of manufacturers agree to use vertical restraints (as
in Sealy, where the manufacturers agreed to maintain the prices charged
by their respective retailers) the manufacturers' agreement is horizontal.
The inference that the net effect of the agreement must be the creation
of efficiency then arises, as in all horizontal restraint cases, only if the
manufacturers are parties to a contract integration and, collectively,
lack market control.
In the earlier discussion of the per se rule it was noted that no
restraint could qualify as ancillary, and thereby escape per se illegality,
unless it accompanied a contract integration and was capable of enhanc-
ing the integration's efficiency. Both of these requirements are always
satisfied in vertical cases. The integration in vertical situations may be
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of varying degrees of completeness, but at a minimum the parties are
always related as buyer and seller, and almost invariably the buyer re-
sells or uses the product in making a further product which it sells.
The parties' activities are thus coordinated. They perform different and
specialized functions in getting a final product to the ultimate consumer.
Though vertical, their relationship is the same in economic reality as
that of partners. The ability of all truly vertical restraints to enhance
the efficiency of the integration has been demonstrated by the argument
that they can serve no other function. This same argument demon-
strates that market power is irrelevant in a vertical case, so that vertical
restraints are not only always ancillary but should always be lawful.
The argument for the legality of vertical eliminations of competition
as well as that for the legality of certain horizontal eliminations of com-
petition has proceeded on the theory that, where restriction of output is
not a danger, the motive of the parties must be to increase efficiency.
The parties may, of course, be mistaken. The net effect of such an
agreement may be inefficiency. That possibility, however, does not
affect the rules proposed here. The Sherman Act can only strike down
agreements whose effect, through one mechanism or another, is to
create market control which raises a likelihood of output restriction.
Where that danger does not exist the Act must necessarily leave judg-
ments concerning the most efficient methods of doing business to busi-
nessmen. For a court to strike down, for example, a vertical market
division on the theory that the manufacturer had made a mistake as to
the most efficient mode of distribution would be equivalent to judicial
supervision of any other normal business judgment. The court might
as well second-guess management's judgment on assembly line plan-
ning, inventory policy, product design or any of the other decisions
that affect efficiency. Whatever else it is, the Sherman Act is not a
device for imposing upon the entire economy, or any aspect of the econ-
omy's behavior, a judicial form of public utility regulation.
This analysis also indicates that the legality of vertical restraints
should not depend upon the form of the restraint. Resale price main-
tenance, vertical territorial limitations, 4 and vertical customer alloca-
64. Both Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court and Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in White Motor distinguished between the continuing per se illegality of resale
price maintenance and the uncertain status of vertical market division. 372 U.S. at 260.64,
268.
The argument in the text for the legality of vertical eliminations of competition is Inde-
pendent of the provisions of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire amendments to the Sherman
Act. These amendments provide a rather narrow exception to the judge-made rule against
vertical price fixing. It is proposed here that the courts abandon that rule. Congress'
making of an exception, however, may arguably be read as approval of the rule outside
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tions65 are equally incapable of restricting output and must, therefore,
be presumed equally capable of producing efficiencies. 0
A Consideration of Some Objections to the Legality
of Vertical Restraints
The argument made here for the per se legality of vertical market
division and price fixing may be subjected to a variety of objections.
The major ones, which require discussion, are: (1) It may often be
impracticably difficult to tell whether a particular restraint is manu-
facturer-imposed or the tactic of a dealer cartel; (2) it may be difficult
to distinguish individual manufacturer employment of resale price
maintenance from collusive manufacturer use of that device to dis-
courage defection from a manufacturer cartel; (3) vertical restraints
may result in the transference of an imperfect market structure from
one level of an industry to another; (4) vertical market division may be
used to create price discrimination; and (5) the distinction between
horizontal and vertical restraints may be difficult to make in many cases.
None of these objections seem weighty enough to invalidate the policy
suggested here. The first, second and fifth raise problems of law enforce-
ment which seem soluble. The third objection is a truism without im-
plications for policy. The fourth is an infirm objection both because it
will usually be impossible to tell whether the market division creates
or prevents discrimination and because the effect of discrimination
upon consumer want satisfaction cannot be determined.
The Dealer Cartel Objection.
The dealer cartel objection is grounded in the theory that some
restraints which appear vertical may actually be horizontal cartels
the area of the exception. That argument does not seem strong enough to require the
courts to freeze their present position should they become convinced of its economic un-
soundness. In any event, the Supreme Court could put the matter up to Congress by
announcing the legality of all vertical eliminations of competition other than rec price
maintenance and stating that only an inference as to Congressional intent drawn from the
existence of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire amendments prevented the abandonment of
the rule against vertical price fixing.
65. Justice Brennan thought that White's customer allocation clauses-which forbade
resellers to deal with classes of customers reserved for direct selling by White--were more
dangerous than the territorial restrictions, since "they serve to suppress all competition
between manufacturer and distributors for the custom of the most desirable accounts."
372 U.S. at 272. Yet such agreements suppressed competition no more completely than did
the allocation of reseller territories. It seems clear, moreover, that White's customer alloca-
tion clauses were vertical and could not have been used to restrict output by eliminating
rivalry between White and its resellers. See pages 424-25, 470-71 infra.
66. The topic of efficlencies is taken up at pages 429-64 infra.
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among resellers which they coerce or induce a manufacturer to ad-
minister and police. For purposes of this discussion that theory will be
accepted. 7 Such cases should be treated by the law as horizontal cartels
and therefore illegal per se.68 The existence of such reseller cartels con-
stitutes a serious objection to the legality of vertical restraints only if
reseller coercion or inducement is more common than manufacturer
origination of vertical-appearing restraints and if there is little likeli-
hood that the enforcement authorities can tell the two apart.
It is useful to begin by considering the breadth of the dealer cartel
objection. It does not seem to apply with equal force to all types of
vertical-appearing restraints. Vertical market division among the re-
sellers of one brand provides a poor instrument for reseller cartels.09
67. See generally Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance,
22 U. Cm. L. IR1v. 825 (1955).
68. It may be objected that a reseller agreement cannot, consistently with the argu.
ment of this article concerning horizontal restraints, be treated as per se illegal but must
be tested by the market share of the resellers and their intent. A contract integration
might be perceived in the relationship of the resellers as members of the same distribu-
tive system, having a common supplier and brand. Or the resellers might agree upon a
form of cooperation such as a joint advertising campaign which would supply the needed
contract integration. The analogy to horizontal cases is faulty, however. In a vertical
system, the horizontally agreeing resellers necessarily affect the interest of the manufacturer.
If they must force the use of resale price maintenance or vertical market division upon the
manufacturer, that is excellent evidence that the manufacturer regards the restraint not
as creating efficiency but as restricting output. The case for preferring the manufacturer's
judgment is that he can never be interested in restriction of output at the reseller level
and the resellers can. In addition, the manufacturer is likely to be the better judge of the
effect of restriction upon his overall business and output than are organized resellers. A
rule making reseller-imposed restraints illegal thus achieves the benefits of a per se rule's
clarity without substantial danger of destroying efficiency. Of course, a conspiracy of
the resellers of a single manufacturer will be very unlikely to change total output and
price. They will more likely, on the same analysis as the sleeping.car contract with the
railroad, see text at notes 63-65 supra, merely affect the split of any greater-than-competi-
tive profits between the manufacturer and themselves. But there is no consumer benefit In
permitting this split and there is always the danger that the conspiracy may broaden to
include resellers of one or more additional manufacturers. Broadening the conspiracy
would create additional horizontal market power and make additional restriction of output
possible. It seems best, out of caution, to maintain a per se rule against all reseller-Imposed
restraints, as Justice Brennan stated in White Motor. 372 U.S. at 267.
69. The case of a cartel agreement among resellers dealing in only one brand is dis-
cussed in the text at note 70 infra. It is difficult to imagine that exclusive outlets for
different brands could use vertical-seeming market division as a cartel tactic. This would
require that the manufacturers divide territories among themselves in order to eliminate
competition among all resellers. Not only does that seem unlikely but the presence of the
cartel would be made immediately visible by the division of territories according to
brands. Outlets which carried all brands could not use the device either since tile cartel
would have to consist of one member in each geographical market and would have
to force all, or virtually all, manufacturers to abandon all other outlets in each ter-
ritory. The loss in market coverage in industries that found multiple outlets useful (e.g.,
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The resellers would gain no market power their manufacturer did not
already possess and could do no more than share whatever extra-com-
petitive profits the manufacturer might be able to command. It also
seems highly doubtful that resale price maintenance can be used ef-
fectively by a reseller cartel where resellers specialize in the products
of only one manufacturer. Reseller specialization implies that the
products sold by each reseller are different. It is also probable that the
resellers will display a wide range of costs of operation. Reseller in-
terests, accordingly, would be quite diverse, and considerable negoti-
ation would be required to arrive at acceptable cartel prices. The
prices might well have to be different for different resellers. Under
such circumstances, cartelization would usually prove impossible. If it
were possible, the resellers would then have to force the agreed prices
and a program to maintain them upon each of the manufacturers.
The likelihood that such a cartel could be stable and effective is small.
For reasons which will be discussed, the likelihood that such a cartel
could go undetected approaches the vanishing point.
The dealer cartel objection, then, probably applies almost entirely
to resale price maintenance of products sold through common outlets.
It is, perhaps, unsafe to speculate on the relative frequency of reseller
coercion and manufacturer initiation in creating price maintenance
programs in such marketing situations. The fact that resellers in the
past may have succeeded in imposing such programs is probably not
an accurate guide to the probability of their success today and in the
future. New high-volume, low-price methods of retailing have created
such diversity among retailers that cartelization is probably much more
difficult. The reseller that depends on low prices is unlikely to join
a cartel to force resale price maintenance upon manufacturers. The
presence of such resellers probably also makes manufacturers less likely
to submit to cartel pressures from other resellers. The fact that resellers
do agitate for price maintenance and assist manufacturers in detecting
drugs, cosmetics, phonograph records) would impose so high a cost that most if not all
manufacturers would surely prefer to continue to use the non-cartel resellers. If. for the
sake of argument, one assumed that such a cartel might occasionally succeed, the collective
withdrawal of the manufacturers from all but one reseller in each area would make the
cartel enormously visible and create a large class of complainants.
70. This conclusion, again, follows from the analysis of the contract between the
sleeping-car company and the railroad. In order to make cartelization effective, the
resellers of two or more manufacturers (which, collectively, had market power) would
have to agree upon prices as well and force the appropriate resale price maintenance
programs upon their respective manufacturers. Aside from the difficulty in organizing
and operating such a cartel, reseller ability to fix prices in this fashion would make market
division superfluous.
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price cutting is also not necessarily evidence of reseller cartelization.
Many resellers may be expected to like price maintenance and the
particular types of competition it encourages even when the manu-
facturer initiates it. They will, therefore, actively participate in polic-
ing the program.
The argument below suggests that the enforcement agencies should
find it relatively easy to separate manufacturer-originated and reseller-
coerced resale price maintenance programs. (The argument should be
qualified, however, by conceding that if experience should show that
in common outlet industries all but a very few price maintenance
programs were reseller-imposed, it might be more economical to em-
ploy a rule of per se illegality for such situations than to expend re-
sources in attempting to identify and save the few efficiency-creating
programs. That is, vertical market division, as in White Motor, and
resale price maintenance in specialized outlets, as in Union Oil, would
be lawful, but resale price maintenance in common outlets, as in
Parke, Davis, would be per se illegal.)
Four considerations indicate that there should be little difficulty in
determining whether the impetus for a resale price maintenance pro-
gram comes from the manufacturer or from a reseller cartel.
First, under the rule of legality suggested here there would be no
occasion to hide manufacturer-imposed restraints. The group of resale
price maintenance programs requiring investigation would thus be
visible, and any disguised program could be presumed to be hori-
zontal in nature. The task of the enforcement agencies in ferreting
out secret horizontal programs would be no different and no greater
than it is under present law.
Second, a reseller cartel would have to comprise at least a majority
of the industry and the resellers of more than one manufacturer. A
majority of the industry is required because otherwise the resellers
taken collectively would not have the requisite market share to make
output restriction profitable. The resellers of more than one manu-
facturer are necessary in order to create a restriction of output beyond
any that the size of an individual manufacturer already created. The
only caveat to this guide would be the possibility that part of the price
maintenance would operate in the open and the rest in secret, thus
making it appear that the conditions here were not fulfilled. This
method of concealment seems so unwieldy and likely to be so rare that
the requirements mentioned would still provide useful guides to the
enforcement agencies in choosing which resale price maintenance pro-
grams to investigate for evidence of reseller conspiracy.
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Third, the presence of reseller cartels which coerce manufacturers to
use resale price maintenance will often be discoverable through the
complaints of coerced manufacturers. Those manufacturers who fear
reseller retaliation will have little difficulty in making their complaints
secretly. The likelihood of manufacturer complaint is increased by
the fact that any effective reseller cartel will have to coerce more than
one manufacturer; in many industries a minimum of three or four
would be required and often far more. The absence of manufacturer
complaint could not be relied upon to demonstrate conclusively the
vertical nature of parallel programs of resale price maintenance, how-
ever, since it may be possible in some cases for resellers to buy the
manufacturers' cooperation by sharing the cartel profits with them.
This possibility seems slim for the same reasons, discussed next, that
manufacturers will not often impose vertical restraints to police manu-
facturer cartels. Manufacturer complaints therefore, could be relied
upon to uncover many, perhaps most, reseller cartels.
Fourth, detection of reseller cartels is relatively simple because the
very large numbers and disparate interests involved makes such cartels
notoriously difficult to organize, administer, and police.71 The cartel
must be initiated by a vigorous organizational campaign which cannot
be carried on in secrecy.72 Subsequent suggested or actual changes in
prices must be discussed and justified to the numerous members. De-
fection by resellers who see the opportunity for greater profits in cut-
ting prices must be discovered and stopped. Having the appropriate
manufacturer cut off the misbehaving reseller will hardly work because
it will create a government informant. If, in addition, manufacturers
are brought into the cartel to prevent them from complaining, the
already insuperable problems of maintaining secrecy will be intensi-
fied. Additional organization and communication will be required to
negotiate the terms of the division of the spoils with the manufactur-
ers, to keep readjusting prices and terms as market conditions change,
and to assure the manufacturers that they are being treated equally.
The foregoing points are reinforced by the fact that once the cartel
71. McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27
U. Cm. L. REv. 191, 196-204 (1960).
72. The organization of large numbers of resellers, many of whom are apathetic or
timid, if not hostile to the notion of cartelization, seems often to require relentless organ-
izing, fight talks against manufacturers, and wide publicity. Often the reseller organization
advertises in the trade papers, news articles about its efforts appear in trade papers, the
organization is often formalized or even incorporated, dues or contributions are collected,
and large meetings are held in such places as hotel ballrooms. Observation of some re-
seller attempts at cartelization suggests that they are not merely usually ineffectivd but that
they are so highly visible as to be impossible for an enforcement agency to miss.
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nature of an allegedly vertical restraint is suspected, the running of a
grand jury will bring out any element of horizontal conspiracy. Quite
aside from the access to files and correspondence that grand jury sub-
poenas give, the power to call and question industry members makes
the idea of concealing a widespread cartel wholly impractical. Busi-
nessmen willing to lie concerning an antitrust violation in the grand
jury room comprise a relatively rare species. They will be even rarer
in reseller cartel cases where they would have to rely upon a large num-
ber of other persons being equally willing to perjure themselves, to do
so successfully, and to coordinate their fabrications. A witness con-
templating perjury must also take into account that the government has
the files and correspondence of dozens or hundreds of firms and that he
has no idea whether the cartel may be evidenced in such documents.
It seems safe to conclude that reseller cartels would be easy to detect
and that the rule legalizing vertical restraints suggested here need not
be rejected or even seriously questioned on the theory that it would
enable such cartels to operate under cover.78
73. An objection related to that discussed in the text might be that in some circum-
stances reseller pressure for a manufacturer-imposed restraint could be effective without
actual reseller cartelization. This theory, which could only apply to the case of common
outlets, would be that individual resellers, acting independently, could put non-price-
maintained brands under the counter and so coerce all manufacturers to resort to resale
price maintenance. The theory seems defective. A reseller who behaved in this fashion
would lose sales on the non-maintained brands to resellers who displayed and pushed
them. The non-maintained brands would have a price advantage. If some resellers found
it profitable to discourage sales of non-maintained brands, it would become increasingly
profitable for other resellers to feature them. The manufacturer of non-maintained brands
would feel no more pressure to institute price maintenance than the manufacturers of
maintained brands would feel to drop price maintenance.
The idea of individual resellers not selling brands that some consumers want because
the margin is not above the competitive level is the same as the idea of individual re-
sellers charging more than the price competition allows them. If the reseller can accom-
plish the first it is because he has some degree of market power, and, in that event, lie
can get the higher price without resale price maintenance. Reseller coercion, therefore,
will not be effective unless resellers collude. That requires a conspiracy whose high visi-
bility has already been discussed. In fact, the existence of conspiracy could be Inferred
from the mere fact that most resellers were putting non-maintained brands out of sight
since such behavior, like parallel price increases when costs and demand had not changed,
would be inexplicable under any hypothesis but collusion.
The theory just discussed is to be distinguished from the case where some resellers
choose to make a service and sales effort appeal and others choose to make a price appeal.
The former are in effect offering consumers a different product. If the product (consisting
of the physical item plus the services, atmosphere, etc.) sells, they do not need resale price
maintenance to get the higher price. The theory is also to be distinguished from the situa.
tion in which the manufacturer uses resale price maintenance in order to induce resellers
to engage in a greater amount of sales effort. See text at notes 159-61 infra.
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The Manufacturer Cartel Objection.
It has been suggested that manufacturers may agree to use resale price
maintenance as a means of policing their own horizontal agreement on
prices. 74 The idea is simply that a manufacturers' cartel may break down
more easily in industries in which the prices charged by the manu-
facturers are not very visible so that defection becomes difficult to
detect. A refiners' cartel in the gasoline industry would fit this model.
If certain resellers of one refiner began consistently underselling to con-
sumers it would be hard to know whether or not the cause was a price
cut by the refiner. One answer, it has been suggested, would be for the
refiners to agree also upon the prices they would require their resellers
to maintain. Retail prices, being highly visible, could easily be checked,
and there would be no advantage to a refiner in cutting prices to its re-
sellers secretly if the cut could not be passed on to consumers. Such
a price cut would merely expand the resellers' profit margins at the
refiner's expense.
The first question is the breadth and reality of the manufacturer
cartel objection. The theory of manufacturer cartels does not apply to
manufacturer use of reseller market division. Where common outlets
are used reseller market division is highly improbable." Where ex-
clusive outlets are the industry pattern manufacturer imposition of
closed reseller territories would leave the resellers of different manu-
facturers in competition with one another and would in no way solve
the cartel's problem of tracing reseller price cuts to manufacturer
defection from the price agreed upon at the manufacturing level.
The manufacturer cartel theory, therefore, applies only to the col-
lective use of resale price maintenance. Even there, however, the ob-
jection seems applicable only in special cases. Where common outlets
are used a manufacturers' cartel would not need to agree to maintain
resale prices in order to detect secret price cutting by cartel members.
Any manufacturer price cut would inevitably and instantly be reported
by resellers to the representatives of the other manufacturers in an effort
to obtain matching price cuts from them.70 The manufacturer cartel ob-
74. See Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAw & Eco.N. 86,
96-104 (1960). For a critical analysis of the theory, see Bowman, supra note 67, at 838-39.
75. See note 69 supra.
76. This common observation concerning reseller behavior is borne out by the diffi-
culties of suppliers in complying with the Robinson-Patman ACL The Act permits a
seller to charge a lower price to one customer than to another where the lower price
"was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor." Sellers are fre-
quently told by their reselling customers that they have been offered a lower price by
a competitive supplier. They frequently find, however, that the lower competitive offer
has either been exaggerated or did not even occur. This playing of suppliers off against
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jection, therefore, seems not to apply to industries using common out-
lets because resale price maintenance would be superfluous as a detect-
ing device and there are, as will be shown, substantial costs involved in
using resale price maintenance.
The manufacturer cartel theory of vertical restraints seems limited,
then, to the use of resale price maintenance by manufacturers selling
through outlets that carry only one brand. But even here it may be
doubted that manufacturers often employ resale price maintenance for
this purpose. Of course, the manufacturers must comprise the dom-
inant group in the industry to make their cartel effective. Moreover,
even resale price maintenance would not be sufficient to remove the
incentive to cut prices in order to sign up new resellers. The cartel
would therefore have to agree upon a market quota or a new reseller
quota.7 The cartel, moreover, would be faced with the fact that re-
sellers given a secret price cut by their manufacturer but unable to cut
prices themselves would attempt to use the cut to compete by offering
other terms and services to consumers.7 To be effective the manufac-
turers' cartel must prevent such behavior, but policing and preventing
these less visible forms of competition will be much more difficult than
each other is a common method of reseller price bargaining. Manufacturer agreement
to use resale price maintenance collectively would not prevent reseller use of this tactic.
Even a manufacturer who offered the lower price in return for preferential treatment
plus secrecy could not hope that none of hundreds or even thousands of resellers would
use the offer to exact similar offers from other manufacturers. Telser, supra note 74, at
97, suggests that in a common outlet case the manufacturers' cartel which used resale
price maintenance might be eroded by individual manufacturer price cutting to gain
preferential treatment from resellers and that the manufacturers might prevent tils by
agreeing to let each reseller handle only a single brand. The analysis above, concerning
reseller reporting of price cuts, suggests that in common outlet industries detection of
manufacturer price cutting would be so simple that resale price maintenance would not
be used for that purpose. Manufacturers would not, therefore, agree to use exclusive out-
lets to prevent the preferential-treatment bribe from undercutting the cartel. In fact, if
manufacturer cartels did prefer exclusive outlets, it might be for the opposite reason:
false reseller reports of price cuts or other special inducements might constantly raise
suspicions of defection where none existed.
77. See Telser, note 74 supra, at 97-98. Telser suggests that the cartel would have to
agree not to take each other's resellers, but this may not be necessary. Though it might
be possible to pick off a rival's reseller now and then with a secret price cut, the practice
could hardly be common and go undetected. The argument is similar to that in note 76
supra. Most resellers would be likely to try to get their existing manufacturers to meet
or beat the offer before switching. This would disclose the price cutting of the defector.
78. Id. at 97. Telser suggests that resellers given a price cut they cannot pass on may
instead offer customers favorable credit terms, free delivery, a cut on the price of a tied
article, and the like. That resale price maintenance has this effect upon resellers is, In
fact, the basis for the argument that manufacturers often employ it to induce just these
other forms of competition. See pages 453-56 infra.
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policing prices. The fact that reseller competition must take these
forms may decrease the incentive for secret manuft, cturer price cuts
somewhat but an incentive will still exist.
It must be remembered also that resale price maintenance carries
with it costs to the manufacturers. To the degree that all outlets did
not have identical costs of operation, as they surely would not, resale
price maintenance would present serious inefficiencies. To give the
least efficient outlets a competitive return the prices of other outlets
would have to be pegged at a point that would prevent them from
fully utilizing their efficiencies. This loss of reseller efficiency would
very often impose serious costs upon manufacturers. The costs could
be avoided only be setting different prices for different resellers (where
they were not in competition), a process so complicated and difficult
that it would seem almost certain not to be undertaken. Moreover,
manufacturer agreement on resale prices would require constant re-
vision as marketing conditions changed. And perhaps the conditions
would change in different directions in different markets, or in dif-
ferent directions for different resellers within the same market. The
manufacturers' cartel would have to renegotiate the appropriate re-
sale prices continually. The problem would be intensified if the
products were somewhat differentiated and so sold at different prices.
The question of the appropriate resale price differential would fre-
quently require review. The time lags and inevitable compromises
involved in all of these changes would be other costs of the program 9
All of these costs would have to be set off against the expected returns
from cartelization at the manufacturers' level. These costs, moreover,
would be incurred not to make cartelization possible but simply for a
device that assists in detecting or discouraging secret manufacturer
price cutting. To the degree that other less visible forms of reseller
competition are possible, the device paid for is not even wholly ef-
fective for the marginal purpose it serves.80
79. Id. at 99.
80. One other theory requires mention. This is the theory that manufacturers, either
collectively or singly, may offer resale price maintenance in return for resellers' promises
to deal exclusively, and that the object of the maneuver is to foreclose the outlets to
existing or potential rival manufacturers and so increase the market power of the manu-
facturers offering maintained prices. In the first place, the tactic could not work if there
were any significant number of resellers left for the other manufacturers or if entry
into reselling were easy, as it almost invariably is. In such cases existing or potential
manufacturers would be in no way "foreclosed." Moreover, a manufacturer, or group of
manufacturers, comprising less than the entire industry will obviously not be able to get
all the retailers to deal exclusively in exchange for resale price maintenance. The more
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These considerations by no means prove that resale price mainte-
nance is never a tool of manufacturers' cartels, but they may lead one
to doubt that price maintenance will be used for this purpose with any
frequency. Assuming, however, that there are some few cases of resale
resellers have their price fixed, the more attractive it will become to be a reseller free to
compete in prices. Non-price-maintaining manufacturers, therefore, seem certain to be
able to hold or find an appropriate fraction of the industry's resellers. In the hypothetical
case where all of the manufacturers join to sign up all of the resellers in this fashion it may
be thought a way of requiring new entrants to come in on both levels at once. If greater-
than-competitive profits are being made (which seems to be the point of the argument), It
is difficult to see why the requirement of entering both levels at once poses a problem. One
suggestion seems to be that in some cases the diversity of products required in reselling
may be greater than those required in manufacturing. But in such cases it is not at all
clear why only one manufacturer is likely to be attracted by the greater-than-competitive
profits being made. The problem under discussion is actually that of "foreclosure" by
vertical integration (whether by ownership or contract). These matters have been can-
vassed elsewhere. See Bork and Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 368,
366-68 (1965); Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, id. at 404-09; Bowman, Contrasts in
Antitrust Theory: II, id. at 418-19. Boax, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: the
Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 157, 194-201 (1954). So
far no satisfactory theory of "foreclosure" seems to have been worked out.
It seems true, nevertheless, that manufacturers, singly or in concert, do sometimes
maintain resale prices and require their resellers not to handle the goods of rival manu-
facturers. An explanation is required but a further study of actual cases will be necessary
to supply it. One possibility may be expounded first for the case of the single manu-
facturer. It is conceivable that a manufacturer wishes its resellers to engage in a signifi-
cant amount of service and local sales effort because it feels that there is an important
segment of the market which is sales-and-service elastic rather than price elastic. Resale
price maintenance, like market division, is a method of inducing such reseller activities.
See text at notes 159-61 infra. The manufacturer may also feel, however, that the likeli-
hood of having the reseller effort be effective or, if effective, always accrue to that manu-
facturer's products is considerably lessened when the reseller displays lower price items
of similar description in the same store. In such cases the manufacturer may well require
exclusive dealing as a means of realizing the benefits of the efficiencies gained through
resale price maintenance.
The same rationale might explain collective manufacturer use of resale price main-
tenance with the requirement that only goods of those manufacturers (or of manufac-
turers whose products retail above a certain price) be carried by the resellers. This might
occur where no one manufacturer provided a sufficiently broad line of products to permit
resellers to operate efficiently as exclusive outlets for one brand. By joining together in
a joint marketing scheme of the sort described, the manufacturers act, in these respects, as
a single firm and gain the efficiencies of resale price maintenance unavailable to any of
them singly. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), may fit this theory.
These are matters requiring further investigation. In any event, the "foreclosure" Idea,
even if accepted, would justify making illegal only resale price maintenance given as a
quid pro quo for reseller exclusive dealing and which was used by a monopolist or by
agreement among manufacturers comprising most of an industry. The latter agreement
should be unlawful, in any case, because it is a horizontal restraint among firms which,
taken together, possess market power.
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price maintenance employed to police a manufacturers' cartel, these
few cases should not be difficult for the government to detect.
The considerations here in many respects parallel those in the re-
seller cartel case. In the first place, the rule suggested would not
increase the government's burden in discovering cartels employing
secret resale price maintenance schemes. Secondly, resale price main-
tenance used as a tool of a manufacturer cartel would have to be
employed by manufacturers controlling the industry since an effective
cartel must possess market power. An industry pattern of resale price
maintenance would direct government investigation to cartelized in-
dustries. Another sign of manufacturer cartelization would be attempts
by manufacturers to discourage resellers from competing on terms
other than prices. Where a manufacturer cartel is not involved resale
price maintenance would often be used precisely to encourage such
competition.
With the search thus narrowed it should not be difficult to uncover
those cases in which manufacturer cartels were responsible for the use
of resale price maintenance. Manufacturer cartels, too, require organ-
ization, administration, and policing. Thus, the evidence of manu-
facturer collusion seems rarely, if ever, successfully concealed once a
determined governmental investigation begins. The added administra-
tive problem of agreeing not only upon the manufacturers' prices but
upon resellers' prices, and changes in both to meet changing conditions,
would make successful concealment even less likely than in the case
of a cartel that controlled only manufacturers' prices. The grand jury
in this situation too, provides a potent means not only of discovering
documents and evidence of excessive communication between manu-
facturers but of encouraging a desirable degree of candor in industry
witnesses.
The Objection That Vertical Restraints Transfer Imperfect Market
Structures.
The objection to vertical restraints has frequently been made that
they transfer the market structure existing at the manufacturer
level to the reseller level.81 The notion seems to be that if a monopolist,
or a group of oligopolists acting non-conclusively, extends control to
the retail level through vertical restraints, the public has lost a benefit
of competition at that level even though monopoly or oligopoly exists
81. See STOGEI=G & IWATMNS, MONOPOLY AND FREEE N'.si 322-23 (1951); Note,
Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 Hv. I. Rm. 795 (1962).
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in manufacturing. 2 It is obvious, however, that consumers lose nothing
in such a case. The monopolistic or oligopolistic manufacturer may be
assumed to restrict output, but it will have no incentive to cause a
further, unprofitable, restriction of output at the reseller level. Out-
put and prices will remain unchanged except to the extent that the
efficiencies created by the restraint increase output and thereby lower
prices.8 3 To say that vertical restraints transfer a market structure from
one level of industry to the next, therefore, is to state a truism which
has no policy implications adverse to the restraints.
The Problem of Price Discrimination.
Vertical restraints may also be used to separate markets with differing
elasticities of demand for a product so that a different profit-maximiz-
ing price may be charged in each.84 This category of cases is narrow. In
the first place, resale price maintenance alone cannot be used to
separate markets. A manufacturer might wish to set different reseller
prices for different markets but the separation of the markets would
have to be accomplished by a market-division agreement to prevent
cross-selling by the resellers. 85 Secondly, a territorial market-division
agreement could almost never be used to create price discrimination. A
seller might be supposed to wish to discriminate on a territorial basis
when: (1) He wants to employ price discrimination as a predatory tactic
to drive rivals out of business in the lower-price market; or (2) he is
faced with rival sellers of the same product in one market but not in
82. So put, this objection dates back at least to the Dr. Miles case, supra note 55, at
403, where Justice Hughes remarked that merely "because there is monopoly of produc-
tion, it certainly cannot be said that there is no public interest in maintaining freedom
of trade with respect to future sales after the article has been placed on the market and
the producer has parted with his title." The argument in the text, however, indicates
that this is precisely what can be said.
83. The problem is identical to that of vertical integration. A manufacturer control-
ling its resellers' business practices would have no more reason to cause the reseller to
restrict output or raise prices than would a manufacturer that purchased the same
resellers. See Bork, supra note 54, at 195-96.
84. It is conceivable that an ancillary horizontal restraint could be used for this pur-
pose as well. The members of a cooperating group, such as the manufacturers in the
Mattress Cases, see text at notes 43-44 supra, could divide markets to enable some members
to charge a higher price but such a scheme would necessarily involve profit pooling. Other-
wise the members assigned to less profitable markets would not agree to the division.
No example of a horizontal restraint used for this purpose comes to mind. If there are
any, they are subject to the same limitations and analysis as the text demonstrates apply
to vertical restraints.
85. See Bowman, supra note 67, at 839-40.
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another so that his revenue-maximizing price differs in each market. In
neither of these cases would a market-division agreement be used to
create the capacity to maintain differential prices since in each case the
rival sellers in the lower-price market, not being bound by the agree-
ment, would always be able to sell in the higher-price market.8s
Price discrimination enabled by vertical restraint, therefore, is con-
fined to the case in which the differing elasticities of demand (which
make the discrimination profitable) are created by the fact that the
customers to be separated place different values upon the product. The
customers might place different values upon a product because different
alternatives are open to each. For example, a computer manufacturer
might sell a machine which can be used in both manufacturing and
banking. The computers of other manufacturers might be equally
satisfactory in manufacturing but unfit for bank use. The elasticities
of demand for the computer might, therefore, differ for bankers and
manufacturers. The computer manufacturer will not be able to take
advantage of the difference and charge a higher price to banks unless
he can prevent cross-selling. Where resellers are involved, he may be
able to accomplish market division by a customer allocation clause.
He could use territorial division only in the rare case where the two
classes of customers happened to be geographically separate. The
problem of price discrimination, then, insofar as it concerns the topic
of this article, relates almost entirely to the proposed legality of vertical
customer allocation clauses. These clauses may be used, as will be
shown, to create a number of efficiencies valuable to consumers. The
question now is whether the possibility that they may sometimes be
used to create price discrimination should weigh against their legality.
Three considerations indicate that the Sherman Act should ignore
the possible use of customer allocation clauses to create price dis-
crimination. (1) The identification of discrimination, particularly in a
litigation context, is probably impossible. A law against price discrim-
ination might easily compel more price discrimination than it stopped;
(2) any attempt to enforce a law against discrimination imposes costs
86. That is, if a multi-plant manufacturer sold on both the East and West Coasts and,
for either of the reasons mentioned in the text, charged a lower price on the East Coast,
he would not use a territorial-division agreement to keep his East Coast resellers from
shipping to the West Coast. If the East Coast resellers could, but for the agreement. reach
the West Coast market and break down the higher price structure there, so could rival
East Coast manufacturers. Since the rival manufacturers are not bound by the agreement.
the agreement could not preserve the power to discriminate. If shipping costs separated
the two markets, the agreement would be superfluous.
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which, if they were fully measurable, might be prohibitive; and (3)
even if discrimination could be readily identified, it is unclear whether,
on balance, discrimination benefits or injures consumers.
The ability to identify price discrimination is, self-evidently, essen-
tial to any proposal that the law prohibit it. The fact is, however, that
there are now available no reliable means, and certainly no means
suitable for use in litigation, for making the identification. As writers
on the Robinson-Patman Act have repeatedly pointed out, the ten-
dency to equate price differentials with price discrimination is wholly
erroneous. Discrimination in the economic sense occurs only when a
seller makes a greater return on some sales than on others81 Direct
observation of prices, which are visible, must, therefore, be replaced
by comparison of returns, which are not visible. Since the seller's
costs may differ from market to market, the observation of differing
prices would not show discrimination, and the observation of equal
prices would not show the absence of discrimination. Thus, if White
Motor spent more in sales effort and servicing to reach certain large-
volume accounts than it did in selling smaller accounts through re-
sellers, other costs being equal, it could avoid price discrimination only
by fully reflecting those cost differences in a higher price to the large-
volume accounts. A customer allocation clause might then be essential
to prevent economic discrimination. Striking down the clause would
create price discrimination. The law could be sure it was preventing
rather than creating discriminations only if it could identify and
allocate all relevant costs.
The identification and allocation of all relevant costs is, however, for
practical purposes, usually impossible. Nor does the analogy provided
by Robinson-Patman Act litigation suggest the contrary. The Rob-
inson-Patman Act attempts, in a rough fashion, to deal with the prob-
lem of economic price discrimination through the cost justification
defense, which provides that the statute does not outlaw price "differ-
entials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered."88 It is common wisdom in the antitrust field, however, that
87. See Dam, The Economics and Law of Price Discrimination: Herein of Three
Regulatory Schemes, 31 U. CI. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1963); McGee, Price Discrimination
and Competitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. Cm. L. REV. 398,
399 n. 2 (1956); Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV.
3, 4 (1953); and RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE RODINSON-PATMAN Acr 29-31
(1962).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
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even when such cost differences seem to exist, the cost defense is so
difficult to establish that it is usually worthlessso The difficulty stems
from the inadequacy of accounting techniques to measure and allocate
accurately all relevant differences in cost. To the degree that the law
recognizes only the costs which the accountant can "prove" and ignores
all others, it is measuring accounting data and not price discrimina-
tion. When the law requires price differences to reflect only demon-
strable cost differences and ignores the others, it compels price
discrimination. This result clearly seems to be occurring in Robinson-
Patman litigation.
If attempts to prove costs have been unsatisfactory even within the
range of costs which Robinson-Patman permits to be shown, the pros-
pects are even more bleak for any law that attempts to deal with
economic discrimination by including, as it must, a whole range of
even less provable costs which lie outside the Robinson-Patman de-
fense. 0 These difficulties are made insuperable by the fact that avoid-
ance of economic price discrimination by law would require the seller
to reflect all economic cost differences in differential prices and then
stand prepared to prove every one of them. Anything short of that
utopian standard would not be a law dealing with price discrimina-
tion.
In addition to these difficulties, in framing a new legal policy it is
appropriate for Sherman Act courts to count the consumer costs in-
evitably incurred in any attempt to ban price discrimination. Even
the limited, unrealistic cost defense of the Robinson-Patman Act
requires enormous expense in accountants' and lawyers' time'1 The
attempt to limit price differentials to the range of readily provable
costs also distorts business policies and price and output decisions. The
cost of such distortion to consumers in legally compelled misallocation
of resources can be imagined only vaguely.92 There is, therefore, no
89. See RowE, op. cit. supra note 87, at 296-312; Dam, supra note 87, at 13-14; Adel-
man, supra note 87, at 7-14. See also Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61, 68-69 (1953).
90. See Rowa, op. cit. supra note 87, at 30, 281-90.
91. Id. at 307-09.
92. For example, if White Motor incurred higher costs in selling and servicing large-
volume accounts directly than it did in reaching smaller customers through rmellers, it
would wish to separate the two markets and charge a higher price to the large accounts.
If the law forbade discrimination and White discovered that it could "prove" in an
accounting sense only half of the cost differences it believed to exist, White would be
motivated to limit the price differential to half of what it should be. White would obvi-
ously not continue to fail to cover costs. It would either reduce its service and sales
efforts to cut unprovable costs or switch to another method of distribution, perhaps
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
certain way of knowing that consumers gain as much as they lose in
such efforts. Resources expended or misallocated in law enforcement
and compliance are as effectively lost to consumers as resources mis-
allocated by cartels. Even if identification of price discrimination in the
litigation context were ultimately possible, therefore, it would be far
from certain that the costs of enforcing a ban on price discrimination
did not greatly exceed its benefits.
If these problems were not enough, there remains the unfortunate
fact that, given the present state of economic knowledge, it is im-
possible to be certain that banning all price discrimination (assuming,
for the sake of argument, discrimination to be identifiable without
cost) would actually benefit consumers. The balance of advantages for
the consumer in the short run is not always clear, and, in the long
run, seems to favor allowing the discrimination.
The power to discriminate in the economic sense requires some
degree of power in at least one market. In assessing the impact of
discrimination upon consumers two situations must be distinguished.
The first is that of a firm which, prior to its segregation of markets,
does not possess power in the general market for its product and is,
therefore, not restricting output. In this case, the initiation of market
separation to gain power in a separate submarket and the ensuing
price discrimination may or may not alter the industry's physical
output but in the short run seems likely to decrease consumer want
satisfaction. Because market power and the ability to discriminate in
such cases probably rests upon product differentiation, the long-run
result of the discrimination will probably be an increase in product
differentiation by other sellers and perhaps a net gain in consumer
want satisfaction. The second situation is that of a firm which possesses
market power and is restricting output in the general market prior
to the initiation of price discrimination accomplished by segregating
the general market into submarkets. In this case, the initiation of seg-
regation and discrimination will have an indeterminate effect upon
output. That is, discrimination may or may not result in an increase
in the firm's output to a level which more closely resembles that which
would prevail under conditions of competition. The impact of price
discrimination by a monopolist upon consumer want satisfaction, there-
reaching the large-volume accounts through resellers. These, being second choices, would
almost surely be less efficient means of doing business and would therefore impose a cost
upon consumers. White's other alternative would be to cut back its sales to the large
accounts in an effort to lower costs in line with the lower prices forced upon It. Such
a restriction of output would, of course, constitute a misallocation of resources detri-
mental to consumers.
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fore, is indeterminate in the short run. In the long run price discrim-
ination, by increasing the chances that the monopoly will be attacked
by the government or eroded by entry, may tend to enhance the
prospects for increased consumer welfare.
To illustrate the first situation, let us suppose White Motor had
5% of the general market for trucks but that a fifth of its sales were
to special customers who found White trucks much preferable to any
other make. White would clearly not restrict output in the general
market, and would be unable to take advantage of its monopoly power
over the special customers because of their ability to purchase from
White's resellers.93 If White adopted customer allocation clauses and
reserved the special customers to itself, it would promptly raise prices
and thereby increase its net revenues on sales to such customers. This
raise would certainly restrict White's output.94 The value of the
marginal product of resources engaged in making trucks for the higher-
price market would be greater than the value of the marginal product
of the same resources devoted to truck manufacturing for the general
market. Consumer want satisfaction would be increased if resources
could shift from the lower to the higher value employment. But White
has prevented this beneficial shift through its customer allocation
clauses.
The long-run effect of permitting White to discriminate in this
manner would, of course, be the entry of other producers into the
higher-price market. Since White's power to discriminate and achieve
monopoly returns in the special market arose from the fact that it
offered a differentiated product, other manufacturers will have an
incentive to differentiate their products. They will differentiate in
order to cut into White's special market and, if possible, to carve
out special markets of their own. Entry into the field of differentia-
tion would tend to return the profitability of that activity to the com-
93. If White's resellers were competing among themselves no one of them could
discriminate since it would always pay another reseller to offer the special customer a
lower price. In this way, the price to special customers would be forced down to the
general market price. If the resellers had closed territories, each could discriminate but
the overall level of discrimination might not be as accurate as if White had set the prices
to special customers and, moreover, White would not get all of the benefit of the discrim-
ination.
94. If White selected its special customers accurately, and could confront each with
an all-or-nothing offer, there might seem to be no change in output whatever. This
would be true, however, only if the customers were ultimate consumers. If the customers
were themseves producers of other goods or services, as customers for trucks almost al-
ways are, the increased cost of trucks would sooner or later decrease their output and
hence their demand for trucks.
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petitive level. This effect does not appear to provide a reason for
Sherman Act courts to interfere with price discrimination, and may
suggest the contrary. If product differentiation succeeds, it is because
consumers like and respond to it. The range of consumer choice is
enlarged, and each consumer is likely to find a product more closely
tailored to his wants than before differentiation became common.05 To
outlaw discrimination in order to save short-run consumer benefits
might deprive consumers of more substantial long-run benefits. This
"long-run" effect may occur within a very short time period. The long-
run merely refers to the time required for adjustments to new market
conditions. In this first case, then, there seems to be no clear reason for
a court to interfere with price discrimination.
To illustrate the second case, suppose that White produced all
trucks purchased in the United States and that it faced two general
classes of customers with very different elasticities of demand. White,
as a monopolist, would restrict output but the output chosen would
be a compromise between the different outputs appropriate for its
two classes of customers. The situation would, nevertheless, be un-
favorable to consumers since the value of the marginal product of re-
sources would be greater in this industry than in alternative employ-
ments. Upon the initiation of price discrimination, output for cus-
tomers with low elasticities of demand would be restricted and output
for those with high elasticities would increase. The value of the mar-
ginal product of resources employed in the higher-price market would
diverge even more sharply from the value of the same resources in
other industries. The value of the marginal product in the lower-
price market, however, would move downward toward the value of
the same resources in alternative uses. Whether the discrimination
benefitted or injured consumers would depend upon which of these
effects on the value of the marginal product predominated. Perhaps
the total effect can be gauged by the effect of the discrimination upon
total output. If White's total output increases, the value of the mar-
ginal product of the resources it uses must, on the average, have
moved closer to the value in other employments. If White's output
decreases, the values must have been further separated. Consumer
want satisfaction, therefore, can be correlated with the effect upon
95. The analysis is not changed if the product differentiation seems rooted less in
physical characteristics than in advertising which develops "irrational" preferences. Such
preferences are likely to be confined to ultimate consumers, however, and no likely situ.
ation comes to mind in which customer allocation clauses would be used to segregate
ultimate consumers. This topic, therefore, need not be developed in the present article.
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output. In the abstract, the effect of discrimination upon a monopo-
list's output is indeterminate. 6 In concrete cases, perhaps the effect
may be estimated by the relative sizes of the higher-price and the
lower-price markets. There will be difficulty in close cases because
the discrimination will change these relative sizes by tending to shrink
the higher-price market. The situation before the discrimination can-
not safely be used as a guide because other factors may have changed
and because the two segments of the market may not be clearly visible
to an outside observer prior to the price differentiation. There may be
some cases, nonetheless, in which it is clear that the higher-price market
is much the larger and that outlawing customer allocation clauses
would increase consumer want satisfaction. These cases, however, are
only a part of the total range of discriminations by a monopolist. Dis-
criminations by a monopolist in the sector of the economy to which
section 1 of the Sherman Act applies (primarily the sector not subject
to administrative regulation) are, in turn, probably less frequent than
the product differentiation case already discussed. A law against cus-
tomer allocation clauses which create price discrimination would only
rarely, therefore, benefit consumers. Broadly applied to discriminating
monopolists, such a law might easily do more harm than good.
The likely long-run impact of price discrimination upon monopoly
position, and hence upon consumer welfare, slightly favors permitting
the discrimination. Insofar as a monopoly is not based on government
protection or economies of scale so great that a single firm inevitably
occupies the whole market, the monopoly is vulnerable either to anti-
trust attack or to the entry of new firms. The existence of price dis-
crimination will assist in calling the monopoly to the attention of the
enforcement agencies. By increasing the monopolist's rate of return,
price discrimination will also more certainly attract the attention of
potential entrants.
Taken in combination, the extraordinary difficulties (often amount-
ing to impossibility) of finding out whether price discrimination is
prevented or created by a customer allocation clause, the high costs
96. See SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 42-45 (1917). As an example.
using purely arbitrary figures, suppose that White had one identifiable Class of customers
willing to pay from $5,000 to $7,000 per truck and a second class willing to pay from
$7,000 to $9,000. If White were unable to separate these two classes, it would have to
charge a single price to all. Let us suppose the maximizing monopoly price would be
$6,500 per truck at an annual output of 20,000 units, but upon separating the two classes
of customers White arrives at a maximizing price to the first class of $5,500 and to the
second of $7,000. Without empirical data concerning the demand schedules of the cus-
tomers it is impossible to predict whether White's output would rise or decline.
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of even attempting to outlaw discrimination, and the uncertainty
whether a successful ban would aid or injure consumers, seem to argue
conclusively against taking the subject of discrimination into account
in deciding the legality of customer allocations.
The Problem of Distinguishing Between Horizontal and Vertical
Restraints.
Since vertical restraints should be treated as completely lawful while
ancillary horizontal restraints should be judged by the criteria of
market share and intent, it is necessary to be able to distinguish the two
types. Though the distinction is often quite simple, there are cases
which may be thought to present some conceptual difficulty. The test is
simply whether, assuming market power to exist, the agreement elimi-
nating competition could lead to a restriction of output. If it could, the
restraint is horizontal; if it could not, the restraint is vertical.
The factual situation of the White Motor case may be used to illus-
trate the point. White imposed six restrictions upon competition: (1)
control of certain resale prices; (2) the requirement that resellers make
no sales outside their assigned territories; (3) prohibitions of reseller
sales to certain customers reserved for direct sale by White; (4) White's
agreement not to compete for retail sales with its resellers in the cate-
gories of customers assigned to them; (5) White's agreement not to
appoint additional resellers within an existing reseller's territory; and
(6) the reseller's agreement to sell only White trucks.9 7
These restrictions are all vertical because none of the agreements
could restrict output. The argument concerning agreements (1) and (2)
has already been made.98 Agreements (5) and (6) are essentially the
same as the agreement between the railroad and the sleeping-car
company which Taft justified, and the same analysis which shows that
that agreement could not restrict output applies to them.9 Agreements
(3) and (4) are subject to the same reasoning. Only the fact that they
eliminate competition between parties operating at the same level
(White as a retailer and the resellers) may seem to give the agreements
a horizontal cast. The fact that White is a retailer is misleading and
irrelevant, however. The agreement is still vertical. Assume that White
manufactured all the trucks sold in the United States, and that it sold
97. Only the first three agreements were challenged by the government. This seems
somewhat anomalous since (3) and (4) are identical in being customer allocations. The
government, however, challenged only the allocation of accounts to White and not the
allocation to resellers.
98. See text accompanying notes 63-66, supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 58-66, supra.
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25%o of them directly to customers and the remainder through resellers.
Since White could collect its entire monopoly profit at the manufac-
turing level and would wish the costs of retailing kept as low as consis-
tent with efficiency, it would have no incentive to divide markets at the
retail level in any way which would lead to a restriction of output there.
If its own retailing operation were less efficient than that of the inde-
pendent resellers, White's best course would be to get out of retailing,
let more efficient firms take over, and thereby increase the price it could
charge as a manufacturer. 00 If for some reason White wanted to keep a
hand in the retail market,' 01 its least costly method would be a straight
subsidy to its own retailing operation. This method would trim the
subsidy to the minimum needed and avoid subsidizing its resellers as a
customer allocation clause, made for such a purpose, would necessarily
do. No rational firm would divide markets to protect its retail opera-
tions from the competition of more efficient resellers of its products.
Agreements (3) and (4), which allocate customers between White and
its resellers, cannot lead to a restriction of output and must, therefore,
be classified as vertical.
All of the agreements discussed, (1) through (6), may be confidently
classed as vertical only because there is no real likelihood that the re-
sellers could compete with White in manufacturing trucks. If they
could, agreements (3) and (4) would, to that extent, become horizontal,
and White's market share would become relevant to their legality.
Suppose that White made a deal with a nationwide truck rental concern
to supply trucks and that the agreement contained the following pro-
visions: (a) White will not rent trucks directly to customers for that
service; (b) the rental company will not manufacture trucks; (c) White
will not sell trucks to any other rental concern; and (d) the rental
company will not purchase trucks from any manufacturer but White.
(a) and (b) are horizontal agreements since they presume the likeli-
hood of competition at both levels between the firms.102 Either agree-
100. The fact that White had an investment in retailing would in no way affect this
decision. That investment represents a past cost and is irrelevant in deciding upon a
revenue-maximizing course for the future.
101. It could conceivably wish, for example, to acquire first-hand knowledge of retail-
ing problems and trends.
102. The market share of each firm in its own market would be relevant since, if that
share were large enough to confer the ability to restrict output, the agreement of the
other firm not to compete would preserve that ability. If both White and the truck
rental concern were monopolies but entry was likely only by White, the agreement of
White not to engage in the rental business would still be vertical. The preservation of
the truck rental monopoly would not maintain a restriction of output because White
would retain complete power to restrict output even if it entered truck renting and
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ment standing alone would be horizontal only if there were a likeli-
hood that the firm which did not promise not to invade might do so,
for then an implied promise to that effect would seem likely. That is,
if the rental firm agreed not to enter manufacturing but White made
no explicit promise about entering the rental business, and further,
if it seemed likely on independent grounds that White would enter
the rental business, the courts might suspect an implied promise by
White not to do so. In that case, the agreement is between firms who
are potential competitors and should be viewed as horizontal. Its
legality would depend upon the market shares of White and the rental
concern in their respective markets, modified, of course, by the likeli-
hood of entry by other firms. Agreements (c) and (d), above, are vertical
since they do not eliminate any existing or potential competition.
Horizontal analysis becomes proper only when each of vertically-related
parties is in fact realistically capable of entering the other's market,
or when the party at a competitive level is capable of entering at a
level at which restriction of output is possible.
The facts underlying the Penn-Olinl s case provide a contrast to
those of White Motor because an agreement which seemed vertical
in form was perhaps horizontal in fact. Prior to the formation of Penn-
Olin, the joint venture corporation, Pennsalt made sodium chlorate,
but Olin did not. Pennsalt appointed Olin its selling agent for the
southeastern United States. Pennsalt agreed not to compete with Olin
on certain categories of sales in that area. The effect of the arrange-
ment, the district court noted, was to preclude Olin from selling Penn-
salt's sodium chlorate in any market other than the pulp and paper
mills in the southeast and to preclude Pennsalt from selling to such
mills, with the exception of one account it reserved to itself. The agree-
ment was characterized by the district court as creating both "territorial
division" and "customer allocation."'1 4 Though this supplier-distri-
butor relationship was clearly vertical in form, the strong possibility
that Olin might otherwise have produced sodium chlorate itself, and
thus have entered competition with Pennsalt at both the manufacturing
and distribution levels, made it appropriate to analyze the situation
further to determine the degree of likelihood of such competition and,
if a substantial likelihood existed, the market share of Pennsalt. It
destroyed the monopoly there. If White's market were competitive and the truck rental
market monopolistic, however, White's agreement to stay out would be horizontal since it
would preserve in the truck rental concern the power to restrict output.
103. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1968), vacated,
378 U.S. 158 (1964).
104. Id. at 135.
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would be better to know what Olin's market share would have been,
but the case could as well be decided upon the share of Pennsalt which
is protected by the arrangement.105
The Pennsalt-Olin relationship, of course, was not challenged at
this stage' 06 but after the contract integration had been converted into
an ownership integration by the formation of the joint venture corpora-
tion, Penn-Olin, and the construction of new facilities. The rela-
tionship of the principals remained much the same, however, with
Pennsalt being responsible for the manufacturing operations of Penn-
Olin and Olin responsible for the distribution of the product.107 The
effect upon competition between Pennsalt and Olin in the southeastern
United States was approximately the same, too. The case was therefore
properly analyzed, though in a Clayton 7 rather than a Sherman 1
context, in an effort to see whether the likelihood of competition
between the two parents, absent the joint venture, was substantial
enough to make horizontal precedent applicable.
A final problem worth notice is whether the vertical nature of a
restraint is affected when the parties on whom it is imposed own the
firm imposing it. The industry situation in White Motor may con-
veniently be used once again as a background for a hypothetical exam-
ple. Suppose the resellers of White trucks had purchased White
Motor Company. Reseller ownership of White could be viewed as con-
verting the restraints to horizontal agreements since the reseller-owners
would now be imposing the restraints upon themselves. This view
would seem mistaken, however. The restraints would still be vertical,
and this would be true whether they were imposed by White before or
after the resellers took control of it. The reason is simply that the
resellers as owners of White would have no more reason to restrict their
output as resellers than White had before the change in control. If
White's share of the final market was large enough to make restriction
of output profitable, that restriction would take place at the manufac-
turing level and would not require the more cumbersome and costly
mechanism of division of reseller territories. 08
105. The government challenged this agreement in the district court as per se unlaw-
ful. The court, however, discounted the possibility of competition between the two
companies. Id. at 134-37. The Supreme Court did not discuss the legality of the agreement
but confined its analysis to the subsequent joint venture.
106. It would have been inappropriate to apply a per se rule to the agency agreement.
as the government urged, since the contract integration of Pennsalt's manufacturing and
Olin's distribution is obviously capable of creating efficiencies.
107. 378 U.S. at 163.
108. A possible theoretical exception to this generalization might be constructed by
supposing that the split of the profits taken at the reseller level was different from the
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The foregoing discussion of the problem of distinguishing vertical
from horizontal agreements does not cover the special problems that
arise when the restraint is imposed in connection with the licensing or
sale of a patent or of know-how. These forms of property are sufficiently
distinct so that they will be discussed separately in the third section of
this article. It will be helpful in the remainder of this section, however,
to indicate briefly why it seems proper to analyze cases such as Sealy and
Spring-Air as horizontal. In each of these cases a corporation owning
trademarks and tradenames licensed them to bedding product manu-
facturers. The licenses required the manufacturers to use identical
materials and specifications so that uniform products could be nation-
ally advertised. The licenses also required the manufacturers to sell
products using the licensed marks and names only within specified
territories and to require their retailers to maintain specified retail
prices. The manufacturers in each case, however, owned and controlled
the licensing corporation. Though the cases thus seem similar to the
hypothetical reseller purchase of White Motor, the resemblance is
superficial. Sealy and Spring-Air are better analyzed as horizontal be-
cause the elimination of competition between the bedding manufac-
turers in such a case may raise a danger of restriction of output greater
than that which exists at the level of trademark ownership. A corpora.
tion which owns only a trademark is most unlikely to possess the power
to restrict output in order to take a monopoly profit from an industry.10
Entry at the level of trademark ownership is too easy. Other firms need
division of manufacturing profits. This would in turn require that voting control at the
manufacturing level be, for some reason, different from the division of profits among the
reseller-owners. Such a situation would permit those in voting control to defraud the
other owners by shifting the taking of the monopoly profit from the manufacturing to
the reseller level. Not only are such cases extremely rare, if they occur at all, but the
shifting of monopoly profits could conceivably have antitrust implications only if it were
possible to say that the restriction of output or the cost of imposing it was greater than If
the monopoly profit were taken at the manufacturing level. For all practical purposes,
therefore, reseller ownership of the manufacturer does not alter the verticality of the
restraints placed upon the resellers by the manufacturer.
109. A firm, or a group of firms using a common trademark, may well possess mo-
nopoly power. The point -under discussion, however, is whether that power is likely to
be conferred by the trademark or by the structure of, or collusion in, the underlying
industry. If ownership of a trademark alone were sufficient to create complete monopoly
power, all trademark licensing cases would be vertical since the imposition of restraints
upon licensees could never create an additional restriction of output. For reasons given
in the text, this does not seem a correct analysis. A trademark would be capable of con-
ferring monopoly power only if the economies of scale in advertising were such In rela-
tion to the size of the market that only one trademark could profitably be advertised and,
further, if trademark advertising were indispensable to survival in the industry.
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only adopt a mark and advertise it to share in the monopoly profit.
Manufacturers offered licenses could avoid the monopoly toll simply
by establishing trademarks, i.e., integrating backward into trademark
ownership. Trademark ownership and exploitation are, therefore,
likely to give only a competitive return. There may be an untaken
monopoly profit which could be captured by the establishment of
market control at some other level of the industry. If bedding manu-
facturers which collectively possessed market power purchased a trade-
mark corporation and, through it, imposed territorial and price
restrictions upon themselves, there would be created the danger, if not
the certainty, of output restriction. This indicates that Sealy and Spring-
Air should be viewed as horizontal cases and the legality of the
restraints involved should be determined by the market share of the
manufacturers.
CREATION OF EFFICIENCY: MARKET DIVISION AND PRICE FLNG
Market division and price fixing may conveniently be discussed
separately because the ways in which they are capable of contributing
to the efficiency of contract integrations are not in every respect iden-
tical. Horizontal contract integrations are typically created by otherwise
independent and perhaps competitive firms in order to achieve the
advantages that accrue to a larger scale of operations in the activities
co-ordinated. Vertical contract integrations are typically created in
order to permit a manufacturer to obtain the benefits of a stable
relationship with its resellers: reduction of selling costs, accurate
estimation of output required, reseller expertise in the marketing
and servicing of the particular product, and so forth. The question
to be examined here is what additional efficiencies may be created
by an agreement eliminating competition between the members of a
horizontal system or the resellers in a vertical system. The efficiencies
suggested for such agreements do not, of course, exist in all contract
integrations, or may be outweighed by other business efficiencies with
which they interfere.
The theory of efficiencies presented here is undoubtedly incomplete
and is probably inaccurate in certain aspects. But the fact that market
division and price fixing can create efficiencies valuable to consumers
does not seem subject to reasonable doubt. The present state of legal
doctrine, unfortunately, too often precludes judicial inquiry into
the efficiency-creating potential of such agreements. Some of the recent
cases discussed here give reason to hope that the law will soon permit
the relevant inquiries to be made.
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Market-Division Agreements
Though there may be other methods which will be revealed by
analysis or by study of particular situations, the most obvious ways by
which market division may enhance the efficiency of a contract integra-
tion include:
1. Optimizing local sales effort: the free ride problem;
2. Optimizing local sales effort: the size of the market problem;
3. Encouraging exchanges of information;
4. Minimizing the costs of providing post-sales service and mini-
mizing the risks of customer dissatisfaction;
5. Preventing overlapping use of a service whose cost is shared; and
6. Preventing duplication of costs and customer irritation due to
overlapping distributive effort.110
The first and third points and part of the analysis under the fourth
point relate to the solution of the free ride problem. This problem,"'
in all its manifestations, is similar in form to the partnership case dis-
cussed earlier.1 2
1. Local Sales Effort: The Free-Ride Problem.
Defendants have occasionally attempted to justify market-division
agreements with the contention that they were necessary to insure
intensive coverage of markets. In White Motor, for instance, the
defendant argued that it had "to insist that its distributors and dealers
concentrate on trying to take sales away from other competing truck
110. The Note, supra note 81, at 813, suggests the first and fourth eficiencies listed,
as have other writers, and also suggests three others: facilitation of manufacturer plan-
ning by keeping the volume of each reseller constant; encouragement to resellers not to
take on competing lines by assuring a sufficient market; and facilitation of manufacturer
tracing of defective goods. The first and third seem theoretical possibilities, though the
first does not appear a significant efficiency and the third may be important only in
special industries. The authors say it is often mentioned in the drug industry. The
second factor listed would exist only where the law outlawed an exclusive dealing agree-
ment or where the unattractiveness of the product made it necessary to offer a large
protected territory to get a dealer to agree not to handle other lines. The Note contains
an excellent summary of reasons given by businessmen for wishing to use various forms
of reseller market division. The economic analysis and the policy suggestions of this
article, however, differ considerably from those in the Note.
ill. Bowman, supra note 67, refers to the same phenomenon as the "spilling-over
effect," Telser, supra note 74, refers to it as "free ride." Both of these authors analyze
the problem in the context of resale price maintenance. The analysis here differs pri-
marily in the variety of situations in which the problem is suggested to exist and in the
variety of contractual restraints which are believed available to solve it.
112. See text accompanying notes 19-34, supra.
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manufacturers in their respective territories rather than on cutting each
other's throats in other territories."'1 3
At first glance this argument seems difficult to follow. The self-
interest of the dealer would seem sufficient to cause him to cultivate
all profitable accounts in his own territory as well as to raid other
territories to attempt to capture the profitable accounts there. Merely
because there is a more profitable account in a neighboring territory
seems no reason for a dealer to ignore any account in his own territory
on which some profit is to be made. He would seem more likely to
try for both.
There seem two valid explanations for the contention made in
White Motor. Both have to do with the deleterious effect upon local
sales effort of the ability of firms selling the same brand to sell to the
same accounts. This section takes up the explanation based on the free-
ride problem-that is, the problem created when one firm in an inte-
grated group is able to take advantage of the efforts of other members
of the group. The next section discusses the explanation based on the
size-of-the-market problem.
Recent litigation discloses a number of distributive systems which
appear to employ market-division agreements to prevent any seller
from enjoying a free ride upon the efforts of others within the same
system. The Sealy and Spring-Air cases, here viewed as horizontal,
involved the licensing of trademarks and trade names to bedding prod-
uct manufacturers" 4 who were required to follow promulgated stand-
ards and specifications so that the products appearing under the li-
censed marks and names were uniform. Though confined to selling
such products in designated territories, the manufacturers remained
free to make and sell anywhere other bedding products under their
own labels. The primary purpose of this cooperative effort of geo-
graphically dispersed bedding manufacturers seems to have been to
attain national distribution of a uniform product in order to gain the
advantages and efficiencies of national advertising. Funds for national
advertising were contributed by the manufacturers.
Two vertical cases of recent vintage are White Motor and Sandura.1"5
White Motor's market-division agreements have been discussed. San-
dura, a manufacturer of vinyl floor covering products, required its
113. United States v. white Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562, 578 (N.D. Ohio, 1961).
114. Thirty-four manufacturers were licensed by Spring-Air and approximately thirty
by Sealy.
115. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
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various distributors to resell Sandura products only to retail dealers
located within assigned territories.
The market-division agreements in Sealy, Spring-Air, and Sandura
were upheld by lower courts, and the Supreme Court refused to fashion
a per se rule for the White Motor restraints, though reserving that as a
possibility after further litigation had clarified the economic function
of vertical market division. Apparently the various courts which upheld
these agreements, despite the semantic applicability of the per se
dogma, recognized that issues of efficiency were in play. None of the
opinions, however, analyzed the mechanism of efficiency creation in a
wholly satisfactory manner.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Spring-
Air is perhaps least satisfactory in this respect. It analyzes the case
rather artificially as involving a restraint necessary to the licensor's
protection and exploitation of its trademark,"" but the opinion does
not explain how the division of territories was related to these pur-
poses. In its concluding remarks, however, the court suddenly took
what seems a more realistic tack:
An agreement which strengthens and promotes competition is not
a violation of the law. As a practical matter, it would be extremely
difficult for each member of the Spring-Air group effectively to
compete with the large bedding manufacturers. Spring-Air is not
in a position to compete. It manufactures nothing. The arrange-
ment under consideration gave to the members of the group estab-
lished brand names, trademarks and national advertising, all of
which cost money which was raised by assessments and the con-
tributions of each member.1
7
This observation shifted the focus of the reasoning from trademark
profitability as an end in itself to the efficiency of national advertising
by a group of manufacturers. Co-operative advertising is, of course, a
form of horizontal contract integration. The court's remark, however,
still fails to explain the need for market division.
Sealy is in some ways a more interesting case because the district
court's extensive findings of fact provide a better understanding of
the role of market division in such a system, because the government's
contentions illustrate its attitude toward the idea of ancillary restraints,
and, finally, because the government has appealed the decision
to the Supreme Court." 8 The government's contention in the trial
court seemed to be that price fixing and market division are always
116. 308 F.2d at 409.
117. 308 F.2d at 413.
118. Prob. juris. noted, 86 S. Ct. 58 (1965).
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and everywhere illegal. Rejecting the suggested application of Taft's
ancillarity concept, the government urged upon the trial court the
flat proposition that "Price fixing and territorialization are not and
cannot be ancillary to anything."n 0 The court in turn rejected the
government's per se position. Finding that there was no "central
conspiratorial purpose" on the part of Sealy and its licensees, %he
court cited evidence which showed that: "The Sealy executive commit-
tee rejected a specific proposal to divide the country among Sealy
licensees; Sealy continually sought new licensees to fill in uncovered
territory; and licensees relinquished territory that was not within
their natural trading areas, so that it would be covered by other li-
censees, existing or new."'120 The court ultimately concluded that
Plaintiff's evidence, read as a whole, conclusively proves that the
Sealy licensing arrangements were developed.., for entirely legiti-
mate business purposes, including royalty income .. .and the
benefits to licensees of joint purchasing, research, engineering,
advertising and merchandising.'L2'
The courts in Spring-Air and Sealy both saw that desirable efficiency
was created by the contractual integration of the mattress manufac-
turers to make a uniform, nationally-advertised product, but they did
not attempt to explain the bearing of the market-division agreements
to that efficiency or to provide conceptual justification for such agree-
ments within the rule of reason. The Sixth Circuit's Sandura opinion
came nearer the mark in both these respects. The court stated that
closed territories were necessary to get Sandura's distributors to under-
take product advertising themselves. L' - Sandura had contended that its
distributors "would not spend to advertise and promote an unpopular
product without assurance that resulting sales accrued to them."'12
Relying upon the Supreme Court's White Motor opinion, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that "closed territories made for the vigor and
health of Sandura [which, the court had noted, was one of the smaller
companies in the industry and had almost gone under in the recent
past], increasing the competitive good that flows from interbrand
competition without any showing of detriment to intrabrand competi-
tion."'2 4 The latter remark is not quite fair, of course, since there
119. Post Trial Brief for Plaintiff, p. 24.
120. 1964 Trade Cas. 71,258 at 80,076-77 Finding 84.
121. Finding 119, id. at 80,083.
122. 339 F.2d at 856.
123. Id. at 851.
124. Id. at 858.
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could hardly be any showing of detriment to intrabrand competition
other than that it was eliminated. The finding of benefit to interbrand
competition rested on the fact that Sandura faced larger and stronger
competitors and upon the court's conclusion that the advertising engen-
dered by closed territories was "essential to the continuation of San-
dura as a significant competitive force in an industry dominated by
firms many times as large.' '1 25
Though other efficiencies may have been involved as well, the con-
tract integrations in Spring-Air and Sealy seem to have been created
primarily to gain efficiencies of national advertising, promotion, and
other forms of sales effort. The members of the Spring-Air and Sealy
systems were mattress factories limited to local markets by costs of
shipment. A business with only a local market is obviously unable
efficiently to employ advertising media that are best used on a national
or even a regional basis.120 Not only was national advertising said to
be extremely important to these groups,1 27 but the behavior of the
groups indicates that it was important to have national distribution in
order to utilize national advertising most efficiently. 128 White and
Sandura, both national manufacturers, could provide the national
advertising and promotion to support their local resellers. Sandura,
however, contended that it lacked the capital to engage in extensive
national advertising and therefore relied heavily upon the local sales
efforts of its distributors.2 9 Sandura, as noted, argued that the distribu-
tors would not engage in such efforts unless closed territories assured
that resulting sales accrued to them.
125. Id. at 857.
126. The advantage of national advertising appears to have been the basis for Clorox's
heavier use of advertising as compared with rivals that distributed primarily on a local or
regional scale. See Procter r Gamble, supra note 51.
127. E.g., in Sealy the court quoted one licensee as stating, in connection with the
suggestion that the royalty basis be changed from licensees' sales to the circulation of
national publications in licensees' territories: "The primary purpose of the organization
is to secure national advertising, and that mainly is what each factory secures from the
Sealy Corporation." 1964 Trade Cas. 71,258, at 80,075 Finding 26.
128. In Sealy the court's findings 31, 85, and 86, among others, deal with this topic.
A specific example is provided by finding 90 which recites that "At the Board meeting
in June 1937, representatives of the B. F. Goodrich Company stated that they had experi-
enced considerable difficulty in having Sealy mentioned frequently in Goodrich advertis-
ing 'because Sealy does not have proper national distribution.'" The Spring.Air opinion
also suggests the relationship of national advertising to national distribution: "It [Spring-
Air] is composed of a group of 34 small bedding manufacturers who attempt to compete
with large national bedding manufacturers by making Spring-Air products of uniform
nature and quality; and by advertising such products in national magazines." 308 F.2d
at 405.
129. 339 F.2d at 851, 853, 856.
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But if local sales effort-including in that term local advertising,
salesmanship, and all forms of promotional effort-was the main pur-
pose of the vertical Sandura system of dosed territories, there is no
reason to suppose that either White Motor or the horizontal Spring-Air
and Sealy systems were not also vitally interested in such effort. Locd
sales effort and national advertising may be able to substitute for on'e
another to a certain extent. It seems clear, nevertheless, that national
advertising and local sales effort are rarely, if ever, perfect substitutes
for one another. In marketing their products almost no firms seem to
depend exclusively on national advertising. Local sales effort almost
always plays a role, often a vital one. The individual firm will employ
marginal analysis not merely in deciding how many dollars to spend
upon national advertising and local sales effort, but also in determining
its allocation of expenditures between the two and among their various
components. The fact that many firms use a variety of forms of advertis-
ing and other sales effort indicates that these forms are not perfect
substitutes. If they were, no firm would take the extra trouble and
expense involved in using more than one. Thus, the mattress manu-
facturer joining a group such as Spring-Air will likely believe it can
sell the Spring-Air line most profitably by combining local efforts
with the national advertising campaign. In addition to advertising
through local media, the manufacturer, it may be supposed, will resort
to such efforts as having salesmen call upon retailers, hotels, and other
large purchasers of mattresses in its area to persuade them of the ad-
vantages of the brand, and, very probably, to provide them with a
variety of consultative services concerning the product and the cus-
tomer's particular needs.
Local sales effort costs money that can be recaptured only in the
price at which the mattresses are sold. The firm that is large enough to
distribute nationally under its own trademark will measure such efforts
and expenditures simply by their relation to expected sales and reve-
nues. The member of a group has a special problem, however. It may
find that it is unable to recapture all of its expenditures in local sales
effort because a neighboring member of the group undersells it. The
interloper gets all the advantages of the first firm's expenditures with-
out paying for them. It thus gets a free ride and this very fact may
enable it to undersell profitably. The customer gets free information
and advice. The point is not that such behavior is unfair but rather
that by making the effort less profitable, it will decrease the amount of
local sales effort members of the group are willing to do. To that
extent the group becomes a less efficient marketer than a single fully-
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integrated firm of the same size. An agreement dividing territories
between the members of the group, such as was actually employed by
the Spring-Air and Sealy groups, protects each member from the
danger of free rides. Each is able to engage in the optimum amount
ef local sales effort, and the total efforts of the group once more tend
to equal those of a single fully-integrated firm of comparable size.
A market-division agreement employed by a co-operating group such
as the Spring-Air or Sealy licensees, therefore, seems precisely analogous
to the agreement of partners not to compete with the partnership.
The same reasoning applies to vertically-imposed market divisions
such as those in White Motor and Sandura. In selling its products to
the public the manufacturer can supply national advertising (assuming
it has the funds), but it will undoubtedly want its resellers to engage
in the sorts of local sales effort that only they can do effectively. 180
The manufacturer may perceive or have brought to its attention that
reseller local sales effort is less than the desirable amount because
some resellers make a practice of free riding. The most efficient (i.e.,
least expensive) method of obtaining the desired level of such effort
is to make each reseller's interest in providing the effort coextensive
with the manufacturer's interest in having it provided. Giving resellers
exclusive and closed territories creates an identity of interest by assur-
ing, just as in the horizontal case, that the sales engendered by such
effort accrue to the business unit that provides the effort.
This analysis applies as well to forms of market division other than
territorial allocations. White Motor, for instance, required its resellers
to agree not to sell to the federal government, any state government,
or any department or political subdivision of any such government. In
his concurring opinion Justice Brennan said that customer allocations
seemed inherently more dangerous than territorial limitations, "for
[customer allocations] served to suppress all competition between
manufacturer and distributors for the custom of the most desirable
accounts."'131 The territorial limitations were equally effective in sup-
pressing all competition between the resellers, so perhaps the factor
that troubled Justice Brennan was that the accounts here were more
desirable and that the manufacturer rather than the reseller got them.
130. Local resellers will obviously be in closer touch with local customers' desires and
needs than a distant manufacturer can be. For the manufacturer to rival its local rescllers
in effectiveness of local sales effort would require extensive forward integration into the
reseller level. The manufacturer would then duplicate many of the functions of Its local
resellers and increase the costs of distributing its products.
131. 372 U.S. at 272.
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As already shown, however, these agreements could not have been im-
posed by White for the purpose of restricting output. White must have
believed that this form of market division, too, enabled it to achieve
distributive efficiencies. Customer allocation seems capable of serving
the same function with respect to sales effort as territorial limitation.
Many large-volume accounts are likely to require special sales effort.m -
It is likely, for instance that a customer about to purchase a fleet of
trucks may require a great deal of study and discussion of its particular
problems and requirements from manufacturers who wish to obtain
the order. In some cases it is probable that the necessary information
and modifications of the trucks or their accessories can be supplied
best by the manufacturer. Where this is or may be true it will be less
expensive for the manufacturer to deal directly with the customer
rather than to have requests and answers relayed by the intermediate
reseller. Since the manufacturer may often initiate suggestions to such
customers, the interposition of a reseller may lose sales because such
suggestions are not made. It would not be an answer to train all resellers
to have the same knowledge of customers' needs and of the variety of
ways in which the manufacturer might be able to meet them. Training
of reseller personnel would require an enormous and continuing effort
and would impose large costs upon the manufacturer in order to
duplicate in dozens or even hundreds of resellers the knowledge the
manufacturer already has and is steadily revising.
Nor is it any answer to this argument to suggest, as Justice Brennan
did, that, if the manufacturer is more efficient in dealing with these
accounts, it does not need the customer allocation clauses because it
will get the business anyway.133 The sales effort put forth by the manu-
facturer requires the incurring of costs and these can be recaptured
only in the price it charges for its product. If resellers are permitted
to sell to such accounts after the manufacturer has done all the pre-
liminary studies and selling, the expenditure of such effort by the
manufacturer would be less profitable and the manufacturer would
reduce the amount of such effort it engaged in. The customer alloca-
tion may thus also function to prevent free rides in much the same way
that the territorial limitation upon resellers does. Customer allocation
132. White stated, for example, that "the reason for reserving the right to sell par-
ticular accounts, such as government agencies, is even simpler. It is the natural feeling that
the only sure way to make certain that something really important is done right, is to do
it for oneself. The size of the orders, the technicalities of bidding and delivery, and other
factors all play a part in this decision." Brief for Appellant, p. 18.
133. Id. at 274-5.
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clauses enable the manufacturer whose customers fall into different
classes and require different kinds and amounts of sales effort to reach
each class most efficiently.
It should constitute no objection to the policy implications of this
analysis that the efficiencies gained by preventing the free ride are
in the use of local sales effort. Local sales effort, of course, may include
an element of advertising, but advertising efficiencies are real and
important despite signs of a developing antipathy to them in some anti-
trust litigation. Secondly, local sales effort encompasses a great deal
more than "advertising" in the narrow sense. It may involve, for exam-
ple, the technical training of personnel and the provision of consider-
able services and information to customers. Finally, since there is pres-
ently no antitrust objection to the most efficient utilization of local
sales effort by ownership-integrated firms, there seems no reason to
discriminate against the accomplishment of the same objective by
contract-integrated systems through the use of market-division agree-
ments.
2. Local Sales Effort: The Size-of-the-Market Problem.
Quite aside from the free-ride problem, it seems possible to conceive
of a situation in which local sales effort would fall below optimal pro-
portions because particular markets were too small to repay the efforts
of two sellers of a single brand. Market division is a way of solving this
problem by insuring that only one seller will be able to reach the
market or account.
Testimony in the Sandura case suggests the reality of this situation.
The Court of Appeals' opinion states:
[D]istributor testimony .. illustrates that closed territories are
responsible for more thorough coverage of dealer accounts than
Sandura would otherwise enjoy. In the words of one distributor
who testified that the Sandura system avoided duplication of effort
and resulted in greater coverage of a given territory, "this way
we are able to concentrate, and we do a lot of business in little
towns, small towns. We don't bypass them. We can back into
the hinterland.'1 34
This suggestion may make economic sense if in a number of terri-
tories there are towns of widely different sizes and if a number of the
smaller towns constitute markets of such size that they will not repay
cultivation by two distributors .1 5 Where two or more distributors are
134. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1964).
135. In many industries distributors not only call upon dealers but perform a variety
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permitted to reach such towns, therefore, neither may consider it worth-
while to cultivate them intensively since even sporadic visits by other
distributors would diminish the distributor's sales below the point
at which such cultivation is profitable. Such markets are then likely
to be reached only occasionally, as when some other business causes a
salesman of the distributor to pass through the area. The net result
is likely to be irregular or intermittent service by the distributors so
that dealers are set up or served less efficiently than would be the case
if a single distributor had the town exclusively.",,
3. Exchanges of Information.
It is, of course, beneficial to the overall efficiency of any integration
for the various units within it to pass on information which may be
useful to other units. This efficiency, too, may be impaired if it is pos-
sible for the unit receiving the information to use it competitively
against the unit supplying it. Thus, it was argued in the partnership
case that the individual partners would be less likely to disclose to one
another valuable business information if the others were likely to make
use of it for their individual profit rather than the profit of the firm.137
This manifestation of the free-ride problem has obvious application to
distributive systems such as those in White Motor, Sandura, Sealy, and
Spring-Air. The dealer or distributor of White trucks, or the manu-
of services such as helping to set up the dealership, instructing in record keeping. ad% ising
on techniques of promotion and sales effort, organizing displays, keeping inventories bal-
anced and adequate, and so forth. Thus, the distributor may incur significant costs in
making dealers efficient.
136. By analogy to the size-of-the-town problem, it may be possible to construct a
second situation having to do with the size of the customers. Suppose that methods and
costs of selling and servicing large-volume accounts differed significantly. Suppose further
that it would be profitable for any single dealer to specialize on large-volume accounts
and sell as widely as his costs of doing business permitted, or that it would be profitable
for him to stay in a single territory and reach both types of accounts with a compromise
organization, but that it would not be profitable for any dealer to specialize on scattered
small-volume accounts. The manufacturer might judge that its most profitable course
would be to have each dealer build the compromise organization and cover limited areas
intensively. If any significant number of dealers made different judgments about their
own interests and specialized on large-volume accounts, the small-volume accounts in
the markets they could reach might be completely lost to the manufacturer. Whether
this result occurred because of some difference in the interests of the manufacturer and
particular dealers or merely because of differences in their judgment or business acumen
is not important. The manufacturer might well believe it in his interest to assign dosed
territories of such a size that every dealer found it could operate most profitably by
building an organization capable of reaching both large and small accounts. This argu-
ment is admittedly speculative and requires a number of preconditions, but it seems
at least a possible explanation of some dosed territory arrangements.
137. See pages 380-82 supra.
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facturer of Sealy mattresses, is much less likely to make known to others
in the system any particularly successful selling or manufacturing
techniques it devises if there is a substantial possibility that such tech-
niques will be used to take business away from it. Market division
removes this disincentive to disclosure and so tends to make the whole
system more efficient.
This form of efficiency may often be served by a division of fields
agreement (a form of market division) to prevent the problem of
the free ride created by joining the complementary technologies or
resources of two firms. To recur to a hypothetical used elsewhereY' 8
suppose that a boat-building company sees that plastic hulls are a
distinct improvement in construction. The company may not wish to
have hulls built for it by an independent plastics firm because of the
danger that its own designs and marketing plans might then become
known to competitive boat builders using the same supplier of plastic
hulls. On the other hand, the boat company has no experience in
working with plastics and would find it too difficult, expensive, and
time-consuming to acquire the necessary equipment and skill to make
its own plastic hulls. In many such cases of complementary technolo-
gies, moreover, the efficient scale of operation in the other manufactur-
ing field may be much greater than that needed to supply the needs
of the first company. If that were true here, the boat company would
find that in order to supply its own needs at an acceptable cost it had
to manufacture a much wider range of plastic products and attempt
to sell them in competition with existing plastics concerns. The invest-
ment would be wholly out of proportion to its own needs and would
require entry into an industry that in other areas might not look
particularly promising. The obvious solution is to find a plastics con-
cern which, looking at the problem from the other side, considers hulls
a promising new end use for its product but has no desire to enter the
completely unfamiliar field of boat design and construction and lacks
the distributive facilities to sell in that market.
Both companies may be able to solve their problem by pooling their
specialized technologies and facilities. Each then faces the difficulty
that the other may make use of the information gained to enter the
other field. The firms can enter into a closer and more effective collabo-
ration by eliminating the possibility of competition between them-
selves in areas in which the disclosed information would constitute a
substantial competitive asset. Whether their arrangement ultimately
138. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. SE=rrON or ANTrmrur
LAw 211, 227 (1959).
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took the form of a supply contract or the creation of a jointly owned
subsidiary to produce plastic boats, the efficiency of their collaborative
effort would be enhanced by an agreement that neither would deal
with a competitor of the other or enter the other's field. If a joint sub-
sidiary were formed, it would be necessary to have the subsidiary agree
to stay out of the parents' fields. The agreement would be most effective
if it covered not only the fields of operation directly involved in the
joint effort but also fields in which either company operated and the
knowledge gained would be an advantage to a competitor. That is,
it might be helpful if the boat company agreed to stay out of other
aspects of the plastics business in which it could utilize know-how
gained in working with the plastics company on hulls.
An incomplete insight concerning this sort of efficiency perhaps
formed the basis for the district court's decision in United States v.
Bausch 6 Lomb Optical Co. 39 There the Soft-Lite Lens Co. distributed
unpatented, pink-tinted lenses. Originally Soft-Lite bought the glass
abroad and had it ground in the United States. Eventually it turned to
Bausch & Lomb, first as a grinder, later as sole manufacturer of tie
glass. The parties agreed that Bausch 8& Lomb would manufacture
pink-tinted glass only for Soft-Lite and that it would not compete with
Soft-Lite and that it would not compete with Soft-Lite in the sale of the
pink-tinted lenses. The government attacked this agreement as violative
of the Sherman Act, but the district court sustained the restraint as
reasonable and ancillary:
In the case at bar the main purpose of the contract is to provide
a source of supply for Soft-Lite. The restraining covenant is for
the protection of the purchaser who is spending large sums to de-
velop his good will and enlarge the public patronage of a relatively
new article of commerce. The arrangement, though not a partner-
ship in legal form, is functionally a joint enterprise in which one
will produce and the other market the commodity.140
The efficiency suggested by this passage does not seem real. If Soft-
Lite were spending large sums to develop the good will accruing to
its own trade name, that investment would not be endangered by
Bausch & Lomb's selling the same kind of glass to other purchasers
who would market under different names. Nor would Soft-Lite's ex-
penditure of money to develop public demand for a new article of
commerce be jeopardized by Bausch & Lomb's selling the glass to others
139. 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd on the point under discussion by an
equally divided Court, 321 U.S. 707, 719 (1944).
140. Id. at 398.
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if those others were able, in any event, to get the same product from
other suppliers.
The restriction seems to make sense only if additional considerations
existed. One such consideration, suggested by the record, is that
Soft-Lite believed it had a somewhat unique formula for the glass
which was unlikely to be duplicated exactly and quickly. This is to
say that Soft-Lite must have had a product which was differentiated
physically as well as by its advertised trade name. In return for dis-
closing the means of differentiation to Bausch &c Lomb Soft-Lite would
demand that Bausch & Lomb not compete with it, directly or indi-
rectly, by selling the identical glass to others.141 An alternative, though
closely related, explanation is that Soft-Lite knew of manufacturing
techniques which reduced the cost of producing pink-tinted glass.
Though not a manufacturer, Soft-Lite wished to retain the cost ad-
141. Singer, the president and general manager of Soft-Lite, explained his request that
Bausch & Lomb put in writing its promise not to sell pink-tinted lenses to others or dis-
tribute such lenses itself: "I would not hand them our specifications, our trade-marks, our
business, so they won't compete with me on a glass like ours and just forget what we had
been told before . . ." Rec. 103. He also testified that Bausch t: Lomb offered to try to
make a harder, better quality of glass than the French glass Soft-Lite originally supplied
them for grinding if Soft-Lite would give Bausch & Lomb the specifications. Singer said
he replied: "Well, the first thing my dad will ask me is, what protection have we?" Rec.
466. Further:
"Q. Mr. Singer was there any discussion as to an arrangement to make the glass ex-
clusively for you?-A. There was.
"Q. Will you tell us just what that transaction was?-A. Well, before I brought up the
formula specifications I told him my dad would want to know whether or not they would
be making a glass like ours for themselves or anybody else; if they would, if it was putting
my Dad's interest in the lenses, good will property and trade name in jeopardy, and he
says, 'We don't do those things up here. If we make it for you we won't make it for any-
body else. Of course we sell colored lenses now and will sell colored lenses, but that par-
ticular type of absorption, a rose tint, we will make it for you and for nobody else.'
"Q. You were talking about a particular type which was being developed from the con-
fidential specifications you furnished?-A. That is right.
"Q. And you did not want them to use that in the making of glass for themselves or
anybody else?-A. That is right.
"Q. And Mr. Hammele told you they would not operate that way?-A. He told me,
promised definitely and said, 'We don't do things that way here,' and I says, 'That is
why we came to you.' Rec. 469-70.
Singer returned later and gave the specifications to Bausch & Lomb. Bausch & Lomb
experimented and made a better quality glass with those specifications. Rec. 466. The
district court's opinion stated: "It is not necessary to find and I do not find that Soft-
Lite's specifications for the glass constituted a secret formula for the protection of which
a restraining covenant would be proper." 45 F. Supp. at 399. The court found the ar-
rangement proper for reasons cited in the text. The record does not appear adequate
to support a finding of valuable, secret specifications, but it also seems inadequate to
disprove such a theory. The court did not, of course, find that such specifications did
not exist. One could wish, for present purposes, that the question of the specifications had
been gone into more thoroughly at the trial.
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vantage which knowledge of these techniques gave by requiring
Bausch & Lomb not to make the glass for anybody else.
An additional explanation, also suggested by the record, is that
the information Soft-Lite wished to protect related not only to the
method of making the glass but to its business plans and techniques.142
Had Bausch & Lomb wished to enter the field of distribution itself or
to aid other customers in doing so, such information as Soft-Lite's
customer lists, methods of pricing, techniques of "missionary work"
in particular territories, etc., could have been used to give Bausch &
Lomb or its other customers a free ride at Soft-Lite's expense.143
It may conceivably be objected that it might be more desirable from
the consumers' point of view to make agreements such as those in Bausch
& Lomb and the plastic boat example illegal.1 44 Absent the ability
to make such an agreement, for instance, Soft-Lite would have had
the option of giving up its manufacturing or commercial know-how
142. Soft-Lite gave Bausch & Lomb a list of Soft-Lite's customers to whom Bausch &
Lomb referred in an office memorandum as jobbers and retail licensees. Finding of Fact,
No. 7, Rec. 53. The reason given by Singer was that possession of the list permitted
Bausch & Lomb to ship direct when it received an order for Soft-Lite lenses rather than
refer the order to Soft-Lite. The list was necessary because Soft-Lite refused to sell certain
jobbers for a variety of reasons ranging from credit difficulties to refusal to comply with
Soft-Lite's policy on retail prices. Bausch & Lomb's use of the list was said to save several
days' time in filling orders. Rec. 107-08. Bausch & Lomb and Soft-Lite apparently worked
so closely together that Bausch & Lomb became very familiar with Soft-Lite's business and
promotional methods. See Brief for the United States, pp. 17-20 and record citations
there; Brief for Appellees, Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, pp. 25-31 and record cita-
tions there; Finding of Fact No. 18, Rec. 55.
143. Agreements or tacit undertakings not to compete or to deal with a supplier's or
customer's competitors are common in the business world. The above anal)sis suggests that
many of them may be motivated by a desire to prevent free rides on information supplied
in the course of coordinating the activities of independent firms. Manufacturers often de-
velop product changes or selling plans which necessarily become known to their suppliers
through such matters as changes in specifications, amounts, or delivery dates of supplies
ordered. In addition, the manufacturer may wish to work closely with the supplier to de-
velop new products and techniques of manufacture. When the supplier serves competitive
manufacturers or may move into manufacturing itself the chance of a deliberate or in-
advertent disclosure of such information is always present. Vhere possible, therefore, many
manufacturers prefer an exclusive relationship with a supplier. Such arrangements, too,
are, in economic reality, the same phenomena as partnerships or joint ventures.
144. The theory would be that consumers would gain because the information would
be more widely used if the firm possessing it were required to disclose without limitation
in order to get any benefits from the information itself. The theory under discussion
does not involve monopoly at either level which is preserved by the agreement not to
enter. It assumes that there are other manufacturers of glass, plastics, and boats, and
other distributors of spectacles. The mere possession of valuable knowledge cannot, of
course, be viewed as the possession of a monopoly any more than can the possession of any
valuable asset.
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or of manufacturing the glass itself. An election to disclose and thereby
sacrifice the know-how, however, might not benefit consumers even if
Bausch & Lomb used the information to enter distribution of pink-
tinted glass or to assist competitors of Soft-Lite in doing so. The effect
might be simply to transfer the value of the assets from Soft-Lite to
Bausch & Lomb. The profit would merely accrue at a different stage of
a vertically related process and consumers might receive about the same
output at about the same prices. Consumers might be benefited, of
course, if the marginal costs of distributing such glass rose more rapidly
than the marginal costs of manufacturing so that the most efficient
arrangement would be a single manufacturer and more than one
distributor.145 One cannot state d priori whether or not this is the
general situation where a division of fields is sought to protect the
transfer of information.
Weighing on the other side are inefficiencies that may result from
refusing to allow a firm in Soft-Lite's position to require the agreement
protecting its disclosure of know-how. The first inefficiency is that
many firms in such a position will find manufacturing their own sup-
plies a lesser evil than disclosure, even though that choice creates
corporate size which may be less efficient and commits them to opera-
tions in which they are less skilled than the manufacturer they have
given up. Secondly, even if these diseconomies for the firm do not
exist, the decision to manufacture glass may waste resources by dupli-
cating facilities already existing in glass manufacturing. Finally, firms
in Soft-Lite's position will have less incentive to develop or scout out
know how because it will now be less valuable to them or, if making
their own supplies is not a realistic alternative, will be of no value
to them.146 The net result must be that a lesser amount of such know-
145. In this situation Soft-Lite would be operating at an inefficiently large scale so
that the distribution function would be performed at a lower cost if other firms could
enter distribution. Even if this were the case, however, it is unlikely that consumers
would suffer, for it would be in Soft-Lite's interest to license other firms to aid It In
distribution. This would lower distribution costs and increase Soft-Lite's profit from Its
manufacturing know-how, in this case taken largely on the royalties charged its dis.
tributor licensees.
146. The analysis of this section has not mentioned the possibility that the possessor
of know-how may be able to realize its value by selling or licensing it. If this alternative
were satisfactory, it would go far to lessen the weight of some of the arguments made
in the text. A firm such as Soft-Lite, for example, would continue to have an incentive
to develop or locate know-how even if it could not protect itself by requiring Bausch &
Lomb not to distribute pink-tinted lenses or to sell to other distributors. Soft-Lite could
simply sell its know-how to Bausch & Lomb, realize the value of the asset in that fashion,
and become a purchaser like any other. Patent ownership offers an analogy. Patentees
do not generally hug the right to work their inventions to themselves. They often license
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how will exist or will be profitably employed. The result, in each of
these cases, will be a socially disadvantageous loss of efficiency in re-
source use.
4 7
For many possessors of know-how, moreover, there is a third alterna-
tive which does not involve disclosure or entry into a new field, and
which underscores the need for market division to encourage exchanges
of information. A manufacturer in the Sealy group or a reseller in
White's distributive system, for instance, would have the additional
option of keeping the information to itself. If the firm cannot be
protected from the danger of the free ride by a market-division agree-
ment, the manufacturer or reseller will not disclose information, the
and recover any advantage the patent confers in the form of royalties. The analogy does
not seem persuasive, however. The difference rests in the nature of the legal protection
afforded the two forms of property. The patentee discloses his information in his appli-
cation. Thereafter, if he is issued a valid patent, he may prevent anyone from working
his invention, and he may do so regardless of how the infringer acquired his knowledge.
The patentee may freely offer his patent for sale or license without fear that those to
whom it is offered -will use it without paying. The same is not true of the possessor of
unpatentable know-how. Secrecy is his only protection, and any other person who acquires
the same know-how fairly may use it. But the owner is likely to find it impossible to
convince a prospective purchaser of the market value of the know-how without disclosing
it to him. The risks involved in such disclosure would lessen the value of sale as an
alternative means of capitalizing the value of the asset. If, for example, the prospective
purchaser did not buy, it would be next to impossible to discover whether he later began
using the know-how anyway, and if that fact were discovered there would necessarily
be a dispute as to whether he acquired the know-how in the operation of his business
independently of the disclosure. In fact, the purchaser who wanted to protect his oppor-
tunity to act in bad faith could claim at the moment of disclosure that he had already
learned the information. The point is valid even if the know-how owner does not fear
fraud. He and the prospective purchaser may honestly disagree upon the value of the know-
how. If the sale is not made, how likely is it that the firm to which disclosure was made
will be able to prevent itself from deriving any advantage from the knowledge that it now
has? The possibility of sale or license, therefore, is not likely to give a firm in Soft-Lite's
position the same incentive to develop or locate know-how that it would have if it could
make an agreement such as that upheld in the Bausch & Lomb case. The problem of an
honest disagreement about price is eliminated there because Bausch & Lomb is not asked
to pay anything but only to make a particular variety of lens for Soft-Lite and sell it to no
one else. Bausch S& Lomb protected itself from any serious disadvantage from even this
agreement by noting that it would not feel bound by its agreement if "the progress of
science [resulted] in producing glass possessing better properties than is obtainable at the
present time." 45 F. Supp. at 590. There is, of course, less reason to fear fraud or honest
disagreement on price after disclosure 'where it is clear that valuable know-how is pos-
sessed and the prospective purchaser will commit himself to a price in advance or where
a continuing flow of technical information is anticipated and the parties are enabled to
work out a license conditioned on periodic royalty payments.
147. Knowledge is a resource like any other. It is desirable for consumer welfare not
only that it be developed but that it be freely transferred to employments where the
value of its marginal product is greatest. Such transfers will occur more often if firms
like Soft-Lite are permitted to protect the asset and so have an incentive to locate i.
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
contract integration will be less efficient, and consumers will be
poorer.148
4. Post-Sale Service.
Market division may in many cases cut costs of providing post-sale
service and diminish the risk of customer dissatisfaction with such
service. Post-sale service is likely to be particularly important where
the product is somewhat complicated and likely to require adjustment
by technical personnel after being put in use. At least two kinds of
inefficiencies seem likely to arise in connection with post-sale service
when market division is not used.
The first variety of inefficiency arises from the familiar problem of
the free ride where the service charge is included in the price of the
product. If dealers are permitted to sell to customers who use the
product in a distant locality, provision of the necessary servicing by
the selling dealer will obviously prove very costly. The selling dealer
is likely, if he provides any servicing at all, to hold it to an absolute
minimum. The dealer close to the customer, on the other hand, will
have little incentive to provide any servicing since he is not paid for it.
Servicing the product would represent a donation to the customer from
the servicing dealer's point of view, and since the customer has already
proved his inclination to purchase elsewhere, the local dealer has no
reason to expect that the donation will bring him the next sale to
that account. If he services the machine well, the customer, happy
with the way things worked out, is quite likely to purchase again from
the other dealer and expect servicing from the local dealer. If the
local dealer services the machine poorly, the customer is quite unlikely
to draw the conclusion that he should purchase his next machine from
that dealer. The distant selling dealer is thus enabled to enjoy a free
ride on any local dealer who is required to perform servicing. The
distant dealer can easily make matters worse by skimping on pre-
delivery adjustments. This situation, which could arise in either a
horizontal or a vertical system, can be cured by a system of closed
148. The foregoing arguments are limited to cases in which information is to be
transferred between parties who stand in a collaborative relationship in other respects--
supplier and customer of goods or members of a distributive system of goods. There are
also cases in which information alone is sold or licensed and the parties have no other
area of dealing. This, for instance, is a typical situation with respect to know-how licenses.
In such cases, the information itself is the product sold. The forms of efficiency created
by market division are then as varied as in the case of the sale of other products.
Because the analysis is broader than this topic it is reserved for separate discussion In
the third section of this article.
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dealer territories. The local dealer then has an incentive to provide
good service because he has been paid for it in the price of the product
and there will be a close connection between the customer's satisfaction
and the probability of selling to him again.
Another form of service inefficiency may be cured by customer allo-
cation clauses. Just as there are cases in which a manufacturer is more
competent than a reseller to provide particular forms of sales effort,
there may be situations in which the manufacturer has superior ex-
pertise in the provision of post-sale service for particular types of
accounts. This argument states that manufacturer and resellers should
be permitted to specialize according to their different capacities to
provide different degrees of post-sales service. Some accounts may
not realize the difference in competence between the manufacturer and
its resellers in this respect and so may purchase from the reseler and
aftenvard become dissatisfied with the servicing. Such customers will
be likely to turn to competitive brands in the future. The analysis
here is much the same as that set out above in connection with pur-
chases made from a distant dealer who for cost reasons is unable to
provide adequate service. The manufacturer has somewhat more in-
centive than the local dealer to provide adequate service, for the manu-
facturer hopes to sell more products in the future. But the manu-
facturer's incentive will be lessened and its servicing therefore impaired
by the fact that the reseller has pocketed the purchase price which
includes payment for the service.
A variety of solutions other than market division may be envisaged
for post-sales service problems. One alternative would be to sell servic-
ing separately from the product but this method may not be viable
in cases where the customer wants to know in advance the cost of
acquiring a usable product. This system, moreover, is particularly
liable to abuse since the selling dealer, who gets a flat price, has an
incentive to cut corners on any pre-delivery adjustments or services.
This practice will increase the cost of post-sale servicing. Making the
service charge a flat fee will not work either. The customer would know
in advance what the usable product would cost but the dealer required
to provide the service would often find himself out of pocket unless he
skimped in some cases to keep his costs of servicing within the fee
specified. Setting the fee high enough to cover any probable service
cost would give the servicing dealer a windfall in a number of cases
and increase the total price to prospective customers.
A second method of coping with the post-sale service problem would
be to have the dealer closest to the customer perform the service with-
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
out charge and obtain reimbursement either from the manufacturer
or the selling dealer. Where the manufacturer makes reimbursement
there is again a strong incentive for the selling dealer to cut comers
in readying the product for market. Where either the manufacturer
or the selling dealer makes reimbursement, there are obvious oppor-
tunities for disputes over such questions as what servicing was really
required and how much it ought to cost. Where the dispute is between
dealers, the manufacturer is likely to become involved as arbitrator.
The servicing dealer, moreover, is likely to keep his services down to
what he thinks he can recover without excessive argument and nego-
tiation with either the manufacturer or the selling dealer.
Difficulties of this sort obviously cost money to cure. The manu-
facturer in a vertical system, or perhaps a specially constituted board
in a horizontal system, must police the servicing system and arbitrate
disputes between servicer and seller. If this costly function is not
undertaken, customer dissatisfaction is apt to rise to critical levels.
And, even if the function is undertaken, it may not be possible to
avoid all customer irritation.
Justice Brennan, in his White Motor concurrence, offered other solu-
tions when the problem was one of reseller incompetence relative
to the manufacturer in providing service.149 He said even this differ-
ence in competence did not justify cutting the resellers out of a segment
of the market but called for less drastic measures such as improved
supervision and training for resellers or perhaps a special form of
warranty for the accounts which were likely to receive unsatisfactory
service from resellers. 150 Presumably, however, if a manufacturer
chooses allocation clauses, that fact indicates the manufacturer thinks
it less costly to perform the servicing function itself than to train all
resellers who have such accounts in their markets. Moreover, it hardly
149. Justice Brennan made the argument cited in the text in answer to White's con-
tention that certain of its restrictions were required because a distributor or dealer was
not competent to handle the intricate process of giving expert advice to customers con-
cerning their needs, determining engine size, etc., until the distributor or dealer had had
many months of specialized White training. Justice Brennan apparently viewed this as
an attempted justification of White's policy of reserving certain customers to itself, and
he answered it in terms applicable to post-sales service. Actually, White was apparently
arguing the need for its contractual restriction which prevented distributors from selling
to dealers for resale to customers without White approval of the dealers selected, Its
"servicing" argument, moreover, concerned what has been termed "local sales effort" in
this article. See Brief for Appellant, 17-18. Whether or not Justice Brennan misappre-
hended the thrust of White's argument on this point, his reasoning remains relevant to
the point under discussion in the text above.
150. 372 U.S. at 273-7-1.
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seems a good business tactic for a manufacturer to admit that large
accounts are likely to need a special warranty for unsatisfactory service.
The prospect of operating troubles followed by negotiation or even
litigation on the warranty would likely turn a number of such accounts
to other manufacturers. In addition, the costs of making good on the
special warranty, particularly if the warranty is to reimburse the cus-
tomer for all of his direct and indirect losses due to faulty servicing,
might far exceed the costs of having the manufactururer do the servic-
ing in the first place.
5. Effectiveness of a Service or Facility Whose Cost Is Shared.
The need to separate the markets in which sellers use a service whose
cost they share seems to occur only when overlapping use of the service
would destroy its effectiveness. This category may consist of rather few
situations.
An example is suggested by the reported cooperation of three re-
gional breweries which pooled their radio and television commercials
through a common advertising agency. One brewer marketed its beer
in the Gulf States, the second in New England, and the third in the
Midwest. Each, of course, marketed and advertised under a separate
mark and name. The advertising agency prepared commercials using
nationally-known talent. Each commercial was used in all three regions,
only the name of the beer being changed. The sharing of the efforts
of the agency was said to reduce production costs of commercials by as
much as a third. In addition, each regional brewery was usually able to
use commercials that had already proved successful in another market.
Each brewery had to try an unproved commercial only a third of the
time, thus giving the group the benefits of regional testing usually
available only to a national concern.151 Whatever the arrangements may
have been in the actual situation, it is worth noting that an agreement
by the parties dividing the territories in which the commercials might
be used (or, what amounts to the same thing, a reliance upon the
common advertising agency to prevent such overlapping) would create
efficiencies. Overlapping would tend to destroy the value of the com-
mercials for all parties. 52
151. The actors used were Mike Nichols and Elaine May. The three breweries were
Jadon Brewing Co., New Orleans, selling Jax beer in the Gulf States; Narragansett
Brewing Co., Providence, R. I., selling Narragansett beer in New England; and Geo.
Wiedemann Brewing Co., Newport, Ky., selling Wiedemann's beer in the Mfidwest. The
facts given are taken from Broadcasting, July 6, 1964, pp. 38-39.
152. The situation described, however, would not appear to justify an agreement not
to sell beer in each other's territories. The efficiencies described in the text seem fully
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Examples of this sort seem uncommon because most forms of sharing
costs to achieve the most economical scale of operation do not appear
in themselves to require market divisions to make the integrations
effective. Thus, the mere fact of joining to make a common product
and engage in national advertising would not seem to justify the
market division of the Sealy or Spring-Air groups if it were not for
the problem of local sales effort. Some members of the group might
find the national advertising more profitable than others, perhaps
because of their superior ability to reach the market areas of other
members. The problem of one member enjoying the benefits of funds
contributed to national advertising by other members can be solved
by varying individual contributions according to sales of the advertised
product. The Sealy group, at one time, did measure its assessments
in this way.153 This solution would in no way impair the effectiveness
of the national advertising or the local sales effort that members found
worthwhile. It is only the free ride problem's effect upon local sales
effort, which is made possible by the fact that the members are selling
an identical, nationally-advertised product, which requires market
division.
For this reason, market division does not seem necessary to enhance
or protect the efficiencies of such activities as joint manufacturing or
joint research undertaken by competitors in order to achieve economies
of scale which none of them could attain alone.1 4 This conclusion
protected by an agreement which restricts only the use of advertising so that identical
commercials for different beers do not appear in the same market areas. No additional
efficiencies seem achievable by dividing markets for the sale of the product. The notion
that consumers who travel from one region to another may continue to associate the
commercials with a different brand of beer and so lessen the effectiveness of the com-
mercials in the second market area seems, at first glance at least, too trivial to cause
concern.
153. 1964 Trade Cas. 71,258 at 80,076, Finding 33. In 1932 the Scaly group agreed
to change the basis for royalty payments from a percentage of sales to a pro rata amount
of national advertising dependent upon the circulation of national publications In each
licensee's territory. This change had been suggested because national advertising was
what Sealy had to offer licensees. Id. at 80,074-75, Finding 26. Presumably, sales might
differ according to the individual efforts of the licensees and there would be no justifi-
cation to charge royalties on such effort. Yet a royalty based on national advertising done
in a territory would seem to work best when the territories were closed. Otherwise a
licensee who was less able to capitalize on the advertising than an invading neighbor
would feel that he was paying too much for the asset and would prefer to have sales
made the measure of royalties.
154. Firms which supported a joint research laboratory, for example, could measure
their contributions either by sales or by use of the research results. There would be no
free-ride problem and no other inefficiencies arising from the continued competition of
the firms in manufacturing and sales.
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would be different, of course, if the joint undertaking required the
contribution by the parties of substantial amounts of teclmical business
know-how which the other parties could appropriate to their own uses
outside the joint venture.
6. Minimizing Costs and Customer Irritation Due to Overlapping
Distributive Efforts.
The theories that overlapping distributive effort may lead to inef-
ficiency due to duplication of costs or to customer irritation at multiple
solicitations seem less substantial than the points already discussed.
The first theory requires as an assumption that a manufacturer can
make the allocation of customers among its resellers with an efficiency
and precision sufficiently close to that which reseller competition
would provide so that elimination of duplicative effort would result
in a lowering of the costs of reselling. The efficiencies of allocation
by competition are well known. Let us take the case of a manufacturer
selling to independent dealers. If he does not divide their territories,
there will be a certain amount of duplication of effort as the dealers
compete in overlapping areas. The dealer who operated most efficiently
would tend, other things being equal, to expand his business at the
expense of less efficient dealers. If equilibrium were reached, each
account would be handled by the dealer able to do so most efficiently
and the total costs of distribution would be at a minimum. There still
might be duplication of selling effort when dealers tried to take
accounts away from each other, but no dealer could survive who
persistently engaged in unremunerative selling effort. Even though
equilibrium would undoubtedly never be attained, the system would
always be tending toward the most efficient allocation of accounts to
dealers, and responses to changed circumstances would seem almost
certain to be substantially more rapid and accurate than those a manu-
facturer could dictate by continually reassigning accounts. If no coun-
tervailing factors were present, therefore, no manufacturer would
divide his dealers' territories. The other efficiencies of market division
discussed here are, of course, countervailing factors which do account
for manufacturer-imposed territorial divisions in many cases.
The same analysis seems to apply to horizontal groups. The way
for the group as a whole to reduce distribution costs is to divide the
business among themselves by competition. This is true even in a
cartel situation. The scheme disclosed in Addyston Pipe & Steel in-
volved the charging of non-competitive prices to customers, but business
was divided among the cartel members according to an internal bid-
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ding system.Y 5 This system, the cartelists apparently believed, would
allocate the business among their respective plants most efficiently
and thus maximize the profits of the group as a whole.
These considerations suggest that it will be only in rare cases that
either a manufacturer or a horizontal group will find elimination of
duplicative distributive effort to be an efficiency which justifies market
division.
The avoidance of multiple solicitation and consequent customer
annoyance seems a highly speculative ground for market division. The
idea is that customers may be especially irritated if solicited by more
than one seller of the same brand. An answer sometimes given is that
multiple solicitation will stop as soon as the customer makes it known
to the additional representatives that their visits are unwelcome. This
answer seems not wholly satisfactory, however, since the customer may
not single out particular representatives for his annoyance but may
become irked at the company that sends so many representatives to
call upon him. He may also gain an impression of inefficiency in dis-
tribution that may make him suspicious of the company's operations
in general. Perhaps a better answer to the customer-annoyance con-
tention is that irritation is unlikely to become serious if the customer
manages to get better prices from multiple solicitation. This answer
may not be complete either, however. The price savings attained may
not compensate the customer for the time he spends listening. If this
is the case it must mean that the customer himself would not consider
shopping around a worthwhile activity, but that he will, for some
reason, refuse to turn away flatly all but one of the representatives
who call on him. The argument seems to be rather speculative. On
balance, it seems likely to be a rather rare case in which serious ineffi-
ciencies of the sort discussed in this section are created by duplication
of distributive effort.15 6
155. 85 Fed. at 274-76.
156. A tempting analogy which may seem to suggest the efficiency of eliminating over-
lapping distribution is the fully-integrated manufacturer which assigns its salesmen or
owned distributors closed territories. This analogy does suggest that market division
must often create efficiencies, but it does not indicate that the suggested efficiency
under examination here exists. The fully-integrated firm may, for example, wish to
eliminate the problem of the free ride among its salesmen quite as much as does a
contract-integrated firm. A second difficulty is that a fully-integrated firm, being more
aware of retail conditions, may be able to make decisions concerning allocations of
accounts within territories more accurately than a firm that uses independent resellers.
The latter is likely to find it better to let competition among its resellers make the
decisions for it. In fact, the decision whether to employ independent resellers or to Inte-
grate into retailing may turn upon an estimate of whether it is more efficient In the
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Price-Fixing Agreements
Price fixing and market division are, of course, the same gereral
economic phenomenon. Either may be used by cartelists to restrict
output.157 One would, therefore, expect the courts to treat price fi'ting
and market division similarly in all respects. A difference in treatment
is, nevertheless, perceivable in a number of cases. White Motor, Sealy,
Spring-Air, and Sandura, to name only a few of the most recent cases,
all display a greater willingness to contemplate the possible legality of
market division than of price fixing. The apparent anomaly is increased
by the fact that the two forms of elimination of competition also seem
comparable in their capacities for creating efficiency. The efficiencies
which may be achieved by price-fixing agreements include:
1. Optimizing local sales effort: the free-ride problem;
2. Optimizing local sales effort: the uniform product;
3. Reinforcing a market-division system;
4. Providing the means of transferring information;
5. Assisting the achievement of advertising economies of scale;
6. Protecting one party to a joint venture against the fraud of an-
other; and
7. Breaking down reseller cartels and preventing the misuse of local
reseller monopolies.
1. Local Sales Effort: The Free-Ride Problem.
Price fixing can be a method of eliminating free rides in either a
vertical or a horizontal contract integration.Y58 The analysis is very
similar to that already suggested in connection with market division.
circumstances of the particular industry to have the manufacturer or the market organize
the allocation of accounts. There are costs in either method. Another weakness in the
analogy is that the fully-integrated firm may be more vulnerable to customer annoyance
since the customers know that the multiple solicitation is due not to the rivalry of
independent businesses but to the policy of the manufacturer.
157. When competitors with market power agree upon a higher-than.competitive price
they must necessarily restrict output to raise the market price to the agreed level. They
will choose a price that comes as dose as possible to the monopoly solution-that is, a
price which limits output so that industry marginal cost equals industry marginal revenue.
When competitors with market power divide markets each is left with a local monopoly
and is free to restrict its own output to the point where marginal cost equals marginal
revenue. The primary difference between these arrangements is that where the cartelists
have significantly different marginal cost schedules so that no common price is best for
all, price fixing, which requires an agreement upon a common price, may be less stable
than market division which permits each to arrive at its own maximizing solution. Never-
theless, price fixing and market division, where restriction of output is a possibility, are
equally hurtful to consumers.
158. Bowman, supra note 67, and Telser, supra note 74.
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When prices are fixed no purchaser is able to obtain the information
and studies he wants from one seller and then purchases the identical
product from another at a lower price. Each seller is, therefore, free to
engage in the optimal amount of selling effort without fear that another
seller of the same brand will enjoy a free ride at his expense. Where a
reseller's price is maintained, he is forced to engage in other forms of
competition in order to make a competitive return. Market division
permits the seller to use an appropriate amount of local sales effort.
Price fixing forces him to. Market division may be a superior technique
where the appropriate degree of local sales effort varies from market to
market and is best left to the seller's judgment. Price fixing may be
superior where uniformity of sales effort is important or where the
manufacturer believes itself a better judge of selling techniques than
a significant fraction of its resellers. Price fixing is also likely to be pref-
erable to market division in any situation where effective marketing
requires thorough coverage of an area through numerous resellers
rather than use of a single outlet.
2. Local Sales Effort: The Uniform Product.
Price fixing may also be a means of gaining efficiencies of local sales
effort in either a horizontal or vertical system even when the free-ride
problem does not exist. This situation may occur where the consumer
cannot easily obtain sales effort free from one seller and then purchase
the physical product from another. In such cases, the sales effort is
obviously a part of the total product which the consumer purchases.
An example is the provision of services in conjunction with the sale of
gasoline. Some major gasoline refiners have made persistent attempts
to control the prices charged by their service stations15 9 Assuming that
some such refiner attempts are truly vertical, and not the result of
collusion among refiners or service station operators, it is worth asking
whether local sales effort can really be a factor in such an industry, and
why, since free rides are not possible, refiners should need resale price
maintenance to ensure the optimization of sales effort by their outlets.
The local sales effort involved in the retailing of a product like
gasoline is, of course, quite different from the effort involved in selling
trucks or other complicated machinery. Selling effort with respect to
products of the latter type is likely to involve technical training of
159. The courts have regularly outlawed such attempts when accomplished by resale
price maintenance contracts, and recently, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964),
the Supreme Court struck down an attempt to accomplish refiner control of retail prices
through a consignment contract, casting great doubt upon the legality of any means of
vertical control of prices short of ownership and operation of the outlets by the supplier.
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personnel, the provision of information to customers, product modifica-
tion, and so forth. The case for market division and resale price mainte-
nance is more immediately apparent in such situations. But the case
for efficiencies in sales effort ought not to be so narrowly conceived.
Even with respect to such a simply retailed product as gasoline a good
deal of local sales effort goes into merchandizing. In fact, much na-
tional advertising of gasoline stresses the extra services, conveniences,
and courtesies that local retailers provide. The same concern for local
sales effort is shown by the common refiner policy of instructing re-
tailers upon such matters and policing their compliance.c0
Resale price maintenance by a refiner motivates dealers to increase
their sales efforts as the only alternative competitive tactic available to
them after their pricing freedom has been curtailed. Competition
among service stations will, in any event, result in dealers making no
more than a competitive return. When a refiner maintains pump prices
at a level which seems to ensure a greater-than-competitive return,
dealers will bring their returns down to the competitive level once
more by adding more local sales effort to the product they sell. Any
dealer who did not would lose business.
The next question is why the refiner cannot allow individual service
station operators to determine for themselves whether a price or a ser-
vice appeal would be most effective. The answer is twofold. One is that
the refiner may feel that its business and marketing acumen is signifi-
cantly greater than that of the general run of people it can attract to be
service station operators. More important, perhaps, is the fact that a
large part of the refiner's brand appeal rests upon the uniformity of the
product sold by each of its stations. Since gasoline consumers are mobile
they will necessarily patronize many different service stations. A refiner
wishing to appeal to those consumers who value a high degree of sales
effort must establish the uniformity of his product so that consumers
can rely upon getting a particular combination of physical product
and sales effort at any station carrying the brand. The deviation of any
significant number of stations from the product standard will lessen
the effectiveness of the refiner's advertising and reduce the appeal
160. And, in fact, it is observable that many service stations do provide a great
number of services that may be classified as local sales effort: the availability and clean-
liness of washroom facilities; the cleanliness of the station and neatness of attendants; the
geniality with which service is given; the giving of travel directions; the availability of a
range of services for the car (lubrication, tire and battery replacement, and minor repairs):
recognition of credit cards; and the provision, often without being asked, of such free
services as wiping windows, checking the pressure of tires, pumping air into tires, checking
the water in the radiator, etc.
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which uniformity makes in itself.161 The economic efficiency of estab-
lishing product uniformity in this way is very similar to the product
unifor aity gained in the Spring-Air and Sealy systems by controlling
the physical specifications of the bedding products made under trade-
mark licenses. The difference in technique of control is probably at-
tributable to the different composition of the product and the differ-
ent marketing settings. It is far easier to police physical characteristics
by occasional direct observation of the output of some thirty bedding
manufacturers than to police the amount and quality of an intangible
such as sales effort in thousands of service stations.
3. Reinforcing a Market-Division System.
Price fixing seems capable of being used to reinforce a market-
division system. Violation of the territorial limitation may sometimes
be difficult to detect. Suppose, for instance, that a manufacturer in the
Spring-Air system, for one reason or another, sold some mattresses in his
territory at a price significantly below the prevailing price in another
territory. The lower price might be a deliberate violation of the terri-
torial division, the manufacturer realizing that he could induce a re-
seller to invade the neighboring territory by selling to him at prices
low enough to make such arbitrage profitable. It might be very dif-
ficult for the group to show that the invasion took place with the
connivance of the low-selling manufacturer. There might also be
instances of sales at low prices and subsequent resale across territorial
boundaries which were not intended by the manufacturer. Control of
the manufacturers' prices by the group prevents the opportunity for
such arbitrage.162 An agreement of manufacturer members to maintain
161. Each service station typically serves some motorists who are passing through and
will never return and a great many who will purchase gasoline somewhere in that area
again. The refiner wishes all to get the same combination of service and physical product
so that they will continue to patronize stations carrying that brand. The interest of the
individual service station operator is confined to the potential repeaters, for only as to
that segment of consumers can his sales effort operate as a competitive tactic for future
sales. The station operator is, however, unable effectively to separate the two classes of
consumers and discriminate in sales effort against the non-repeater. For one thing, many
of the services he provides--availability of facilities, neatness of the station, etc.-are
indivisible. Others-courtesy, cleaning windshields, etc.-can be segregated, but the oper.
ator cannot usually be certain whether a particular customer is a potential repeater or
not, the effort to discriminate may be more trouble than it is worth, and there is always
the danger of being reported to the refiner. These factors tend to create the uniformity
of product for all consumers which the refiner desires.
162. An alternative method of control would be to require each manufacturer in a
horizontal system or each distributor in a vertical system to exact agreements from its
customers not to sell across territorial lines. This might be more difficult to police, how-
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the resale prices of their retailers could be used to accomplish the same
purpose. Retailers forbidden to advertise or sell at cut prices would find
it more difficult to resell across territorial lines. 63
Price control could reinforce a market-division system which was
itself designed to accomplish certain of the efficiencies earlier mer-
tioned plus a few efficiencies that market division is not capable of
creating. These effects are possible, moreover, whether the price con-
trol is vertical or horizontal, and whether the market division involves
territorialization, customer allocation, or some other criterion of sep-
aration.
It may be worth suggesting a specific way in which price fixing can
cope with the free-ride problem which is not achievable by market
division. National concerns with purchasing offices in more than one
territory may create the free-ride problem by encouraging one member
of a group or one dealer to undertake the task of selling the product,
explaining its features, studying and discussing the purchaser's needs,
perhaps even designing slight modifications, and so forth, and then
going to a different territory and negotiating a large purchase at a
low price which does not reflect any of the expense incurred in the
selling effort. Fixing prices would prevent this type of free ride in a
way that market division could not. It would be possible, of course, to
solve the problem by assigning the purchaser to a single territory or
requiring that the seller reimburse the member or dealer who incurred
the costs of the sales effort. These agreements are equivalent to price
fixing, however, and may be less desirable. The fixing of prices permits
each member or seller to compete for the national purchaser's patron-
age in terms of sales effort and services offered. Fixing prices thus makes
it more likely that the contract integration will succeed in interbrand
competition and also that the business will go to the most efficient
unit within the integration.
4. Providing the Means of Transferring Information.
One reason a fully-integrated manufacturer may dictate the retail
prices to be charged by its owned outlets is the belief that the manu-
facturer has greater information as well as greater competence to make
ever, since it might not be possible to discover quickly and inexpensively which of nu-
merous customers had violated its agreement. It would, moreover, be difficult to prove
the complicity of the manufacturer or distributor even after a number of violations by
various of its customers. A price maintenance plan would solve the question of com-
plicity and would reduce the opportunity for customer cross-selling.
163. There are some indications that an agreement on maintaining retail prices served
to reinforce the manufacturers' market division in the Sealy case. 1964 Trade Cas. t 71,258,
Findings Nos. 248, 253, 255.
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price decisions. The same factors might well lead a contract-integrated
system to engage in price fixing.
This efficiency seems to be the explanation of the price agreements
held per se illegal by the district court in the Nationwide Trailer
Rental System (NTRS) case.164 NTRS was an organization of automo-
bile trailer rental operators engaged in the one-way rental trade. The
system was created to facilitate the exchange of trailers so that persons
renting them for one-way movements did not have to pay the expense
of returning the trailers to the renting operator. Trailers involved in
this one-way trade continued to be owned by the operators who first
put them into the system but would be rented successively by the
various operators into whose hands the chances of the business brought
them. The renting operator divided the rental fee with the operator
who held title to each particular trailer. NTRS was formed to achieve
a number of efficiencies in this previously rather confused and hap-
hazard trade.165
Among other restraints contained in the system, 0  the NTRS Board
164. United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental System, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 800 (D. Kan.
1957), aff'd, 355 U.S. 10 (1954).
165. Prior to the organization of NTRS, persons engaging in the one-way trailer rental
business could not control the rental operators into whose hands their trailers might
come, 156 F. Supp., Finding 8 at 801-02. Low quality trailers were often used in the one-
way trade. Id. at 802, Finding 10. The formation of NTRS tended to regularize the trade
for member operators who could now be sure their trailers did not go to operators with
whom they did not wish to do business. The by-laws of NTRS permitted expulsion of
members if necessary "to preserve the good name and business of the System." Id. at 803,
Finding 15. This suggests that the integration of operators into a system was expected
to create good will for all members, perhaps in a manner analogous to the appeal of
uniform gasoline service stations. NTRS as well as the individual operators may have
engaged in advertising of the system as a whole. NTRS Jurisdictional Statement, p, 8,
355 U.S. 10. In any event, the local sales effort and advertising by each member of the
NTRS name would benefit not only himself but other members of the system into whose
areas customers might go. The efficiencies of NTRS's uniform lease form and suggested
rate schedule are discussed in the text. Unfortunately, neither the district court's find-
ings of fact nor the briefs filed in the Supreme Court focus upon the efficiencies of the
NTRS contract integration.
166. The district court held: the NTRS by-laws which provided that no new member
should be admitted within the city or immediate vicinity of an existing member without
the latter's consent in writing was an agreement for exclusive territories violative of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act (156 F. Supp. at 805); and the power of the NTRS Board of
Directors to expel members when "necessary to keep this System out of legal entangle-
ments or to preserve the good name and business of the System" provided for a boycott
and was per se illegal. Ibid. The decree required NTRS to admit to membership any
applicant, regardless of location, who agreed to meet his financial obligations and main-
tain safety standards. Id. at 807. NTRS contended that this destruction of its ability
to grant exclusive territories would damage the effectiveness of the system: "when the
persons who build up, by advertising and sales effort, a valuable organization must share
that property with every newcomer who applies, it must be obvious that there will be
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of Directors adopted a suggested rate schedule which was circulated
to the member trailer rental firms, and also adopted a uniform lease
agreement for use by members which specified the charge for overtime
use of trailers.167 Since the members were located in different cities
and were not in competition with each other, it is difficult to see how
NTRS' activities relating to prices could have been designed to acieve
an elimination of competition which did not exist.0 8 The purpose of
the schedule and the lease form, therefore, must have been the creation
of efficiency. NTRS in fact stated on appeal that the function of the
suggested schedule was to give information to members:
[I]t was essential to the intelligent conduct of a one-way trailer
business by the numerous small businessmen-filling station oper-
ators and the like who are members of NTRS-that they have an
estimate of what rates would prove profitable and reasonable in
areas to which they send trailers. Without this information it was
impossible for them to bargain intelligently with their custo-
mers.6
The district court, however, held that both the circulation of the
suggested rate and the form lease's inclusion of an overtime rate were
forbidden tamperings with price under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 170
Curiously enough, however, the court did not stick to its rigid applica-
tion of the per se rule, for the decree permitted NTRS to set the
percentage of the rental which each member must pay to the owner
of the trailer in question.' 7 ' This softening perhaps reflects a recog-
nition that there is efficiency in having a uniform percentage so that
members need not attempt to bargain with each other over every
no incentive for further membership or investment in such an organization." NTRS Ju-
risdictional Statement, pp. 8-9, 355 U.S. 10. This is a form of the free-ride argument and
suggests that the market division in the NTRS system was related to efficiencies of local
sales effort. The district court recognized that the boycott it had held illegal per se was
related to efficiency, for its decree not only permitted grants of membership to be condi-
tioned upon agreement to meet financial obligations, and to maintain adequate standards
for the safety of one-way trailers, but the expulsion of members who violated these agree-
ments. 156 F. Supp. at 807. This appears to be a holding that a boycott may be a lawful
restraint when ancillary to a contract integration. It is unfortunate that the district
court did not, and the Supreme Court had no occasion to, explain why a boycott that
created an efficiency of this sort could be lawful while a market division, which created
efficiency of sales effort, and suggested price schedules, which passed information, were
necessarily unlawful.
167. 156 F. Supp. at 804-05.
168. The district court did not indicate that the suggested price schedule was unlawful
only because the division of territories was unlawful. It seemed to treat the two as
independently violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 805.
169. NTRS Jurisdictional Statement, p. 11, 355 U.S. 10.
170. 156 F. Supp. at 805.
171. Id. at 806-907.
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trailer rental in which the renting operator is not also the owner.
It is unfortunate that the court did not explain why it was willing to
recognize this efficiency as justifying price fixing but not the efficiency
claimed by NTRS for its suggested price schedule and its lease form.
The decree provision, nevertheless, seems to constitute a somewhat
oblique precedent for the legality of some price fixing where it is neces-
sary (ancillary) to the efficiency of a contract integration.
5. Economies of Scale in Advertising.
Price fixing may sometimes be essential to the creation of economies
of scale in advertising. This motive seems to have led to a proposed
pooling of cooperative advertising allowances by retail druggists to
pay for joint newspaper advertising. The advertisements were to list
the stores selling products at prices agreed upon by a committee of
participating druggists. In an advisory opinion, a majority of the Federal
Trade Commission decided that the per se rule against price fixing
compelled the conclusion that such joint advertising would be illegal.17 2
The Commission appears to have misperceived the issue, for much
of the opinion concerned itself with the undesirability of relaxing the
per se concept to allow small businessmen to compete more effectively
with larger competitors. 173 Such a relaxation of the per se rule would
of course be an improper introduction of a pro-small business strain
into section 1 of the Sherman Act. The issue that should have been
discussed is whether the per se concept had any relevance if the agree-
ment on prices of the advertised goods contributed to efficiency. The
presence of such efficiency seems to be assumed in the Commission's
reasoning that joint advertising would increase the ability of the small
druggists to compete. The agreement on prices appears ancillary to
the joint advertising since such advertising usually makes price a
prominent feature and the participating druggists would have to sell
at the price stated. The only remaining questions bearing on legality
should have been the market power of the cooperating group and the
motives of the participants.
There are undoubtedly numerous instances in which an agreement
on prices would contribute to the attainment of economies of scale
in advertising. Perhaps the agreement of the mattress manufacturers
in Sealy upon the prices they would require their respective retailers
to maintain was keyed to the efficiency of national or regional advertis-
ing in the same way the proposed agreement of the retail druggists
172. BNA, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 91, April 9, 1963, p. x-1.
173. Ibid. See particularly the statements of Commissioners Anderson and Higgin-
botham.
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seems to have been keyed to newspaper advertising.17 4 The Scaly
agreement, however, was also invalidated by the currently prevailing
view that all price fixing is per se unlawful.ra Since the disrrict court
upheld the territorial market division of the manufacturers, t is diffi-
cult to see what policy is served by refusing to permit the agreement r"
the noncompeting manufacturers to require uniform resale prices on
the brand of mattress they sell in common. A variety of other instances
in which price fixing is essential to advertising efficiency is easily
imaginable, e.g., the fixing of prices on food items in franchised drive-
in operations, and the fixing by individual manufacturers of retail
prices of nationally advertised consumer goods. The current state of
the law, however, has decreased the chance of creating such efficiency
by forcing many suppliers to employ suggested rather than fixed prices.
6. Protection Against Fraud by a Joint Venturer.
Price fixing as a means of protecting oneself against the possibility of
fraud by a joint venturer does not eliminate any price competition that
might otherwise exist. In such cases the power to fix prices has already
been placed in one party's hands by the basic contract integration and
the explicit provision that prices shall be fixed in a certain way merely
makes certain that the party with control does not appropriate part of
the value of the other party's products to himself.
This sort of price fixing was upheld by the district court in United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.170 The government there challenged
under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and amended section 7 of
the Clayton Act agreements by which Screen Gems, Inc., a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Columbia Pictures, was granted by Universal
Pictures Company, Inc., a fourteen-year exclusive license to distribute
for television exhibition approximately six hundred Universal feature
films produced before August 1, 1948 for theatre exhibition. Columbia
guaranteed Screen Gems' performance of all its obligations under the
agreements and that Screen Gems would continue to be the exclusive
licensee for television of substantially all of Columbia's pre-August 1,
174. See 1964 Trade Gas. 71,258, Findings 126, 127, 192, 224, 252, 257, 261,
264, 266, 277, all of which suggest a relationship between the manufacturer's agreement
to maintain retail prices and the efficacy of national or regional advertising. The main-
tenance of retail prices may also have been a device to reinforce the market division
among the manufacturers. See note 163 supra. Unfortunately for present purposes, the
district court, bound by the strict per se rule against resale price fixing in the absence
of Fair Trade statutes and the rule against agreements between manufacturers to use -air
Trade laws, did not analyze the efficiencies which might derive from such agreements in
a contract-integrated system such as Sealy's.
175. 1964 Trade Gas. 71,258 at 80,107.
176. 189 F. Supp. 153 (SMD.N.Y. 1960).
196o"]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
1948 feature films. The government contended the agreements were
per se illegal because they included provisions for the advance classifi-
cation of each Columbia and Universal pre-August 1, 1948 feature
into cattgories of comparable quality and provided that Universal
features should not be sublicensed by Screen Gems for less than Colum-
bia features of comparable quality.177
Defendants' evidence convinced the court that the main purpose of
their arrangement was the creation of efficiency. Universal had a
library of pre-August 1, 1948 feature films which it considered to be
of real value for television exhibition but it had never engaged in that
form of distribution. Its existing distributive organization and facili-
ties were geared to theatre exhibition, and distribution to television
stations (including the techniques of promotion, advertising, purchase
and sale) was so completely different that the same organization and
facilities could not be used.178 Universal apparently did not wish to
undertake the expenditures and risks that the creation of such an
organization would entail. 79 Though the court did not mention the
point, it seems quite possible that a factor in Universal's decision was
that it did not have enough of a feature film inventory to justify a
distributive organization within the most efficient size range. The solu-
tion to this problem of course would be for Universal either to enter
the distribution business and seek licenses to distribute other produ-
cers' films or turn its films over to a firm already engaged in distribu-
tion. Universal chose the latter course. The opinion did state that
Screen Gems was seeking additional films to distribute because it
required a certain volume of film sublicensing to operate its organiza-
tion profitably. 80 This evidence tends to substantiate the idea that
177. Id. at 161. The government's per se approach was indicated by the court's phras-
ing of the "broad issue" posed as "whether in the face of the fact that the parties did
not have the motive, purpose or intent to fix prices, and without proof by plaintiff of
any effect of the Distribution Agreement in the market place, the Court can hold the
Distribution Agreement to be illegal on its face as a price fixing arrangement such as is
condemned per se by the Sherman Act." Id. at 160.
178. Id. at 166-67.
179. Id. at 171, Finding no. 39.
180. Hanft, vice president and treasurer of Screen Gems, testified to the marketing
activities involved, and also of Screen Gems' efforts to acquire films and programs to
distribute: "We do this because we have a fixed nut. We have an overhead. We have an
operation to run, and the more film we can run through that operation the lower will
be the cost of distribution on a percentage basis. That means that our profits will increase
if we can reduce our cost of distribution.
"At the same time that means that we can support and maintain the relatively large
independent organization that we have, and hopefully throw off some profits for the
stockholders." Id. at 168.
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the purpose of this contract integration of Universal's and Columbia's
operations was to achieve economies of scale.
This joint selling agency necessarily eliminated competition between
the Universal and Columbia films involved. Why then was there an
explicit agreement which had the same effect? The classification of
films and the no-discrimination provision operated as safeguards for
Universal in dealing with a Columbia subsidiary.18' Without them
it would have been possible for Screen Gems to defraud Universal
by offering sub-licensees Universal films at lower rates if they took
Columbia films at correspondingly higher rates. The cost to the tele-
vision stations would have been the same but profits would have been
shifted from Universal to Columbia. The classification of films appar-
ently served the additional function of facilitating the division of
receipts when Universal and Columbia films were sublicensed together.
Classification in advance saved disputes afterwards. -82 Provisions of
these types were common in analogous situations in the distribution
of films for theatre exhibition. 8 3 The evidence on these points con-
vinced the court that "Each of the provisions of the contract had lawful
business objectives and was not included for the purpose of fixing
prices."' 84 Indeed the government had stipulated as much. 8 There
would seem, of course, to be a certain awkwardness in finding that
provisions were not intended to fix prices when that was precisely
their purpose, but it is clear enough what the court meant: the pro-
visions were not intended to affect general market prices. 80
The court employed the doctrine of ancillary restraints to legitimate
the specific provisions of the agreements attacked by the government
as violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 87 The court thus handled
the case before it skillfully but did not articulate a general theory of
what might constitute that "legitimate primary purpose" which justi-
181. Id. at 173-76, Findings 67-98.
182. Id. at 180.
183. Id. at 169-70, Findings 22-28.
184. Id. at 174, Finding 70.
185. Id. at 166.
186. The only remaining question would be whether the size in the relevant market
of Universal and Columbia, as well as any other producers whose products were distrib-
uted by Screen Gems, was such that the elimination of competition between them should
have been held illegal as too likely to affect general market prices. The court saw and
faced this problem, too, finding that the agreements had had no effect upon either the
price of Columbia or Universal feature films or the general market price for such films.
This lack of effect was due, the court said, to several factors, including Screen Gems' rela-
tively small portion of the market. Id. at 177-78, Finding 112; Id. at 194-203.
187. Id. at 178-79.
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fies restraints undertaken by parties lacking monopoly power. Never-
theless, such a general theory seems implicit in the court's handling
of the specific case, for it upheld the Universal-Columbia arrangement
and its subordinate price-fixing arrangements upon an analysis of the
efficiencies they created.
7. Breaking Down Cartels and Controlling Local Monopolies.
Resale price fixing may be employed by a manufacturer to break down
reseller cartels or to control the behavior of a local reseller monopolist.
An example of price fixing as an anti-cartel weapon is provided by the
Kiefer-Stewart case.188 There, two commonly owned liquor manufac-
turers, Seagram and Calvert, agreed to sell only to those Indiana whole-
salers who would not resell above stipulated maximum prices. In
response to a price-fixing charge by a wholesaler plaintiff the manu-
facturers offered the defense that their price fixing was intended to
counteract a wholesaler cartel that had set minimum prices. The
Supreme Court held this defense invalid. This holding makes sense
only upon the assumption that Seagram and Calvert were separate
companies which could not legally coordinate their pricing policies.1 19
The Court might consider it too dangerous to permit manufacturers
to agree on resale prices in order to break down a resellers' cartel since
the opportunity for the manufacturers to agree upon their own prices
would be too great. But the Kiefer-Stewart rationale appears to make
little sense when applied to the action of a single manufacturer. It has
been argued that individual manufacturer use of resale price fixing
should be lawful. The Kiefer-Stewart case merely demonstrates another
efficiency such a restraint may provide. If a manufacturer knows, or
suspects but cannot prove, that resellers have cartelized, the manufac-
turer can provide a powerful incentive for resellers to defect from the
cartel by refusing to sell to those that comply with the cartel's price
agreement. Maximum resale price fixing accomplishes that purpose.
Because there is no danger of a restriction of output but rather the
likelihood of an increase, the law should welcome the vertical restraint.
Maximum resale price fixing may also be a means by which a manu-
facturer controls the misuse of a reseller's local monopoly. This situa-
tion may arise where both the manufacturer and the reseller possess
market power. The situation is then similar to that of bilateral mo-
nopolies, analyzed in connection with the contract between the railroad
188. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
189. Id. at 215. The holding that Seagram and Calvert were capable of conspiring
within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act is highly debatable also. That point
need not be discussed here, however.
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and the sleeping car company.190 The manufacturer may wish to fix
maximum resale prices to insure that the reseller does not, in its inde-
pendent interest, restrict output further than is in their collective
interest. This use of resale price fixing, too, is beneficial to consumers.
ALTERNATIVES AND OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
OF ANCILLARY RETRAmNTs
The literature and discussion concerning market-division cases ha.e
developed certain points which require brief discussion here. Some
of these points are suggested alternatives to the device of market divi-
sion. The thought behind them appears to reflect a recognition that
valid business needs may be served by market division but that there
may be alternative methods of meeting those needs which do not so
completely eliminate competition between the firms concerned. Others
of the points may be described as objections to market division in all
or some circumstances. Similar alternatives and objections would no
doubt be raised with respect to any proposal to legalize some price-
fixing agreements. These points are discussed last so that their relation-
ship to the total doctrine of ancillary restraints may be better perceived.
The Alternative Suggestions
In his White Motor concurrence Justice Brennan expressed a com-
mon view when he suggested that the legality of closed territories
might turn upon "the availability of less restrictive alternatives."''
He suggested not only that the severity of the sanctions which the
manufacturer imposed-upon resellers might be relevant to legality,""-'
but also:
[I]t may appear at the trial that whatever legitimate business
needs White advances for territorial limitations could be ade-
quately served, with less damage to competition, through other
devices-for example, an exclusive franchise, an assignment of
areas of primary responsibility to each distributor, or a revision
of the levels of profit pass-over so as to minimize the deterrence
to cross-selling by neighboring dealers where competition is
feasible. 93
Although the recognition that market division may create efficiencies
is a step forward, an examination of the proposed alternative solutions
indicates that they are half-way houses, neither removing the danger of
190. See text accompanying notes 58-66 supra.
191. 372 U.S. at 271.
192. Id. at 270.
193. Id. at 271-72.
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restricted output, in situations where that danger is present, nor in
many cases adequately creating the full range of efficiencies called for.
Exclusive franchises, profit pass-overs, and areas of primary responsi-
bility, for one thing, focus entirely upon the range of problems to
which vertical territorial division is addressed. They are thus of no
assistance whatever when efficiencies are best created by horizontal
market division, vertical customer allocation, or any form of price
fixing. Even within the spectrum of efficiencies which they purport
to achieve, these solutions will often be inadequate or even irrelevant.
The Inadequacy of Exclusive Franchises and Profit Pass-Over Systems.
A manufacturer gives an exclusive franchise by appointing a re-
seller within a designated territory and agreeing to sell to no other
reseller having a place of business located within that territory. The
franchise often designates the franchisee's business address. Resellers
remain free, however, to sell across territorial lines. A profit pass-over
system modifies such an arrangement by requiring that a cross-selling
franchisee give all or a part of its profits on a sale across a territorial line
to the franchisee in whose territory the sale is made. The only differ-
ence between exclusive franchises or profit pass-overs and closed terri-
tories is the sharpness with which the edges of the territories are defined.
Exclusive franchises rely upon costs of doing business at a distance to
prevent complete overlapping of reseller sales efforts. Profit pass-overs
are a technique for further decreasing the profitability of cross-selling.
Both arrangements, therefore, are forms of territorial division.""4 In
many cases closed territories will be more efficient than either of the
other forms of division. Closed territories permit a manufacturer to place
resellers closer together, thus achieving more intensive coverage of the
market while still solving the free ride and other problems to which
market division is addressed. Closed territories, moreover, solve such
additional problems as that of post-sale service which may arise when
the customer is free to purchase where he chooses. To permit exclusive
franchises and profit pass-overs but not closed territories seems an
irrational compromise between a per se rule and a rule permitting
ancillary market-division agreements.
When an agreement meets the general conditions for a lawful hori-
194. It seems odd at this late date to hear it suggested that courts should judge
market divisions according to the reasonableness of the degree to which they inhibit
competition between two sellers. This is equivalent to judging the legality of price.
fixing agreements by the "reasonableness" of the price set. That criterion was firmly
rejected in such cases as Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, Addyston Pipe & steel, Standard
Oil, and American Tobacco by the judges who established the main tradition of the
rule of reason. See 74 YALE L.J. 775, 785-92, 796-97, 801-05, 829-32 (1905).
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zontal or vertical restraint which have been discussed in this article
there is no danger of restriction of output. The difference between
closed territories, exclusive franchises, and profit pass-overs is then
only a difference of efficiency-creating potential in different business
circumstances. The choice between forms of market division, as well
as between market division and the other restraints discussed, should
then be left to the interested parties who, presumably, are likely to
estimate their needs correctly more often than either courts or govern-
ment attorneys.
The Fallacy of Area-of-Primary-Responsibility Clauses.
The government's response to manufacturers' insistence on the need
for market division among their resellers has, on occasion, been to
permit the use in reseller contracts of "area-of-primary-responsibility"
clauses.195 Such clauses allow manufacturers to insist upon intensive
coverage of areas assigned to resellers but not to confine the resellers to
their assigned territories. If a reseller concentrated on sales elsewhere to
the detriment of adequate coverage in his area of primary responsi-
bility, a manufacturer would presumably be justified in terminating
the reseller's contract or otherwise disciplining him.
It should now be apparent, however, that the area-of-primary-respon-
sibility solution is inadequate. For one thing, such clauses are not
permissible in horizontal contract integrations. Even in a vertical
system, however, such clauses do not meet the manufacturer's needs.
Since such clauses permit dealers to sell anywhere, they cannot be
used to encourage exchanges of information, to minimize the costs
of providing post-sales service and the risks of customer dissatisfaction
with such service, or to prevent the overlapping use of a service whose
cost is shared. Only the elimination of competition between the re-
sellers can accomplish those purposes and the area-of-primary-responsi-
bility concept was devised precisely to avoid the elimination of such
competition.
Such clauses do, however, permit the manufacturer to demand of
the dealer the amount of local sales effort which the manufacturer
considers optimum. The area-of-primary-responsibility concept may
be addressed, therefore, to the first two efficiencies discussed earlier:
achieving optimal reseller sales effort by solving the free-ride and size-
of-the-market problems. The difficulty is that area-of-primary-responsi-
bility clauses are a far less effective solution than market division. Market
195. The first consent decree to permit "area-of-primary-responsibility" clauses was,
apparently, entered in United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. t 6S,409 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
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division cures these problems automatically by making the reseller's
interest in local sales effort coextensive with the manufacturer's interest.
The area-of-primary-responsibility clause, on the other hand, permits
selling across territorial lines and thereby makes it less profitable for
resellers to engage in local sales effort. The resellers' interests then
diverge from the manufacturer's. The manufacturer must, therefore,
know what degree of local sales effort is optimal in each reseller's
territory and must assiduously police each reseller to see that he
expends, against his own interest, the effort desired. This solution is
obviously not satisfactory.
It would be extraordinarily costly for the manufacturer to learn
at first hand the real sales potential of every dealer's area and just
how and where each dealer's sales effort should be expended. Since the
dealer who is required to undertake unremunerative tasks can hardly
be relied upon to identify all such tasks so that they may be imposed
upon him, the manufacturer will have to integrate partially into
the dealer level to make the survey the dealer is not motivated to make.
This survey, moreover, cannot be made once for all time. Changes in
population, income, tastes, products, and other factors will continually
alter sales potential. The manufacturer will, therefore, have to be in as
constant contact with local markets as all of his dealers combined.
This procedure is probably so costly in most cases that the manufac-
turer will not do the job completely. Instead, he will rely upon inaccu-
rate indicia such as whether the dealer comes up to the dealer average
in sales to areas containing similar populations. The use of an average,
however, is inefficient not merely because all dealers will have an
incentive to cultivate less intensively than the manufacturer would
prefer (thus depressing the average), but because the use of an average
will require too much of dealers in territories that have less than
average potential and will require too little of dealers in areas whose
potential is greater than average. Market division, which gives each
dealer the incentive to cultivate his area as intensively as is worth-
while from the point of view of both the dealer and the manufacturer,
eliminates all the extra costs and inaccuracies of an attempt to enforce
an area-of-primary-responsibility clause.
Even if one assumed that the manufacturer could reliably enforce
such a clause to exploit the potentialities of all local markets and that
he would find it worthwhile to do so, the added costs are necessarily
a waste of resources -from the consumers' point of view. In addition,
the dealers, who would be required to perform a number of unprofit-
able tasks, would have to be remunerated. That is, if we assume, as we
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must, that before the enforcement of an area-of-primary-responsibility
clause dealers were making a competitive return, the imposition of
additional costs would drop their return below the competitive rate.
Their obvious response would be to sell less at higher prices. If the
manufacturer insisted that they not sell less, he would gradually lose
dealers and would find it impossible to recruit new ones. By adding to
dealer costs as well as his own costs, therefore, the manufacturer would
make a restriction of output inevitable.
These considerations demonstrate that area-of-primary-responsibility
clauses are hopelessly inadequate substitutes for market-division agree-
ments.
The Objections: Three False Issues
A common objection to the doctrine of ancillary restraints has been
that it is possible to call any restraint of trade "ancillary."I", That
objection is valid, however, only if ancillary is taken to mean no more
than "accompanying." This article has attempted to demonstrate that
"ancillary" may be used as a term of art to denote a restraint which
not only accompanies a contract integration but which contributes to
its efficiency.
196. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), appellant at-
tempted to justify a world-wide system of market division and price fixing on antifriction
bearings on the ground that they were ancillary to a joint venture between itself and an
English businessman. The facts of the case suggested that the restraints came prior to the
"joint venture" so that their ancillarity was, in any event, highly dubious. Justice Black's
opinion for the Court, however, cast doubt upon the whole idea of ancillary restraints:
We cannot accept the "joint venture" contention. That the trade restraints were
merely incidental to an otherwise legitimate "joint venture" is, to say the least,
doubtful. The District Court found that the dominant purpose of the restrictive agree-
ments into which appellant, British Timlen and French Timken entered was to avoid
all competition either among themselves or with others. Regardless of this, however,
appellant's argument must be rejected. Our prior decisions plainly establish that
agreements providing for an aggregation of trade restraints such as those existing in
this case are illegal under the AcL. ... Nor do we find any support in reason or au-
thority for the proposition that agreements between legally separate persons and
companies to suppress competition among themselves and others can be justified by
labeling the project a "joint venture." Perhaps every agreement and combination to
restrain trade could be so labeled.
Id. at 597-98.
From the facts given the agreements should have been illegal, under the analysis of
this article, because of the parties' intent and market power. Justice Black's comments,
however, seem to suggest that there can never be a valid ancillary restraint. Perhaps he
should not be read this way since he next rejected the defense that the restraints were
ancillary to trademark licenses on the ground that the licenses were secondary to the
main purpose of dividing markets and that the restraints covered products not bearing
the name "Timken." Id. at 598-99. His rejection of the defense on these grounds seems to
imply that the defense of ancillarity under other circumstances might be available.
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Three other objections, however, require brief discussion: (1) It
would be improper or unfair to permit a manufacturer partially inte-
grated into distribution to impose restraints upon the competitive
activities of its independent resellers (this may be called the dual dis-
tribution objection); (2) judging the legality of ancillary restraints
requires a difficult or impossible balancing of the effects upon inter-
brand and intrabrand competition; and (3) ancillary restraints deny
consumers the choice between sales effort or other activities and a
lower price.
The Dual Distribution Objection.
Dual distribution, a subject much bruited in current antitrust litera-
ture, has been a topic of concern to the Sherman Act for years.
The analysis contained in this article, however, suggests that dual dis-
tribution should be of no concern to the antitrust laws and particularly
not in the field of vertical restraints.
The economic theory which underlies concern over dual distribution
is that in some situations a firm operating at two levels of an industry
might use its strong position at one level to protect its possibly weaker
position at another. This theory has led the Supreme Court to contra-
dictory conclusions. For example, in the 1926 General Electric case
the court permitted a patentee to insert a price-control provision in a
license on the theory that the patentee was entitled to protect its own
manufacturing of the patented item from the competition of the
licensee-manufacturer. 10 7 The same economic motivation was assumed
and disapproved in McKesson & Robbins'08 which held it illegal for a
dual distributing manufacturer to control the prices of its independent
resellers even through the use of state Fair Trade statutes. The theory
was that such restraints did not fall within the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire exemptions from the Sherman Act because the restraints were
the same as horizontal price agreements at the reseller level.
The same theory seems inherent in Justice Brennan's comments on
White Motor's use of customer allocation clauses to prevent its resellers
from competing with it on sales to certain classes of customers. Justice
Brennan remarked that White's justification for dividing markets in
retailing between itself and its resellers-"the only sure way to make
certain something really important is done right, is to do it for oneself"
-proved too much. He said that if the resellers could not be counted
on to solicit and service certain accounts adequately, the only solution
197. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
198. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
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might be the elimination of all independent resellers through complete
vertical integration.
But that White is unwilling or unable to do. Instead, it seeks
the best of both worlds-to retain a distribution system for the
general run of its customers, while skimming off the cream of the
trade for its own direct sales. That, it seems to me, the antitrust
laws would not permit... if in fact the distributors could compete
for the reserved accounts without the restrictions. 109
It is not entirely clear whether Justice Brennan's primary concern was
one of restriction of output on the retailing level or of unfairness to the
independent resellers who were precluded from the cream of the trade.
The analysis of vertical restraints contained in this article suggests,
however, that the premise concerning economic motivation which
underlies these diverse legal conclusions is invalid. A rational firm has
no reason to protect its weaker retailing position by imposing restraints
upon its independent resellers since that would decrease the firm's net
revenues.20 0 Unfairness to the retailing competitors is not possible
either since the manufacturer that wants to attract and keep resellers
will have to allow them to make a competitive return. An inde-
pendent reseller's failure to survive in competition with the owned
outlets of a dual distributing manufacturer can come about only be-
cause in that case vertical ownership integration has proved more
efficient than vertical contract integration. Harm resulting from
superior efficiency is precisely the sort which the Sherman Act should
not attempt to prevent.
The same analysis applies to the placing of restrictions upon a
licensee's competition by a patent monopolist who also manufactures
the patented product. The patentee-licensee relationship is, to the
degree the patent confers an advantage, the same as the manufacturer-
reseller relationship. No rational owner of a valuable patent would use
price control in its licenses to protect its own manufacturing operations
since his net revenue would decrease. Just as in any other vertical inte-
gration, overall net returns are maximized by maximizing net returns
at each level independently.201 This analysis indicates that General
Electric and McKesson & Robbins came to opposite legal conclusions
on the same economic reasoning and that the reasoning was fallacious
in both cases. It indicates also that Justice Brennan's suggestion that
White Motor should not be permitted to get "the best of both worlds"
199. 372 U.S. at 274.
200. See pages 397-405 supra.
201. See Bork, supra note 54, at 195-96.
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is incorrect. Getting the best of both the world of contract integration
and ownership integration is precisely what the antitrust laws should
permit, since it means achieving maximum efficiency and thus increas-
ing consumer wealth.
Interbrand Versus Intrabrand Competition
It has become common in market-division cases to pose the. issue
as a choice between interbrand and intrabrand competition. The
same issue could as well be seen as central to efficiency-creating price-
fixing cases. When the issue is so phrased, the legality of a particular
agreement which eliminates competition is thought to depend upon the
comparative importance of the interbrand competition which is intensi-
fied and the intrabrand competition which is eliminated.
The difficulty with the interbrand-versus-intrabrand formulation of
the issue in elimination of competition cases is twofold. The first is
that such a formulation leads courts to make judgments that are not
properly their business. The ancillary market-division and price-fixing
agreements whose legality is proposed in this article usually involve a
decrease in intrabrand competition but never involve the likelihood of
restriction of output. This means that the parties to each such agree-
ment are motivated by a desire for increased efficiency. The parties,
therefore, have already weighed any losses in efficiency due to the sup-
pression of intrabrand competition and found them more than balanced
by gains in other efficiencies. The impropriety of using the Sherman
Act as a license for courts to second-guess business judgments about
degrees of efficiency where restriction of output is not a danger has
already been discussed.20 3 The second difficulty with the interbrand-
intrabrand formula is that it introduces an inconsistency between the
law relating to contract integration and the law relating to ownership
integration. Ownership integration, whether created by merger or
growth, has usually been judged under the Sherman Act by its market
size. Where the integration was below the size which created monopoly
power courts never went on to ask whether dissolving the presumably
efficient firm would not increase intrabrand competition. In economic
analysis, a contract integration is as much a firm as an ownership inte-
gration.20 4 The nature of the standards applied to them through the
Sherman Act should be the same.
202. Sandura Co. v. FTC, supra note 115, at 853-59. Brief for Appellee, p. 31. White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
203. See page 404 infra.
204. See Coase, supra note 29.
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The misleading interbrand-intrabrand formula should be aban-
doned. The criteria of efficiency and restriction of output are superior
because they confine decision-making to subjects relevant to the policy
of the Sherman Act and because their use makes the law of similar
phenomena, contract and ownership integration, consistent.
Consumer Choice Between Lower Prices and Alternative Inducements.
The contention that consumers rather than producers should deter-
mine whether lower prices or other inducements are offered205 con-
stitutes a fundamental misperception of the issue. In the case of all
ancillary restraints whose legality is proposed here, consumers do make
that determination. The decision whether to employ increased sales
effort, offer more post-sale service, and so forth, is the same as the de-
cision whether to incur any other costs. The company or group of co-
operating companies will attempt to combine expenditures on supplies,
machinery, labor, management, advertising, servicing, etc., to arrive at
a final package at a price which will prove most profitable. Profitability
depends upon favorable consumer response. In a horizontal case, where
a group lawfully employing an ancillary restraint is necessarily faced by
competitors, the preference of any significant number of consumers for
lower prices instead of sales effort or post-sale service, for example, will
evoke a response from some producers. In a vertical case the same thing
will occur. Where the manufacturer is a monopolist in a vertical case,
it may offer different lines of products to attempt most effectively to
comply with the preferences of different segments of the market. One
line might rely upon heavy sales effort while another might have pri-
marily a price appeal. Where such diversity is not feasible the prefer-
ence of the majority of consumers will control. In each of the instances
where the legality of an ancillary restraint is proposed, consumer choice
is as effective as it would be in the corresponding ownership integration
situations. Indeed, where contract integration is involved, an ancillary
restraint will often be essential to give consumers a choice. But for the
restraint, the free ride and other problems discussed would prevent the
contract-integrated system from offering the level of sales effort, servic-
ing and other activities which consumers might prefer.
SuIMiARY
Courts have always recognized that some restraints upon rivalry are
essential to the full efficiency of both ownership and contract integra-
tions. The difficulty has been, and remains, the reconciliation of the
205. Brief for United States, pp. 24, 26, White Motor, supra note 200.
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competing values of permitting efficiency and preventing restriction of
output. This reconciliation has been unnecessarily delayed by a ten-
dency to oversimplify economic phenomena, to carry over rules of per se
illegality, proper in the cartel contexts in which they evolved, to situa-
tions in which restriction of output was patently neither intended nor
effected. This misuse of the per se concept destroys efficiency and hence
misallocates resources. The overextension of the per se concept by the
courts thus has the same sort of effect upon consumers as do cartel agree-
ments.
Some of the recent cases discussed here exhibit a hopeful tendency
on the part of the Supreme Court and some lower courts to recognize
the efficiency-creating potential of certain market-division agreements.
There are as yet few indications of a recognition of the same potential
in the parallel category of price-fixing agreements. Perhaps more ra-
tional doctrine will evolve from a realization that market division and
price fixing are not only very like each other but are merely members of
a larger family of agreements that eliminate rivalry between persons or
firms. Since some restraints upon rivalry are indispensable to efficiency,
there is no d priori reason why some market division and price fixing
should not share in this beneficial characteristic of the larger class
to which they belong. The doctrine of ancillary restraints formulated
here offers the means of making the necessary distinction between
beneficial and injurious market division and price fixing.
To recapitulate, a horizontal market-division or price-fixing agree-
ment should be lawful when four conditions are met: (1) the agree-
ment accompanies a contract integration (the coordination of other
productive or distributive efforts of the parties); (2) the agreement is
ancillary to the contract integration (capable of increasing the integra-
tion's efficiency and no broader than required for that purpose); (3) the
aggregate market share of the parties does not make restriction of out-
put a realistic threat; and (4) the parties have not demonstrated that
their primary purpose was the restriction of output. If either of the
first two conditions is not met, the agreement is properly classified as
illegal per se. The remaining two conditions embody the other existing
criteria of the modem rule of reason as enunciated by Chief Justice
White.
When a horizontal group agrees to employ vertical restraints (e.g.,
the agreement of the mattress manufacturers in the Sealy system to
maintain the resale prices of their products) the legality of the vertical
restraints should be judged by whether the horizontal agreement meets
the four conditions above.200
205. Horizontal contract integration at the manufacturers' level removes the case from
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The use by an individual firm of vertical market-division or price-
fixing agreements should be lawful in all cases. To qualify as vertical
the agreements must not arise from an agreement among the firms
imposing the restraints and must not have been coerced by a resellers'
cartel.2 07
the per se category appropriate where manufacturers who have not integrated any other
activities agree to employ resale price maintenance. In the latter case there seems no
explanation for the agreement other than that resale price maintenance is being used to
police a manufacturers' cartel. See pages 411-15 supra. The situation discussed in note 80
supra, may present another example of horizontal agreement to use vertical restraints
which may be ancillary to a contract integration.
207. The rule for vertical restraints employs Chief Justice White's rule of reason also.
The economic analysis of such restraints, however, indicates that they are always ancillary
and will never be instituted with either the intent or the effect of restricting output.
See pages 397-405 supra.
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